

WORM IN THE APPLE

7 AUGUST, 2022 | GERMAN TRAITORS AND OTHER INFLUENCES THAT PUSHED THE WORLD INTO WAR

The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany; Friedrich Lenz.

Worm in the Apple

German Traitors and Other Influences
That Pushed the World Into War:

**The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf
Hitler's Germany**

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All illustrations were added by **The Scriptorium**.

Dedicated to all

*who were or are unconditionally willing to give their life for
Germany.*

Friedrich Lenz

A note to our readers: this work, originally published in German in 1952, is a polemic written for the people, not a scholarly study for research purposes; in the interests of readability the author attempted quite deliberately to keep footnoting and other scholarly conventions to a minimum. As a result, however, there are a good number of quotations whose source is not clearly stated. From the perspective of documentation this is unfortunate. We shall attempt to fill in some of the gaps in the documentation; in the meantime, Lenz's arguments stand quite well on their own merits.

Edit: for readers who are conversant in French: **this French translation of Lenz's booklet** contains many of the additional sources!

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1. Preface

July 20, 1944 has gone down in history as a day of great significance. But nothing would be more wrong than to accord the events of this single day a historical importance out of proportion to their strictly symbolic significance. The events in question represent but *one* act of the great tragedy of German history from 1933 to 1945.

"How much longer will it take? When will thunder and lightning finally strike?" fretted the co-conspirators of H. B. Gisevius, one of the foremost participants of July 20. Now they had it, that lightning bolt that was to strike Hitler down, free Germany of a 'monster' and all its woes and bring them to power, as well as the thunderclap which, however, while dealing Germany the final blow, cost many of them their lives as well.

But the 'lightning bolt' had flashed too briefly for the German people to discern the real background and consequences of this act. The truth itself took years to surface from among the tangle of propaganda lies. Only now has it become possible to extract some coherence from the jumble of all the publications that have come out in recent years.

It is the purpose of this booklet to show the broad masses of our nation, who have neither the opportunity nor the time for historical research of their own, the true backdrop of this act as succinctly as possible, so that they will be in a position, in the interests of Germany's future, to draw the necessary political conclusions. The people need to know who concocted the storm of which that thunder and lightning was part, and why it brought about Germany's misfortune.

The urgent need for education on this point is proven by the fact that only recently two persons holding positions of great state responsibility made comments which evinced not only a considerable lack of objectivity, but an even greater lack of historical awareness. Clarification is especially important also because we are presently faced with decisions of momentous significance, and are to be led to board the wrong train of fate, whose destination signs have been falsified by persons both

malicious and incompetent, so that we cannot help but be misled.



Goerdeler

I am aware that my opinion contrasts sharply with those who are currently popular. Nevertheless I claim for my motivations exactly that maxim expressed by Karl Goerdeler, one of the leaders of the Resistance: "Despite the smoke screen of propaganda, the German people must be told the truth, and nothing but the truth." I have written in a way that everyone can understand. I deliberately quoted a great deal from political writings and as little as possible from National Socialist texts.

I have not written for the deceased Hitler, but rather for that Germany that voted for him and gave him its support time and again, for that Germany that now bears, and is supposed to continue to bear, the consequences of a completely false assessment of its and our intentions. The way in which Hitler himself is regarded will change with time, as surely as the view taken of Napoleon has changed. Nobody in all the world will be able to prevent that. It will turn out that the path of truth cannot be barred. To quote Houston Stewart Chamberlain: "In actual fact, truth stands radiant and undisguised, only the veil before our eyes obscures it. We only need to brush away the haze, then we see the truth, and the madness vanishes."

But anyone who has seen the truth will draw the necessary conclusions and no longer board the wrong train. May their numbers be great, for the good of Germany! In closing I will quote a well-known member of the 'Resistance': "In time, the position which our sorely afflicted, beloved Germany will take with respect to the actions of the unlawfuls will be of decisive importance to the view the world will take of her."

Friedrich Lenz

Heidelberg, November 9, 1952



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2. Overview

"The Germans are their own worst enemy."

Tacitus

The cornerstone for July 20, 1944 and for all the acts associated with it was laid the day that 'leading' persons realized that Hitler would become Chancellor of the Reich.

These gentlemen would dearly have liked to prevent his 'seizure of power' by 'lawful' means, but no matter how they racked their brains — it could not be done,



Hitler & Hindenburg

for all suggestions to the point foundered not only on the wording of the Constitution itself, but also on Hindenburg's loyalty to this Constitution and most of all on the mood prevailing among the people.

Hitler had achieved what he had resolved on as private first class, and had sworn to in the Leipzig Supreme Court: he had gained the leadership of his people — *legally*, albeit in the opinion of his enemies only because his electors were not nearly as smart as they.¹ It did not signify to them that in April 1932, at a time when the legality of the elections could not yet be disputed, these 'ignorant' Germans already numbered 13 million, and many

millions more only one year later. While they do question the legality of the elections after the seizure of power, no reasonable and truth-loving person can dispute that propaganda or illusory victories or 'compulsion' did in fact add so many more 'ignorants' to the ranks of Hitler's adherents that the Enabling Act, and hence all measures to amend the Constitution, had a completely lawful foundation.

One can also doubt neither the legitimacy of the Saar plebiscite, conducted as it was under international control, nor the enthusiastic approval voiced by the vast majority of the people at public proclamations.² It is curious that with respect to major political decisions, which he could easily have implemented on his own, Hitler the dictator bothered time and again to have the legitimacy of these decisions affirmed by the people through plebiscites, either before or at least after the fact.

In defense of their meek attitudes towards the methods employed by Hitler after his seizure of power, the opponents now plead the terrorist measures³ that awaited them, had they done otherwise, but they keep silent about the real reason, which is that in light of the clear wish of the people to give Hitler a chance and to help him, they could not have dared offer any practical resistance if they did not want to risk making fools of themselves or being swept away by their own followers. This was also the reason for the stance taken by the Social Democrats in the vote on the Enabling Act.⁴ Today, in light of the fact that the SPD refers so persistently to its attitude of 1933, it is necessary to make this point quite clear. This party could vote against the Act, and had to do so for fundamental reasons of principle, but in light of the mood of the people it did not dare to thwart the bill's being passed into law simply by absenting itself from the debate, as it might have done and which would have been much easier.



What modern-day politician gets this kind of enthusiasm from his voters?!

No-one could have the slightest doubt that Hitler's government fulfilled the true criteria of democracy in Germany for the first time, namely that the *people* let themselves be governed by their own, their *elected leader*, in other words, they 'governed themselves'. And nowadays no-one would be happier than Chancellor Adenauer if he had something even approaching a fraction of such a majority backing his General and EVG Agreements, instead of the bare and reserved majority of the Bundestag which is utterly devoid of the legitimacy that is bestowed by a clear and definite plebiscite. No doubt he would also be happy to have his Bundestag made fun of as a 'choral society' instead of having to desperately repeat "Ladies and gentlemen!" 165 times like a prayer wheel in order to win the Members of Parliament over to his propositions through prophecies of doom and gloom — not to mention the fact that he has to put up with the impertinence of constant interruptions from the floor. The people as well would prefer a 'choral society' that at least knew which hymn to sing, and which would see a reason for singing such a hymn in the unity of its national bearing. No doubt the people would be happier if they had less of a 'say', yet the little they really wanted to say counted for something. The matter of the German contribution to NATO defense forces is perhaps the clearest proof of that.⁵

The will of the people and Hitler's success were the reasons why his opponents kept fairly quiet after the seizure of power. Herr Schleicher also deemed it expedient to give up his (now thoroughly manifest) plan to thwart the legal seizure of power by means of a military putsch the day before. Emil Henk, the intended South

German representative of the putsch government (as he himself declares in his pamphlet *Beitrag zur politischen Vorgeschichte des 20. Juli*), states clearly enough at the start of this publication: "The Resistance Movement against Adolf Hitler is as old as Hitler's dictatorship itself. The day he gained power was the day his enemies began to fight his system and his terrorism. Hitler had devoted followers, but he also had opponents no less resolute and prepared to die for their beliefs, from the very first day right until the day of defeat."⁶

From the *very first day*! It is important to take note of this, for the rationale that is offered in justification of the July 20 assassination attempt, and most of all in justification of opposition at all, is that a stop was to be put to the desperate war in hopes of preventing senseless sacrifice.

It is clear that from the very start all actions directed against Hitler were also in effect directed against the will of the people, since after all they had chosen this man Hitler as their leader. Chancellor Adenauer would judge the same way if his opponents were to attempt to sabotage laws he has created through today's — not even legitimate — Bundestag.

And why should Hitler not have had the right to effect amendments to the Constitution with the help of his Reichstag, if Adenauer can do the same today? Incidentally, the fact that our Constitutional Court must practically work overtime does not say much for the present-day Federal government's 'loyalty to the Constitution'!

The simple logic that if Hitler's measures had the approval of the vast majority of the people, then all of Hitler's opponents were also opponents of this majority, did not bother these conspirators in the least. Those individuals who did grasp this fact, simply described this majority as stupid and themselves as intelligence double-distilled,⁷ whose mission in the interests of the people was to ensure that this majority would be speedily liberated again from the leader they in their stupidity had elected by democratic means.

This wonderful realization was summarized in the following 'democratic' statement by FDP Representative Dr. H. Schäfer in the course of the debate about the German contribution to NATO defense forces: "It was clear to us in the Parliamentary Council back then that in a modern mass-state the institution of the plebiscite is a dangerous thing for democracy as such. We know from experience that all tyranny in the world has ever had its origins in a plebiscite." It is hardly necessary to comment on this.

But since the opponents, being a minority, wanted 'in the interests of the Fatherland' to 'keep their foot in the door' at all costs, with salary or pension if at all possible, they acted in a manner somewhat like this: whenever Hitler approached the engine-room of the very complex machinery of state, they made haste to greet him with right arm raised in ostentatious respect and their left hand busily polishing the machinery, just to take a spanner as soon as they felt unobserved, and throw it in the works — thus making their 'contribution' in the interests of the Fatherland.

Notes

¹In the words of a prominent Member of Parliament, the people were: politically naïve, uncritical, dull and slavishly following authority, half-educated, bewitched, vulgar, blind, servile, and disaccustomed to critical thought. ...back...

²Henry Bernhard, Stresemann's Secretary, commented on this as

follows: These 9.5% (votes against the annexation of the Saarland to Germany) were not a vote against Germany, but rather a protest against National Socialism and its policies of aggression. This percentage also corresponds to the dissenting votes that were recorded in the various elections in Germany and proves that, on the whole, one cannot question the counts of the votes. ...back...

³The true degree of such mental terrorism is revealed in two places by the books of F. v. Schlabrendorff and H. B. Gisevius: namely, that even in 1938 one could still say and write a good deal without disowning one's basic convictions. ...back...

⁴This goes for the approval of the war loans of 1914 no less than for the attitude towards the General Agreement and, since 'Aurich', in the matter of war criminals as well. ...back...

⁵Or, today — to give a more current example — the debate about the "Euro". [-trans.] ...back...

⁶Of the numerous statements regarding the 'age' of the conspiracy against Hitler, I will confine myself to quoting just one, for the sake of its classical phrasing — Allen Welsh Dulles, in his book *Germany's Underground*: "The attempt of July 20 was the culmination of a series of plots and conspiracies that had begun before the outbreak of war. It was not an isolated, spontaneous putsch, but part of a planned, last, desperate effort to crush Nazi tyranny. The German conspirators had been secretly at work for years." ...back...

⁷When one has read the body of Resistance literature and has noted with amazement the character assessments and political evaluations of persons still living, as well as the magnificent plans for the future shaping of our nation, then one cannot help but marvel that we do not live in a model state, and ask oneself what happened to that formerly unshakeable unity that is now so sorely lacking in our party-political relations. ...back...



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3. The three main groups of Hitler's opponents

Before proceeding to shed light on the nature of these 'contributions', I will first outline the various groups that made up Hitler's opponents. I distinguish among three major categories:

I. The group of natural opponents, who opposed the National-Socialist Idea, and thus Hitler, for ideological reasons. This included all the Marxists, who neither could nor wanted to distance themselves from Marxism. Of the Communists, a greater percentage remained loyal to their beliefs than of the Social-Democrats, from whose ranks the dethroned functionaries made up most of Hitler's opponents while the broad masses of their former followers went over to Hitler.

From the parties of the political center, the contingent of adversaries was composed in the main of tenacious adherents to the Weimar Republic, with supporters drawn from all those denominations that felt threatened by National-Socialism. A large component had recruited itself from representatives of 'Reaction' among the nobility, large-scale agriculture and industry.

On the whole, this group consisted of the former 'powers-that-be'. Hitler seems not to have read Machiavelli closely enough, else he would have realized before 1944 that no ruler is ever completely sure of his power as long as those from whom said power was taken, remain alive — by which I in no way mean to suggest that he should have eliminated them physically.

This major group could not be dislodged from its stance of opposition, no matter how successful Hitler was. He was the fly in their ointment. They viewed everything through their own personal prism, and judged all measures in the vein of the following example: "The KdF ships are nothing other than troop transport ships intended to serve in Hitler's conquest of the peaceful world, and are only used now for KdF cruises so as not to

become decrepit through disuse."⁸

Their fundamental attitude towards Hitler was so stubborn that if he had increased their income tenfold — their pensions, for example, which most of them continued to receive — they would have been furious at his brutal callousness in making them count and spend so much money.

II. The second group was composed of those members of the populace who, in part, were initially kindly disposed towards the new system and, in part, adopted an attitude of wait-and-see, and who then had their noses put out of joint either by Hitler himself or by one of his subordinates, usually in some ridiculously trivial matter, or who felt that not enough attention was being paid to them, and who therefore decided to join the opposition, without considering whether the offense had perhaps been justified in the interests of the foremost aims of the state — according to the truism that "you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs."

If one considers, today, what the majority of the German people have had to endure at the hands of their conquerors and rulers ever since 1945, then it is appalling to note the petty trivialities that prompted people to join in a fatal opposition to a government supported by the entire nation. The motives for doing so were generally injured vanity, egotistical interests, small-minded revenge, or similar base and spiteful reasons. It is interesting to note how these motivations show up like the proverbial thread of Ariadne in most of Hitler's major enemies. The very extensive literature on this topic reveals this clearly.⁹

"They put their revenge on ice," it was aptly phrased by one who had allegedly suffered an unjustified beating at the hands of overzealous SA-men, and then let himself be pushed into the role of chief spy for the pro-Soviet espionage organization *Rote Kapelle*, in which capacity he became responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of German soldiers. Or one may read up on the way in which Herr Kempner 'became' the chief prosecutor of the German people in Nuremberg. How much more admirable was General v. Fritsch who, at least outwardly, was satisfied with Hitler's apology before the other Generals for the wrong that had been done him, and with his promotion to Chief of a regiment! Fritsch died an honourable soldier's death. There was also no reason to believe that he ever participated in enemy operations.¹⁰

III. The third category includes all those who were on the whole kindly disposed towards the new system but who eventually took offence at measures whose real significance in relation to the magnitude of world events they were unable to assess properly due to their lack of a realistic perspective, and whose humanitarian sentiments were outraged by events which either were in fact to be condemned or which could only be understood from a revolutionary vantage point. These include: the operation of June 30, 1934,¹¹ the treatment of the Jews and of the clergymen dabbling in politics, the combatting of resistance fighters and partisans during the war, etc.



Stauffenberg

For the most part, however, the members of this third category were entrapped by enemy propaganda or by the hate-mongering of the first two categories, and in time were shepherded into the camp of the opposition.¹²

It is tragic that the head of the would-be assassins of July 20, Colonel Count v. Stauffenberg — one of the few who were even willing to give his life for the deed, if necessary, and who for that reason deserves a certain amount of respect — was one of those officers who had been disciplined by their superiors for participating in the procession of January 30, 1933, out of sheer enthusiasm for Hitler's Movement. This tragic element is particularly manifest in the case of Stauffenberg's friend, Captain Klaus



Klaus

who at his trial in the People's Court manfully told Freisler: "I participated in the attempts to remove Hitler in complete awareness of the responsibility I incurred in doing so. To be sure, now that I know who masterminded this revolt and who would probably have benefitted from it, I can see that it would have come to a bad end, had the attempt succeeded, and I realize that I have served the wrong cause."

I think it would be useful at this point to quote two summarizing assessments of Hitler's enemies by leading members of the Resistance. In his book *Bis zum bitteren Ende*, H. B. Gisevius wrote: "Communists, Social Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives and Christians all drew their own conclusions from the past and present. On the whole, they agreed only on the negative aspect: National-Socialism must be wiped out.



Gisevius

"In terms of the positive goals, their desires were diametrically opposed. Some wanted Socialism, others considered that to be the root of all evil. Some supported Collectivism, others felt that it was difficult even to tone it down, since we were already up to our necks in it. Some wanted a centralist Germany, others a federal state. All of them were concerned about the education and upbringing of the young generation, but opinions diverged widely on even the most fundamental aspects, such as Christianity and the school... Beyond that, they were united only in their hatred of Hitler!"¹³

In his aforementioned contribution to the literature discussing July 20, Emil Henk states more succinctly: "On the whole, these followers of Goerdeler were a colourful bunch of misfits without any uniform program or set political idea. Basically they were all political loners with no tangible common factor. The only thing they all shared was their opposition to Hitler!"

I would like to complement these two 'self-portraits' with a downright classic statement about Hitler's opponents, made by Hans Richard Sprenger in issue 9/II of *Nation Europa*: "Ever since the outbreak of war, General Staff Officer Beck, without doubt a man highly qualified in his field, sat hunched over his battle plans and waited in cold hatred for his learned understanding of warfare to gain him just ascendancy over that outsider, Hitler — completely forgetting in the process that there had also once been an outsider named Cromwell. The theologist Bonhoeffer spent the war years praying to his dogmatically clear-cut God for the defeat of his people — which could result in nothing other than godlessness. Stauffenberg went to work — without having even the foggiest idea of what actually was to become of Germany after his success. The pious officer and jurist von Schlabrendorff dreamed up a 'state under the sway of a lawless régime' to justify his bomb — without, however, feeling obliged today to fight against the injustices of the victors. They were joined by all those strictly-Catholics, strictly-Protestants, strictly-unionists, strictly-scientists who were of little significance themselves but who had strategic intellectual influence, who saw their restless self-sufficiency threatened and thus may well have honestly believed that they would 'save everything' by helping to wreck it all.

"In 1924 these weakly pillars of the old ruling class made fun of that ridiculous splinter-party leader Hitler; in 1930 they regarded him as the welcome 'drummer boy' over whose back they themselves hoped to crawl to power; in 1933 they hid from him, or played up to him in the hopes that he would step back and defer modestly to them, the truly educated ones; they then proceeded to console themselves with definite and logically irrefutable expectations of his impending downfall; in 1934 they reluctantly praised him when he created the Wehrmacht out of next to nothing and placed them into coveted positions, and cursed him for not also giving up the political leadership he had fought for and won. This intellectualism 'saw it all coming': Hitler's quick failure, the rapid collapse of the 'hare-brained idea' of doing away with the injustice of Nuremberg, the inevitable crash — but what was to come *then* was the only thing they did not foresee. They did not contribute to the elimination of the problem of unemployment, to the integration of the worker into the national whole, to the rescue of the farmers as social class, to the cleansing of cultural life, or to the restoration of the German value system — they always stood outside in self-imposed exile, always in opposition, hoping day in,

day out for the collapse of this structure even though it offered the leadership circles every conceivable opportunity. They did not see that the masses became the heartbeat of the nation, did not see how millions grew out of gloominess and self-forlornness into a cheerful and positive attitude to life, and to self-awareness; they did not feel how dried-up wellsprings began to flow again, and did not want to realize that a rush of true faith had taken hold of the German soul. What was happening did not fit into the formulae and dogmata whence this intellectualism drew its sustenance, and its ingenious mind-games had no room for anything new — so what could it be, but of the devil? — And so the carriers of this deviant intellectuality found each other in their uncomprehending disapproval and impotent hatred, formed their circles, fled from the active, *doing* world that grew up around them, and sought consolation in hoping for the return of bygone days, prayed to God to grant victory to Morgenthau and Stalin, to the dollar and the Marxist World Revolution, and sent out their emissaries to get themselves into the good books of the arch-enemies of their own people.”

Notes

⁸I much prefer the Americans’ openness in stating that their new luxury liner, which was awarded the Blue Ribbon, could be converted to a troop transport ship at a moment’s notice. ...back...

⁹According to T. R. Emessen (*Dokumente aus Görings Schreibtisch*), a letter written on April 18, 1938 by Herr von Hassel to Göring tells “which experiences prompted Hassel to join the opponents of the Nazi régime. This man was among the participants and casualties of the putsch of July 20, 1944. But his letter of April 18, 1938 brings us the bitter realization that it was disappointed ambition, not political conviction that alienated this man from National-Socialism. Hassel is not alone in this respect among the plotters of July 20.” ...back...

¹⁰Readers who to date have seen only the distorted accounts of the Fritsch Crisis, including that of General Foertsch (2nd Publication of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte), are urged to study the interesting report that Admiral Boehm published on this topic in issue 4/II of *Nation Europa*, which vindicates not only the actions of the Generals in this matter, but Hitler’s as well. ...back...

¹¹The elimination of the SA. [-trans.] ...back...

¹²There are hardly any base and deceitful means which were not used to achieve such entrapment. The *modus operandi* included lies, slander and blackmail. For instance, a man who had learned of the treasonous activities of Herr Oster and Dr. Müller was prevented from informing his superiors by means of painting the gentlemen in question in glowing colors of patriotism and representing Hitler as a criminal because he had allegedly ordered the attack of German bomber planes on the city of Freiburg — which was not the case, but which, in light of Oster’s position, did not fail to have the desired effect on the man in question. Or, as another example, persons in influential positions were sent seemingly harmless memos, which they ought to have passed on to their superiors because of the contents of these memos, but which they failed to do out of either ignorance or comradeship. This omission was then exploited in order to blackmail them into the ranks of the conspirators. ...back...

¹³This hatred is evident for all the leading members of the conspiracy, and can be traced right to its originating factor. It precluded any possibility of fair assessment, much less responsible decision-making. ...back...



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4. Major camps of the opposition, their plans for a coup, and measures taken

These opponents were divided into two major camps: One, the numerically superior group, confined themselves to the usual negative criticism of the measures introduced by the new system, to the peddling of rumors and cheap jokes, and to ongoing, petty disputes with Party and organizational functionaries. In some cases they also formed groups of like-minded opponents who spent their time thinking up schemes for hampering or actually combating the system, but who did not take action themselves.

On the whole, all these attempts did not pose any danger to the system, and were quite insignificant in terms of what harm they did. Certainly it would have been better if these groups had instead engaged in objective activity or positive criticism or in the judicious use of the 'emergency brake', in the interests of the nation. But the government of any state must expect a certain part of the population to take a negative instead of a positive attitude, without posing any actual threat to the continued existence of the governing system in question.



Müller

The other camp of the opposition was numerically inferior, but of much greater importance. It was made up of influential politicians or high-ranking military officers who were either already retired from active service and hence felt a pent-up need for action, or

who still retained their exalted positions and were dissatisfied for reasons of insufficient recognition and praise, and thus also looked for additional political activity. These circles were the source of the actual antagonists. In *political* respects, these included: Secretary of State E. v. Weizsäcker, the two brothers Erich and Dr. Theo Kordt



Schacht

(the former in a decisive position in the Foreign Office, the latter with the German Embassy in London), Dr. Schacht and Dr. Karl Goerdeler as well as the former Gestapo officer H. B. Gisevius, Dr. Josef Müller and the former German Ambassador to Rome, v. Hassel; in *military* respects: the two General Staff army officers Beck and Halder, the Chief of Defense, Admiral Canaris and his right-hand man, Major General Oster, as well as Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Major General v. Tresckow, and Colonel Count v. Stauffenberg.

The field of home affairs, however, was an insufficient arena for their drives, since National-Socialist revolutionary methodology left little scope for earning laurels here if one was not willing to content oneself with the objective 'use of the emergency brake'. And so this group chose instead the most interesting field where they could actually harm the system, ie. Hitler — the field of foreign affairs. After all, this had the added benefit that 'the broad masses didn't understand it', in other words, that these activities were reserved for an exclusive circle of select men. These considered their activities to be all the more important because, in their opinion, foreign affairs were above the heads of not only the 'masses' but also of the government elected by these 'masses' (the people). Hitler, like the Pied Piper of Hamelin, might be capable of seducing an 'uncritical' majority into giving him their votes, but the conduct of foreign affairs did require a bit more than that. And only *they* were born and called to do that! They, the elite! And since there was that bothersome thing called conscience, that insisted on stirring every now and then, they created distractions for it: 'world peace' and 'humanity' — in whose interests it was acceptable to do things one could never have done in the interests of the Fatherland.



Weizsäcker

The central idea of these opponents is best expressed in the following statement, made by the former Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, v. Weizsäcker, the foremost 'expert' among the plotters. This was recorded in his memoirs, and must be considered very carefully: "Before and during the War I personally always felt morally entitled and bound to act behind the backs of Hitler and Ribbentrop to pass on to the potential political adversary such political news as would help to keep the outbreak and the escalation of the war in check, regardless whether these news were political secrets or not. It was my goal to keep the potential enemy from becoming an enemy in fact."

Now it really was not very nice of the 'enemies in fact' to reward him for his valuable, altruistic help with seven years' imprisonment, and a pity that fate did not let him live long enough to enjoy the fruits of his labors. That's what happens when one confuses the 'machinery' to be sabotaged with that to be polished.

Besides this activity on the foreign policy scene, the conspirators worked on their other big plan: to carry out, as soon as possible, that little murder that would free the German people of the Führer who regularly gave ever so many proofs of his incompetence in matters of both domestic and foreign policy and who clearly had no dearer wish than to plunge the peace-loving and altruistic world into war as soon as he possibly could. I will spare myself the account of all the preparatory details, for there is, thank God, an extensive literature on this subject, in which the heroes brag about their deeds. We owe Herrn Gisevius many thanks for doing this even at the risk of "deglorifying some of the participants".



Beck

The Head of the conspiracy was Ludwig Beck, the Chief of General Staff himself, who had left as early as 1938 because he could not get along with Hitler, that "megalomaniac little private first class". He could not take it that his politically biased memos had not received enough attention.¹⁴ Since he could not 'stay inside', he saw to a proper replacement for himself, in the person of Franz Halder. The result was comprehensive plans for a coup as well as various sorts of foreign affairs operations, summarized as follows:

IN PEACETIME:

1. In the summer of 1938, General Beck, who was then Chief of Army General Staff, together with his successor, General Franz Halder, Secretary of State v. Weizsäcker, Dr. Karl Goerdeler,



Kleist-Schmenzin

Admiral Canaris and Colonel Oster, made preparations for a coup timed for mid-September. In an attempt to enlist foreign aid, Beck informed the British government of the plan and its most important details. In August 1938, after a discussion with Canaris, Beck sent the former Head of the Conservative Union, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, to London with the appropriate orders. Kleist stayed in London from the 19th to the 24th of August 1938 and met with Sir Robert Vansittart, who informed the government, and with Lord Lloyd and Winston Churchill.

Witnesses: Germans: 1. General Halder, 2. Dr. Rud. Pechel, 3. Dr. Hans-Bernd Gisevius; foreign: 1. Mr. Jan Colvin (Gollancz Publishers, London), 2. Lord Halifax, 3. Winston Churchill.

Other documentary material: 1. Halder's testimony in Nuremberg, 2. Halder's testimony before the Denazification Court in Munich, 3. personal communication between Halder and the author of the book *Gespräche mit Halder*.



Simonis

2. On September 5, 1938, Secretary of State v. Weizsäcker instructed Dr. Theo Kordt, chargé d'affaires in London, to inform the British government of the planned coup. The message was conveyed by Frl. Susanne Simonis. The instructions were carried out in the night of September 5-6, 1938 in a secret meeting between Dr. Kordt and the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax.

Witnesses: Germans: 1. Dr. Theo Kordt, 2. Frl. Susanne Simonis (presently with the State Department in Bonn), 3. Dr. Erich Kordt; foreign: 1. Mr. Philipp Conwell-Evans (London), 2. Lord Halifax.

Other documentary material: 1. Dr. Kordt's book *Nicht aus den Akten*, 2. Secretary of State v. Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen*.

3. Shortly before the intended putsch, approximately on September 12 or 13, 1938, Chief of General Staff General Halder instructed his confidante, Lieutenant-Colonel Hans W. Boehm-Tettelbach, to fly to London in order to apprise the British government again of the planned coup, and to request their help.

The message was given to Sir Robert Vansittart.
Witnesses: Germans: 1. Major General H. W. Boehm-Tettelbach, 2. General Franz Halder; foreign: 1. Sir Robert Vansittart, London.
Other documentary material: 1. Halder's testimony at Nuremberg, 2. Halder's testimony at the Denazification Court.

4. In the summer of 1939, Lieutenant-Colonel Hans Boehm-Tettelbach again visited London on the orders of Halder and Canaris.

Witnesses: as for no. 3., as well as Mr. Jan Colvin.

5. A few weeks later, approximately in August 1939, another General Staff officer, General Count Schwerin, visits London on the same instructions.

Witnesses: as for no. 4.

6. In December 1938, Dr. Schacht informs Montagu Norman, President of the Bank of England, of the coup situation in Germany and particularly of the attitude of the Generals. The report was submitted to the British government.

Witnesses: Dr. Schacht and Dr. Gisevius.

7. In August 1939, as before in 1937 and 1938, Dr. Goerdeler negotiates with intermediaries of the British government in London about British support of the German coup.

Evidence: 1. Article "Entschleierter Mythos" by Georg Alexander, in the newspaper *Hannoversche Presse*, July 18, 1947, 2. Hans Rothfels' book *Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler*.

8. In late August 1939, Fabian v. Schlabrendorff, author of the book *Offiziere gegen Hitler*, apprises Winston Churchill and Lord Lloyd in London about the political situation in Germany and the opportunities for a coup. That Winston Churchill was aware of the German General Staff's plans for a coup is proven by his radio speech of October 17, 1938 (quoted by the *Times* on October 17, 1938, p. 16).

Witnesses: Fabian v. Schlabrendorff.

Other documentary material: historian Hans Rothfels, *Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler*.

IN WARTIME:

9. In October 1939, Secretary of State v. Weizsäcker transfers Dr. Theo Kordt to the German Embassy in Berne, with express instructions to contact an intermediary of Lord Halifax. This intermediary is the aforementioned Mr. Conwell-Evans.

Witnesses: Germans: 1. Dr. Theo Kordt, 2. Dr. Gisevius; foreign: Mr. Philipp Conwell-Evans.

Other documentary material: Dr. Kordt's book *Nicht aus den Akten*



Hassell

10. In the months of February and March 1940, Ambassador Ulrich v. Hassell contacts an intermediary of Lord Halifax in Arosa,

Switzerland. The intermediary was Hassell's Italian son-in-law.

Evidence: U. v. Hassell's book *Vom anderen Deutschland*.

11. In spring 1940, one Dr. Josef Müller, acting on the orders of Canaris and Halder, contacts an intermediary of the British government in Rome. "Via Osborne, the British envoy in the Vatican, the contact led to Lord Halifax," comments Hans Rothfels, historian of the Opposition. The discussions and negotiations dealt with the coup in Germany and had as their goal the approval of the British government. This was given in the so-called "X-Report", and was passed on to General Halder, who in turn passed it to General v. Brauchitsch who, according to Halder's testimony at the Denazification Court trial, called these activities "treasonous".

Witnesses: 1. General Halder, 2. Minister of Justice Dr. J. Müller, ret'd, Munich.

Other documentary material: 1. Jan Colvin's book *Chief of Intelligence* (pub. Victor Gollancz), 2. Halder's testimony at Nuremberg, 3. Halder's testimony at the Denazification Court in Munich.

Numerous assassination plans and attempts against Hitler and his escorts were fostered concurrently. One which deserves special mention is the offer made by German Generals who promised to 'liquidate' 300,000 Nazis within 14 days in return for the promise that Germany would not be placed under occupation. (Evidence: Sir Samuel Hoare in *Gesandter in besonderer Mission*.)

These 'clever politicians' proceeded on the naïve assumption that England would adopt a policy of severity towards Hitler, or even wage war against him, precisely at such a time as *they* wished. They even thought that England would adopt this policy in order to force Hitler to step down so that *they*, the 'better Germans', could take power. They were sadly mistaken, however, for practically all they got were empty pseudo-promises and cheap avowals of gratitude.



Schlabrendorff

It will be useful at this point to quote the account which one of the main participants, v. Schlabrendorff, gave in his book *Offiziere gegen Hitler*: "I myself travelled to England before the war. I called on Lord Lloyd, to whom I had access thanks to new connections established by our group. I informed him that a war was imminent, and was to be initiated by means of an attack on Poland, regardless of any and all attempts at mediation. Further, I told him that the British efforts in Russia would be thwarted because the conclusion of a treaty between Hitler and Stalin was imminent. In this way, Hitler hoped to guard his back, as it were. Lord Lloyd asked me for permission to pass both messages on to Lord Halifax, who was the Foreign Secretary at that time. I had no qualms about that. On the same occasion I had a similar discussion with Winston Churchill at Churchill's country retreat. When I began my expositions with the remark, 'I am not a Nazi, but a good

patriot,' Churchill smiled all over his broad face and said, 'So am I.'"

Or Herr Gisevius: "The dangers to which able men exposed themselves in those days can be demonstrated by an instance that raised a lot of dust among the ranks of the Resistance. From a neutral location, warnings were continually being channeled to the Belgian Embassy; these culminated in the notice given of the impending invasion. With amazing candor, the diplomat in question cabled his government about this notice; the main part of his message was taken up by his reasons for why this notice should be disbelieved. It originated with a high military office, he said, which suggested that it was a red herring, intended to deceive, since otherwise the bearer of the message would be — a traitor."

=====

Note

¹⁴When Hitler asked Beck, for example, if he really believed that the French army was superior to the German, Beck referred to his 40 years' military experience and answered that if a war were to break out, the French would "beat the German army hollow."
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5. Germany's desire for a just peace



Stresemann

Before I remark on this unbelievable behavior I must first comment on the political developments. There can be no doubt that until 1932 almost all politicians concerned with foreign affairs, and Gustav Stresemann most of all, did their utmost to free Germany from the worst of the shackles imposed by the Dictate of Versailles — but in vain, as Stresemann painfully admitted. Shortly before his death he said to the diplomat Sir Albert Bruce Lockhart: "If the Allies had met me half-way even once, I would have had the people's support. Even today I could still win their support. But the Allies left me empty-handed, and what trivial concessions they did make always came too late. So we are left with no alternative other than brute force. The future is in the hands of the young generation, and this German youth, whom we could have won for the cause of peace and reconstruction, is now lost to us. This is my tragedy and your, the Allies', crime."

The only thing they succeeded in was the conclusion of a number of treaties which, it must be noted, all still had some foundation in the dictates of Versailles and which can in no way be considered to be unbiased. These are the treaties which "Hitler hastened to violate."¹⁵ Hitler now availed himself of more active methods on principle, without, however, intending for a foolish war to jeopardize his great work that was supposed "to last a thousand years".

He was also very successful in this, and there could be no doubt

that his success would result not only in domestic and primarily economic gains, but also in a considerable increase in international power for Germany.

How serious he was in his desire for peace is shown by his continual efforts to negotiate binding disarmament agreements with Germany's former enemies. Unfortunately, every one of these efforts broke down due to the lack of good will shown by the other powers.¹⁶

In fact, the book by the French Secretary of State Georges Bonnet, *Before the Catastrophe*, clearly shows that there were no thoughts of disarmament, but rather the desire to catch up as quickly as possible on the arms build-up which had been neglected during Germany's weakness. The same goes for England.

This was what prompted Hitler to concentrate on arms build-up — which, however, only resulted in the German arms status beginning to match that of the Western powers. He continually increased his efforts to achieve peaceful settlements with all European nations. Unfortunately, incontrovertible evidence soon made him realize that there were in fact preparations to ensure superiority over Germany in terms of national power by means of arms escalation and political isolation. It is clear that, as responsible statesman, Hitler had no choice but to at least take preventive measures against this attempt, and to arm Germany 'just in case'.

Secretary of State Otto Meissner expressed this best in his book, where he wrote: "In my opinion, one will come closest to the truth by applying to [Hitler's] attitude and intentions the legal term *dolus eventualis*, that is, by considering that he did not desire and plan for the war, but foresaw it as a possibility and was resolved to engage in war if such were to become necessary, in the absence of other alternatives, to realize his aims."

Meanwhile, the Sudetenland crisis had come about. The British government was remarkably accommodating towards Germany in this matter, and the result was the 'Munich Agreement', that solution which the broad masses of *all* nations lauded as a true effort towards peace by the statesmen involved, and thus as a great success on their part.

Disappointed and downright enraged by Munich, on the other hand, were the conspirators of the Resistance, who believed that England had not only spared, but even strengthened Hitler by their support.¹⁷ They had to call off the coup they had planned for this time, for after such a success on Hitler's part the people would no doubt have had even less sympathy for such an act than they would have had at other times.

They simply proceeded on completely false assumptions. They forgot that the British politicians, instructed and drawing on centuries of experience in planned power politics, no doubt gave due consideration in their plans to the 'power potential' offered them by the existence of a conspiracy amongst such powerful circles in the enemy camp, but were quite able and willing to bide their time until the moment was right for making use of this potential.

I must go back a bit in order to make this understandable. In 1915, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the well-known author of *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, wrote in one of his wartime essays: "Everyone must give his all to the holy Cause; if they do not — if there is a chink in the armor, or if domestic discord saps the pure Germanic strength, as heretofore — then Germany is doomed." And Churchill? He knew of the 'domestic discord' and described it in his memoirs as "...the worm in the apple". He knew of its existence as early as 1938 and was perfectly clear on the consequences of this worm's activities — he had already witnessed the like before. What was it that he said on October 4, 1917 in reply to the German peace offer? "There is no doubt that the leaders of Prussian militarism are the enemies of all mankind. Therefore we must not let ourselves be tempted by a German offer, no matter how enticing it may be. After a peace victorious for Germany, Germany might say to us: 'Let us respect each other as worthy opponents, and resume trade relations.' We British must never agree to such a solution. Germany must lose all its influence in the world. *Our friends inside Germany are working on the subversion of the Reich* — they are waiting for a collapse."

Twenty-one years later, the following statement pertaining to the visit that Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin paid to Churchill on the orders of the conspirators appeared in the Englishman Jan Colvin's book:

"In Chartwell Manor Kleist lunched with Churchill's family, and he saw this great political house in days when Churchill repeatedly exposed the mistakes in the program of the Chamberlain Administration. He was received warmly but secretly, was not addressed by name, but as 'our friend', and after dinner he was taken aside for private discussions."

Churchill's opinion of the real strength of the Third Reich, in light of his awareness of the 'worm in the apple', is shown by the following remark, made by the well-known British politician Robert Boothby in his book *Europe and Decision*: "At a luncheon with the Admiralty he said that he still believed that National-Socialist Germany was more 'brittle' than Imperial Germany had been between 1914 and 1918." In his circles, the maxim was: Hitler's enemies are our friends! So England's friends in Germany were his most powerful allies in the coming battle with Germany, and England could count on this army. But Hitler?

First, let us return to Munich!

Notes

¹⁵The treaty to which this charge primarily alludes is the Locarno Treaty. Now it is interesting to consider what the French Secretary of State, Bonnet, said with respect to the Locarno Treaty: "In Locarno, Great Britain and France were the absolute masters of the European game. Disarmed Germany was at their mercy. The French army could occupy Germany without a fight, in only a few days." The Treaty, accepted by the Reichstag with only a very small majority, was described by Ludendorff as "new tool of disgrace and deceit". Incidentally, the German dissociation from the Locarno Treaty was completely justified even from a strict contractual and political perspective. As late as 1932, Brüning had to protest against the attempts to force him to accept a proposal which had as its goal Germany's relinquishment of the right to the correction of the German eastern border as well as Germany's renunciation of military equality. Brüning was to have been compelled to accept this proposal by means of threatening reports

that French divisions were posted at the German border. ...back...

¹⁶I will quote just one of the dozens of proofs offered for this by foreign politicians. In his book *Failure of a Mission*, Sir Neville Henderson wrote: "In my opinion we were not always fair towards Germany in the years from 1933 to 1938. In being unjust, however, we weakened our own cause and strengthened that of the Nazis." ...back...

¹⁷H. B. Gisevius describes the mood prevailing among his ranks when the Munich negotiations threatened to break down: "It was a load off our minds, we counted the hours until the talks broke down and we knew the Premier safely back in London." In other words, the conspirators would have preferred war, so that they could overthrow Hitler. Other publications by leading members of the Resistance also show this. ...back...



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**6. Munich, the Protectorate,
and the British guarantee to Poland**



Chamberlain

The publication *Der Standpunkt* of August 11, 1950 correctly stated that the Conference at Munich "was not a spontaneous, isolated act by the peace-loving man with the umbrella, but rather the carefully considered policy of the Cabinet." The decision to go along with Munich was a 'carefully considered one' because at that time the British were not ready for war! As Prime Minister Chamberlain wrote on May 25, 1940 in a letter to a political sympathizer: "It is as clear as the light of day that if we had begun the war in 1938 the results would have been very much worse. I have been aware of our military weakness from the start, and hence I did my best to delay the war, if I couldn't prevent it outright."



Bonnet

And the French Secretary of State Bonnet, in his memoirs: "New evidence enables us to more fully appreciate the value of the one year which the Munich Agreement gained us."¹⁸ After Munich, the British and the French arms build-up continued even more intensively — and the British Opposition's anti-German incitement also shifted into high gear. England was still biding her time. She even permitted the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in the spring of 1939 — not only because Czechoslovakia had disintegrated, but chiefly because England was still not fully armed. The delay was made full use of, however, to excite the British people to a fever pitch against Germany.

Those Germans who criticize the establishment of the Protectorate as an act of force and thus as a deed of Hitler's to be condemned, I would ask to consider the following:

1. In Munich Hitler had no designs whatsoever on Czechoslovakia; all he wanted was to have the Sudeten-German regions back. In Hitler's directive of October 21, 1938, which is forever being cited as proof of his lust for conquest, he merely states: "It must be possible to crush the remaining part of Czechoslovakia at any time, if it should engage in anti-German policies."

2. After 'Munich', however, the remainder of Czechoslovakia evinced not only tendencies to dissolve further (since Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine wished to secede), but also exhibited pronounced anti-German tendencies, which threatened to pose a danger to Germany. Evidence for this is available.¹⁹

3. In 1930, the well-known politician Peter Rohrbach wrote in *Deutschland — Tod oder Leben*: "One day, when Austria is joined with the Reich, when the platitude of 'one people — two nations' has been thrown into the dustbin of history, the territory of the unified German national state will surround Czechoslovakia to the point where the latter will have to try to get along with Germany." That Czechoslovakia did exactly the opposite, despite the warnings which Hitler expressed in his conversation with the Czech Foreign Minister on September 28, 1938, is no-one's fault but Czechoslovakia's.

4. As early as February 1939 — weeks before the Protectorate was created — a leading British daily published a remarkable editorial about the rump state that was left to the Czechs after Munich. This state, it said, was not viable in the long term. Both geographically as well as economically, it was so tightly surrounded by the German Reich that it would perforce have to merge with Germany sooner or later; one might deem this development regrettable, but it was past stopping. England had started something in Munich, and would now have to finish it.

5. Bohemia and Moravia had already once been part of the German Empire, and for fully 1000 years.

6. Hitler will have recalled the famous statement made by his great predecessor, Bismarck: "The master of Bohemia is the master of Central Europe."

7. To quote the British envoy Henderson: "The opening was too good for Hitler's opportunism not to take advantage of it."

8. In light of the fact that the Czechs did not have the position of an oppressed minority in the Protectorate, but rather that of a largely independent people, I would second Ambassador Abetz in saying: "Anyone who deemed it right that until September 1938 three-and-one-half million Germans were forced against their will into national coexistence with six-and-one-half million Czechs had no right to object against these six-and-one-half million Czechs in turn being assimilated against their wish in April 1939 into a state with eighty million Germans."

9. Anyone who wishes to criticize the 'method' with which Hitler persuaded the Czech President Hacha to accept the terms of the Protectorate



Hacha

ought to know that "contrary to subsequent, tendentious reports of violent conflicts and brutal threats, these discussions in fact proceeded with calm and correct formality." President Hacha had driven to see Hitler in Berlin on March 15 and, according to Meissner, already confided to him while still at the train station "that in light of the intolerable conditions that had sprung up in his native country, he had decided to ask the Führer and Chancellor of the Reich for assistance and protection, and that he hoped that Hitler would be inclined to political co-operation."

To ensure that my readers understand why Hitler followed up on the terms of the Protectorate with the immediate deployment of troops, I think it would be useful at this point to quote from a book on this subject: "...recounted one time how precisely Hitler had assessed all the details of the situation that evening in Berlin when he caught Hacha unawares with the terms of the Protectorate treaty. He knew very well that on Hacha's return to Prague the German units that had been flown in would already be there to receive him. All this had somewhat the aspect of a game of Red Indians on an international scale, and had evidently also been misunderstood as such by some people around Hitler.



Adolf Hitler

Hitler noticed this, and explained: 'Hacha is an honest old man. There will be certain circles in his country that will not believe that he could not have acted otherwise. So now I have to make sure that Hacha will not be forced to take measures against a part of his own people to enforce the treaty. I also have to make sure that the possibility of a loyal development within the framework of this simply essential and inevitable solution is not going to be burdened by even one single shot fired unnecessarily. My function as statesman is that of a surgeon — if I must cut, I must do what is absolutely necessary, and make not so much as one single tiny incision more beyond the needful. Nothing is more important to ensure the future acknowledgment of an objectively inevitable necessity than the strict correctness with which one kept within the limits of the inevitable beforehand as well. That is why this time-table that regulates the sequence of the arrival of my units and that of Hacha's special train in Prague down to the minute is so important. The question of the Protectorate as such is no longer an issue for debate; not even the Czech military could stop it now. But one wouldn't open fire where it is not absolutely necessary and where all it would achieve would be a useless future encumbrance at best."

10. It would be better for the world if today's master of Bohemia were Germany rather than the Soviet Union, and the Czech people would doubtless be happy if the times of the 'Protectorate' could come again.

11. On March 15, Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons that the British guarantee for Czechoslovakia could not be invoked, since the state whose national borders England had meant to guarantee had disintegrated and the intended guarantee had thus lapsed. HM Government could thus no longer consider itself bound by these obligations.

When, subsequent to the establishment of the Protectorate, the Memelland also returned to Germany, but Hitler had declared that he would never begin an armed conflict for the sake of colonial possessions, England was suddenly in a great hurry to find the 'button' she could push at the right moment. The British had learned in the meantime that Germany had entered into promising negotiations with Poland regarding a sensible solution to the Corridor question. As early as November 24, 1932, Churchill had declared: "If the British government really wishes to promote peace, then it should take the initiative and re-open the issues of Danzig and the Corridor while the victorious powers are as yet

superior. If these matters are not resolved, there can be no hope for a lasting peace!" But instead of taking this sage advice, the British government, on March 31, 1939, gave the Poles an extremely foolish promissory guarantee²⁰ that one can understand only in light of their great haste. Chamberlain commented on this in the House of Commons on April 3, 1939, with these significant words which England will yet have occasion to recall with a shudder:

"To have deviated in this matter so far from our traditional ideals as I have done on Friday on the orders of HM Government in fact constitutes so significant a milestone in British politics that I feel I can safely say that this decision will be accorded a chapter by itself, once it is time to write history..."

Even Secretary of State v. Weizsäcker, hardly a fan of Hitler's, commented thus: "How could those in London think that such an act would serve the cause of peace? Do they think they can publicly intimidate Hitler, spoiled and dazzled as he is by external successes? And do they think that this is the way to exhort the Polish government to caution? I did not believe it, and the British Ambassador agreed with me. The British Minister and later Ambassador Duff Cooper put it thus: never before in history had Great Britain granted a nation of inferior rank the power to decide whether England was to join in a war or not. Now, precisely this decision was left up to a small group of people who, with the possible exception of Colonel Beck, were completely unknown in England. And even tomorrow these unknowns might order the start of a European war."

Notes

¹⁸In 1946 Edouard Herriot stated: "There were two reasons for Munich: 1. England would not and could not mobilize at the time: she was not ready. Only after the German attack on Poland did she decide to take the initiative. 2. In those days the French people wanted peace at any price. They had been exposed to a certain anti-militaristic propaganda for years!" ...back...

¹⁹As early as 1918 in Versailles, Czech politicians had justified the need for the state of Czechoslovakia by pointing out that its geographic location would naturally make it Germany's arch-enemy. The French Minister of Aviation, Pierre Cot, confirmed that in the case of war, Czechoslovakia, by virtue of its proximity, was intended to serve as runway for bomber-planes bound for German towns and industrial sites. And finally, the Czech Member of Parliament, Slansky, stated: "We Communists are working unwaveringly towards our goal, the Soviet Republic, whose Head will be Klement Gottwald." (From *Auch Du warst dabei* by Peter Kleist.) ...back...

²⁰In his book *Germany Between Two Wars: A Study of Propaganda and War-Guilt*, Mr. Lindley Fraser now attempts to trivialize the fateful significance of this guarantee by pointing out that it was given on March 31, whereas Poland had already turned down the German offers on March 26. However, he neglects to mention that as early as March 24 the British Ambassador had lodged a diplomatic protest with the Polish Foreign Minister Beck, in order to torpedo the German offers to Poland of March 21. The following day, Poland announced its mobilization. (From the account of the British historian Prof. Namier.) ...back...



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7. Allied stalling maneuvers and incitement instead of a desire for peace

Amongst the people in general, who are not aware of all the connections, the prevailing opinion is that it was our "theft of Czechoslovakia" which served to raise the ire of the British people and rendered them ripe for war. But this is a serious misconception, for it was already right after 'Munich'²¹ that the British and French circles who were not content with this peace measure began their incitement against Germany. I will prove this by means of a chronological presentation of various events and addresses, but I wish to point out beforehand that this is a mere fraction of the evidence that could be brought to bear against our opponents:

September 30, 1938 — Munich

Hitler and Chamberlain declare: "We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again..."

October 3, 1938 — London

Chamberlain states in the House of Commons: "Here in this country we have already been engaged in a great rearmament program which continues to grow both in speed and in scope. Let no-one believe that in light of the ratification of the Munich Agreement by the Four Powers we can at this time relax our efforts with respect to this program."

October 9, 1938 — Saarbrücken

Hitler gives his famous speech, and **Hans Grimm** comments on it in his Arch-Bishop's Address: "This is the situation that sets the context in which we must view the declaration made by the National-Socialist Reichsführer, the German-Austrian Hitler, on October 9, 1938, when he said: 'The statesmen we deal with want peace. We must believe them on that point. However, they govern

nations whose internal structure renders it possible for them to be relieved of their positions at any time, to make way for others who are not quite as desirous of peace. And these others are already waiting in the wings. In England, for example, all it will take is for Mr. Duff Cooper or Mr. Eden or Mr. Churchill to gain power instead of Mr. Chamberlain; we know very well that it would be the aim of these men to immediately start a new world war. They make no secret of this their intent, they declare it openly...; this obliges us to be on our guard, and to look carefully to the protection of the Reich. Inclined to peace at all times, but equally prepared for defense.' For years I have avoided listening to any speech of Hitler's, a man who disturbs my inner mind. But I had to agree with these words of his, and I had to tender him my silent and bitter apology, for he was right; one might disapprove, even despise his strange nature, but he was right, alas.

"The subsequent events and actions taken by the government of the Reich, right up to the second and final British declaration of war, could not and ought not to have happened any differently in light of the ever-increasing danger. In view of the storm clouds in the West, the storm clouds in the East, and the clouds gathering even over the Reich itself, every Reich leader, be he Emperor or Party tribune, soldier or pacifist would have to have taken each and every possible measure to ensure national security."

October 16, 1938 — London

Churchill, in a radio broadcast to America: "...We must arm. Great Britain will give up its centuries-old traditions, and introduce universal conscription... Is this a call to war?"

November 30, 1938 — London

R. S. Hudson, Secretary of the British Office for Overseas Trade: "The question is the much larger problem of how to counter the new form of German competition throughout the world."

December 6, 1938 — Paris

The French Secretary of State, speaking about v. Ribbentrop's visit: "He seemed disquieted by certain British developments. He mentioned Churchill's campaign, and also seemed to doubt the sincerity of the British Ministers, who, he thought, had not interpreted the Munich Agreement as a settlement in good faith with Germany, with its end to be a lasting pact for peace, but rather as a means to gain time, with the ulterior motive of waging war later under more favorable conditions."



Cooper

December 10, 1938 — Paris

Duff Cooper speaks, consoling himself with the thought that in the case of a conflict, America, the great friend of Western

Democracy, would be standing at the ready.

December 11, 1938 — Paris

The French Secretary of State Bonnet realizes: "The enemies of the National-Socialist régime were resolved to destroy it, but such a hazardous undertaking was only feasible if they patiently awaited the hour when they would be strong enough to defeat their enemy with certitude. I think they had not forgotten the price of challenging Germany and then failing to vanquish her.

"The object of all my discussions with the Prime Minister and of my cables abroad was to ensure the utmost efforts towards the arms status and national defence of France and her allies... With noble patriotic enthusiasm, Daladier spurred the completion of his arms program which, commendably, he had initiated in 1936."



Halifax

January 5, 1939 — London

Lord Halifax, to the German chargé d'affaires, Dirksen: "...he would not hesitate to describe the article in question, of which he was aware, as a most outrageous defamation of the Führer. It is regrettable that numerous such offenses had occurred again in the past months."

January 26, 1939 — Paris

Secretary of State Bonnet in the House: "In the event of a war, all the armed forces of Great Britain are at the disposal of France, and vice versa."

January 28, 1939 — London

Chamberlain: "It is therefore for purposes of defense, not for attack, that we continue to devote unflagging efforts to the task of arms build-up."

February 28, 1939 — Paris

The German Ambassador Welczek reports to the State Department: "Recently, still prior to the publication of the anti-German excesses in Poland, the Embassy has received reports from absolutely trustworthy sources that indicate certain tendencies towards a revival of the French-Polish Alliance and, concomitantly, the planned, gradual deterioration of German-Polish relations. The main reason cited is the deep impression which the strengthening of the Entente Cordiale between France and England, as well as Chamberlain's various declarations regarding assistance for France, have made on the Polish government; an additional factor is a remarkable degree of English activity in Poland."

March 4, 1939 — Teheran

The German Ambassador Smend reports to the State Department: "The return of Austria to the Reich resulted in a noticeable cooling of diplomatic relations... While the representatives of other nations expressed satisfaction that a people had come together again, the British side leveled sharp criticism.

"In the local English circles, the solution of the Sudeten-German

problem has triggered nothing short of hostility towards Germany, which has also found open expression in talks with the Embassy.

"Since then, the anti-German sentiments of the local English circles here has increased considerably. The British Delegation and colony are turning into the hotbed of a war psychosis that weaves its web through far more than the actual field of interest. The entire apparatus of the usual rabble-rousing involved in an arms race, as it may be observed today in the British press, on the radio, and in public addresses of the spokesmen of the bellicose party openly opposed to Germany, has a faithful mirror in this British colony.

"When, in conversation with Englishmen, one points out the reprehensible and dangerous aspects of these methods, one receives only the chilly remark that the international arms race cannot help but lead to war some day. To these gentlemen, Eden, Churchill and Duff Cooper are the real representatives of the British nation, and their future representatives in fact."

March 16, 1939 — Paris

Bonnet, commenting on the establishment of the Protectorate: "It was too late to take military steps, and for the other side, in turn, it was too early, since we were still not ready... We wondered whether we would manage to gain the months we still needed to finish arming."

March 16, 1939 — Berlin

The French Ambassador Coulondre, to Bonnet: "I think we must do everything necessary to at least gain time... On the other hand, the French and British rearmament is an increasing source of worry to the leading National-Socialists. And this, in my opinion, is the fundamental issue... It is necessary to hold out, and to gain time by any and all means at our disposal, until we are fully armed."

March 28, 1939 — Paris

Secretary of State Bonnet: "Thereupon, Chamberlain proposed to Poland a pact of mutual guarantee, so as to force Poland to defend Rumania if the latter should be attacked by Germany. This obligation marked a decisive turning point in British foreign policy. Chamberlain was fully aware of all the consequences resulting from this step, but he accepted them for the moment, since there was no other way to thwart Hitler."

March 28, 1939 — Warsaw

The French Ambassador Noël, to the French Secretary of State: "Furthermore, if Poland should actually decide on this course, it is necessary that in order to constrain Poland and to prevent her last-minute evasion of responsibility, Great Britain should commit herself to financial aid in the case of conflict... and that certain economic advantages be proffered which could to an extent satisfy [Poland's] desire for access to colonial possessions. Further, it would be necessary to give Poland express guarantees to ease her concerns with respect to the Soviet Union... For the rest, it goes without saying that a concrete offer of assistance would only appear tempting to Poland, and would only balance any dangers arising therefrom, if Great Britain were to decide to introduce universal conscription during peacetime."

July 25, 1939 — Stockholm

Sven Hedin, in a conversation with the British Lord Dawson of Penn:

Dawson: "The moment that Germany occupies Danzig — whether it be by peaceful means, or with armed force — we will immediately and absolutely declare war on Germany."

Sven Hedin: "A world war, for Danzig? Danzig is a German city, and the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles are being revised."
Dawson: "It's not so much for the sake of Danzig itself. Danzig, however, means the Corridor, and with the loss of Danzig, in other words of the Corridor, Poland loses access to the sea, and dries up and chokes to death. That's what Germany wants, so as then to be able to treat Poland like she has treated Czechoslovakia. From that point on it is only a step to Rumania and her oil fields, to the Black Sea, the Dardanelles, the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, in other words, to that vein that carries the lifeblood of our Empire. So, if Danzig falls, it's a matter of the life of the British Empire. We know that a new world war for the sake of Danzig is more than due, and we will take the opportunity when it presents itself."
Sven Hedin: "Are you prepared to take such a responsibility?"
Dawson: "We understand that there will be nothing left of civilization afterwards, but we will not hesitate one instant."

August 7, 1939 — Soenke Nissen Koog

According to his book *Der letzte Versuch*, the Swede Birger Dahlerus had arranged a meeting between Göring and several of his British business acquaintances, and on the suggestion of the Englishmen they had concluded that the danger of war could best be eliminated by a Four-Power Conference.



Dahlerus

Hitler declared himself willing only a few days later, but the gentlemen from the British government — whose plans were of course quite different from those of that naïve little group of Englishmen from among the common folk who had tried together with Dahlerus to conduct their own brand of foreign politics — no doubt nostalgically remembered 'Munich', and what followed instead of a conference was "an interlude that was quite incomprehensible to me [Dahlerus] and, as it was to turn out, most fateful as well; namely, a complete stand-still of negotiations. The only thing I managed to find out was that a British answer was not to be expected any time soon. Many of the people indispensable to these proceedings, we were told, happened to have gone on holidays just then... as was usual at that time of year." This stand-still of negotiations may be incomprehensible to Mr. Dahlerus, but not to anyone else who really thinks about it, for if that Conference had taken place, the parties concerned would have had no excuse for not coming to an agreement, else it would have been obvious to the world who the ones to blame for the failure really were. So they preferred to remain on holidays rather than prevent a war. Surely they could not have thought of a more feeble excuse.

August 15, 1939 — Rome

The British Ambassador Sir Percy Lorraine informed Ciano that any attempt at a conference, Munich-style, was out of the question, since such a meeting would result in Chamberlain and his statesmen being swept from their position in the government. By whom? By the people?

The answer may be found in a report sent in

late August 1939 — from London

by the German journalist Heinz Medefind, when he had to leave England after a five years' stay there: "For months the British government has done its utmost, through the press, film, radio and Ministerial speeches, to create unrest among the British people. These efforts were heightened considerably in August. On the orders of the various Ministries, the newspapers strove to convince the people that the time has come when the battle for Poland's independence and for the renewed defeat of that frighteningly revitalized Germany must begin. The same old catch-phrases were repeated daily, even hourly. But the desired effect did not come about.

"In one of his last speeches in August, Chamberlain tried once again to persuade his people to back his government's goals: We are faced with the imminent danger of war. We would not be fighting for the political future of a far-distant city (Danzig), but for principles whose destruction would mean the end of peace and security for all nations on earth.

"Yet even this inflammatory speech of Chamberlain's failed to produce the desired effect, no less than the great campaign had failed that had been carried on for months with the intent of inspiring the masses with enthusiasm for war.



Chamberlain

"I had occasion, after this speech, to talk to dozens of British men and women. With the sole exception of one, none of them had any sympathy for the call for war.

"How badly the effect (of propaganda) had failed became clear to me from the statements of my neighbors and the small businessmen who implored me not to leave England. They did not believe that there would be war — and wanted it even less." With respect to the attitude of the British people, his further descriptions of the last days prior to war and his departure from England agree fully with the account given by Hans Otto Meissner, son of the Secretary of State, in his book *So schnell schlägt Deutschlands Herz*.



Churchill

September 2, 1939 — London

Churchill writes to Chamberlain "...that he was uneasy, that there was talk in Paris of a new diplomatic approach, and that he hoped that the British Head of Government would disregard the difficulties he might encounter in France and proceed to declare war on Germany, thus showing our French friends the proper path to take."

September 3, 1939 — Paris

Jean Montigny reports: "The slight hesitation on the part of France has roused the ire of the London war-mongers: several Members of Parliament, led by Churchill, invaded the office of the French envoy (in London) and reproached him vehemently for his country's attitude. Corbin had to protest most vigorously against such behavior."

September 3, 1939 — Paris

The French Secretary of State Bonnet, when he signed the declaration of war: "It seemed to me as though we had suddenly ordered not only the death of millions of people, but also of precious ideas, spiritual values, the destruction of a world... For some seconds I was devastated. But already, calls were coming in again from London. The news had spread that France would not join in the war until 5 am Monday morning. This delay provoked annoyance in Great Britain."

They were sitting on pins and needles there, for while another 'Munich' would have preserved world peace — it would also have preserved Hitler.

The "foreign affairs politicians" of the Opposition saw and heard none of this, for their glasses were fogged over with hatred, their ears plugged with lies, and their time taken up with the planning of coups against Hitler.

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Notes

²¹As for the time prior to Munich, it ought to suffice to recount the comment which Frau von Ribbentrop relayed to her husband's defense counsel in Nuremberg. In 1937 Churchill had said to Ribbentrop in the Embassy at London: "If Germany regains her power, she will be crushed again." When Ribbentrop objected that it would not be as easy this time as it had been in 1914, since Germany had friends on her side, Churchill rejoined: "Oh, we are quite good at persuading those friends to join us in the end." The British prosecutor declined retrieval and presentation of the report which v. Ribbentrop had sent to Hitler about this, saying: "What my friend Churchill said in the course of that conversation is irrelevant." ...back...



Worm in the Apple

German Traitors and Other Influences That Pushed the World Into War:

The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany

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WORM IN THE APPLE

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Worm in the Apple

German Traitors and Other Influences
That Pushed the World Into War:

**The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf
Hitler's Germany**

Friedrich Lenz

8. Ten leading personalities

comment on the question of war guilt (Part 1)

Even for reasons of space I must dispense with drawing on the voluminous documentary material available to bring complete proof that all the diplomatic back-and-forth up to September 3 was only theatrics intended to deceive the peoples about where the real guilt in the matter lay. I will restrict myself to a few concise observations:

A. The British guarantee was allegedly intended exclusively for the protection of Poland. Yet not one single shot was fired for Poland.

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B. The official ie. publicly accessible wording of the Anglo-Polish Mutual Assistance Pact of August 25 speaks of protection from *any* European power. When Germany had overcome Poland and Russia visited war on the other half, Ambassador Harvey, speaking in the House of Commons on October 19, 1939, innocently asked whether this treaty did not also pertain to attacks by non-European powers, in other words, Russia. He was given the official reply, in writing, that Poland and England had expressly agreed in the course of their negotiations that this treaty applied *only* to a possible attack by Germany.

C. To quote a significant statement by Bruno Brehm: "The true reasons for war are not generally revealed in the speeches made before war, but by the actions taken afterwards." Those interested in these actions are referred to the very interesting book by the American author Freda Utey, *The High Cost of Vengeance*.

It might be more convincing to hear the comments made on this topic by leading politicians and historians of that country that believed it had to declare war on us on September 3, 1939, instead of doing what Churchill had already demanded in December 1932: obliging Poland to remove the last injustice inflicted by the Dictate of Versailles, thus sparing the world the second — and third — world war:

1. Sir Oswald Mosley, well-known politician and former Minister, in *The European Revolution*:

"A closer look reveals the British Empire and the German mainland power to be twin pillars that could have supported an age of prosperity and cultural vigor, a lasting construct of order and peace.



Mosley

"Exactly the opposite view prevailed, and resulted in that clash whose consequences can now be stated with almost mathematical exactitude: a third of Europe is lost to Russia, and that mighty Eastern power, confident of its ultimate victory, looms over the exhausted remainder of the Western world whose sole protection now lies in the atomic bomb under American control. Furthermore, 74% of the population and 16% of the areal extent of the British Empire have been lost due to the war or its aftereffects; what is left, stumbles along on crutches of foreign aid.

"Is this bottom line worth all the sacrifices? They would have been justified only if Germany had really striven for world dominance. We have already ascertained that only madmen could have embraced this notion, and those men who began with nothing and achieved such grand results in all areas after a twenty years' struggle could not have been mad. But let us postulate the impossible for the moment, and assume that after consolidating her position in Europe, Germany would really have taken up such plans for world dominance and had turned on the West, ie. against France, against Britain, and against America. What would have been the sole correct response to such a threat? By no means would it have been to throw ourselves unarmed into the fray; it would have been to bide our time, to observe the developments, and to ensure a satisfactory arms status in the meantime. If the three great Western powers had united their mighty industrial resources for the production of those weapons that were decisive in those days, then it would have been impossible for Germany to overcome them even after exploiting all the raw materials available to her. Had they capitalized on their staggering industrial potentials in time, France, Britain and America would not have needed Russia's help to repulse any potential German threat and to fell the aggressor.

"In such a situation, is it not incumbent upon political decision-makers with any sense of reality to strive for the best possible solution while preparing for the worst? Under the conditions of 1939 this would have meant, on the one hand, removing all factors that might have caused a German explosion while, however, also getting ready to fend off any such eventuality. The first step would have entailed the statesmen of the wealthy Western world powers granting Germany access to the raw

materials and resources she needed so badly, either in the neighboring regions of the East or by allowing her a share in the surplus of raw materials available in those days in overseas territories. A free hand in the East would have been the better of the two solutions from both the German and the British standpoints, but this would have required a degree of sober reflection and determination that is too much to expect from the 'democratic' way of thinking.

"However, if there had really been a determination and desire to clear up and defuse the situation, other means more suited to the thought-processes and feelings of the democracies could have been found. Germany would no doubt have agreed to any international settlement that had provided her economy with access to the extant world surplus, even if this had been in the form of barter or trade instead of direct access to the sources — provided, however, that this did not require Germany's submission to the yoke of foreign high finance.

"Aside from the well-known trips of British diplomats in moments of grave danger, in crises that had occurred because the German people had been compressed into too small a living space, democratic statesmen made no serious attempts to eliminate the causes of the impending explosion. On the contrary, they turned a deaf ear to all the various disarmament plans proposed by Germany — proposals that are on historical record and cannot be denied. Germany had serious grievances about her restriction to too small a space without sufficient resources. Common sense and fairness required that an attempt, at least, be made to remove these grounds for complaint. Even if there had been suspicions that Germany was not in fact truly concerned about the welfare of her people, but motivated, rather, by plans for world conquest, no efforts towards peace should have been omitted by peaceful governments. At the same time, of course, the time gained in this way would have had to be used to consolidate the immense industrial potentials, so that the arms status of the three Western powers could have nipped in the bud any bellicose German intentions, had they in fact existed. If a war had still broken out, then thanks to the superior arms status of the Western allies it would not have lasted nearly as long and cost only a fraction of the losses in life and cultural values that were in fact claimed by the Second World War, that devastating result of the lengthy and sluggish muddle that the democrats called 'politics' and 'preparations'.

"Today, no less than in those days, this author is convinced that honest efforts at mitigation and settlement would have been successful, and that free and natural agreements between Great Britain and Germany would have been of benefit to Europe and the world."

2. Robert Boothby, the British Representative in Strassbourg, in *Europe and Decision*:

"That is why we were amazed indeed when Chamberlain informed us on March 31 of our unconditional and one-sided promissory guarantee to Poland. I was then of the opinion, and continue to feel to this day, that in the absence of a binding alliance with Russia this was an act of sheer madness, for in doing so we had made a far-reaching promise which, it was clear beforehand, we could not keep. Lloyd George immediately asked whether the General Staff had consented to our committing ourselves to the defense of a nation entirely inaccessible to us. He received no

reply.

"Poland succumbed to the Blitzkrieg in only three weeks. We did not lift a finger or start an airplane in her assistance. How should we have? There was not even a tangible sense of the urgency of the matter."

3. Peter H. Nicoll, Scottish clergyman, in *Britain's Error*:

"Prior to the outbreak of war there was not yet any anti-Hitler crusader sentiment in Britain, in fact there was hardly even any fear of an impending war. The public did not see that the tense European situation might be about to erupt. Even those who disapproved of the invasion of Czechoslovakia could not pretend that this posed a danger to the freedom of Britain or any other great power. In the summer of 1939 there was considerably less suspense than there had been the year before. The people even seemed to have forgotten that it was not Hitler but Mr. Chamberlain who had exposed them and the whole war to catastrophe through some of the most foolish, presumptuous and provocative words ever uttered by a servant of the state. These words were the immediate cause of the Second World War. Right after the march into Prague, Chamberlain declared that Britain would come to Poland's aid with all the means at her disposal, should Germany attack. Britain would shield Poland's intactness and independence from any act of aggression... The speech in which Chamberlain offered this guarantee was the most disastrous speech ever given by a Prime Minister. Whether he spoke for the Cabinet or not... he did not consider asking the people, who would have to reap the bitter fruits of his thoughtlessness and foolish words — and did indeed reap them.

"The British government must have been clear on the fact that it could never fulfil its guarantee... The Poles let themselves be deluded, and acted henceforth in a confident and provoking manner towards Germany... The blank check given to Poland as much as said: 'We don't care whether you are in the right or in the wrong: either way, as soon as Germany attacks you, we will declare war on her in your defense!' And foolish people presume to call this a great and noble gesture! It was an unprincipled, unsupportable promise motivated solely by hatred for Hitler... Let the reader ask himself what Britain's attitude would have been, had another power dictated her actions with respect to Ireland or Portugal or Canada or India! — We must bear in mind that the artificial construct of Poland — a dictatorship created in 1919 — was set up with the express purpose of complementing the despicable severance of Danzig to effectively constrict Germany. — Just ask yourselves what city, 94% of whose inhabitants are British, would be content to remain under foreign rule, and what Britain would have felt if she had been separated from Scotland by a Corridor.

"Thoughtless people in Britain and elsewhere grew tired of watching Hitler persistently asserting one German claim after another. They became irritated and arrived at the simple conclusion that all these claims must be parts of a cleverly thought-out plan of aggression. But a justified claim is not rendered false and selfish merely by the fact that it happens to be the third or fourth claim that someone has to advance. It is downright unfair of people who were lucky enough not to have to suffer injustices and not to need to make claims for redress, to throw Germany's predicament up in Hitler's face as an accusation. When the question of Danzig and the Corridor was raised, they lost

patience and all sense of justice. They decided without any more ado that these further claims were nothing other than 'aggression' and — in a strange sort of retrospect — that Hitler's earlier demands must therefore also have been outright 'aggression' and territorial theft. In those days it was commonly claimed that we had no quarrel with Germany about her domestic political structure; domestic structure was exclusively the business of each respective state. But if one persisted in asking what injustice of foreign-political nature Germany had done us or another country, the accusers quickly sidestepped to the topics of totalitarianism and Jewish policies, and declared these to be sufficient grounds for war.

"Neither our belief in international relations to which we declare our support, nor general reasons, can account for our entry into the Second World War. Only the grave danger into which the British government's stubborn resolve to crush the Third Reich had finally precipitated the country was able at long last to rouse the nation's willingness for war and to silence all other considerations."

4. Major General J. F. C. Fuller, British military author, in *The Second World War, 1939-45*:

"Thus it came about that by the time Hitler gained power, the British people were so completely duped that had a British Government proposed rearmament, it would have been turned out of office. So intense was this pacific propaganda that, when the crash came in September, 1939, the Government feared to proclaim its true war aim — namely, that as German power politics, the German way of life, the German system of finance and the German method of trading were antagonistic to Britain, and if persisted in would lead to the establishment of a German hegemony over Europe, the self-preservation of Britain as a great power depended on staying their course. Therefore, since Britain's greatness had been built and sustained by the balance of power, its future security depended upon re-establishing that balance. Consequently, the Government's war aim was not to annihilate Germany, but to reduce her strength to balancing point.

"Instead, when on September 3rd, 1939, war was declared, the aim was proclaimed to be a moral one. This placed the conflict onto the footing of a crusade, that is, of an ideological in contradistinction to a political war — a war to annihilate Hitler and Hitlerism, as St. George annihilated the Dragon. This is made crystal clear in the declarations of all parties in the House of Commons. Thus Mr. Chamberlain (Prime Minister) proclaimed: 'I trust I may live to see the day when Hitlerism has been destroyed and a liberated Europe has been re-established.' Next Mr. Greenwood (Labor): 'Lastly in this titanic struggle, unparalleled I believe in the history of the world, Nazism must be finally overthrown.' Then Sir A. Sinclair (Liberal): '...let the world know that the British people are inexorably determined, as the Prime Minister said, to end the Nazi dominion for ever and to build an order based on justice and freedom.' Lastly, Mr. Churchill (Union): 'This is not a question of fighting for Danzig or fighting for Poland. We are fighting to save a whole world from the pestilence of Nazi tyranny and in defense of all that is most sacred to man.'

"Thus, instead of the minds of the people being directed towards the re-establishment of the balance of power, their reason was obliterated by a spirit of hatred for the 'evil thing', and to them, the war became a contest between Good and Evil."²³

"This emotional aim, as we shall see, not only placed the war on a total footing, but eventually led to the very end that Britain had fought against for four hundred years — the establishment of a hegemony over Europe by a foreign power.

"As fate would have it, that power was Russia."

5. Sir Basil Liddell Hart, famous British military author, in *Why Don't We Learn From History?*



Liddell Hart

"It is immoral to make promises that one cannot expect in practice to fulfil — in the sense that the recipient expects. On that ground, in 1939 I questioned the underlying morality of the Polish Guarantee, as well as its practicality. If the Poles had realized the military inability of Britain and France to save them from defeat, and of what such defeat would mean to them individually and collectively, it is unlikely that they would have shown such stubborn opposition to Germany's originally modest demands — for Danzig and a passage through the Corridor. Since it was obvious to me that they were bound to lose these points, and much more in the event of a conflict, it seemed to me wrong on our part to make promises that were bound to encourage false hopes.

"It also seemed to me that any such promises were the most certain way to produce war — because of the inevitable provocativeness of guaranteeing, at such a moment of tension, an area which we had hitherto treated as outside our sphere of interest; because of the manifest temptation which the guarantee offered, to a military-minded people like the Germans, to show how fatuously impractical our guarantee was; and because of its natural effect in stiffening the attitude of a people, the Poles, who had always shown themselves exceptionally intractable in negotiating a reasonable settlement of any issue....

"And yet, in the April 1939 parliamentary debate about the Polish Guarantee, the central idea of almost all leading speakers was to emphasize that they supported said Guarantee in the belief that it would be a means to keep the peace. From a historical perspective, this avowal of their own delusion was the best possible proof that they lacked those elements necessary for practical statesmanship and that they were unfit to determine the fate of a great nation.

"The only prominent exception to this rule was Lloyd George, who alone pointed out the practical difficulties and the dangerous madness of offering such a commitment without first securing Russia's support.

"Through an irony of history, this critical moment saw him for once in agreement with the view of the military authorities — indeed of everyone who had the slightest conception of the practical state of affairs. He was also the only statesman in agreement with the traditions of British statesmanship....

"If anyone tells me that in April 1939 we suddenly recognized the danger that the Nazi system posed for the whole civilized world, I can only smile sadly. What I observed and recorded for history during the months following Munich was a growing resentment of the humiliation we had suffered there, and an increasing fear of the danger to our own interests — a combination that continually received further stimulus, as if under the pressure of expanding gases, after the events of March 1939 had come to pass.

"A comment frequently heard in the winter of 1939-40 was that one did not know what to fear more — Germany's 'protection' or Britain's 'support'."

And in *The True Causes of the War*:

"For the purposes of the Nuremberg Trials it sufficed to allege that the war and all its consequences were due to Hitler's aggression. But this explanation is too simple. It is also not in accordance with the facts, for Hitler wanted anything but a world war...

"Britain's sudden turnabout in March 1939 made the war inevitable. It created a situation comparable to an overheated kettle in which the pressure had reached the danger point and whose safety valve was then suddenly stopped up. The blame lies with those who permitted the kettle to be heated further and who, in doing so, brought about the explosion."

6. A. Raven Thomson, London, in the periodical *Nation Europa*, issue 10/II:

"Today the men in Britain's leadership are realizing more and more what a mistake it was to attack Germany under American and Jewish pressure. In their casual sports-based jargon, many of them now admit: 'We bet on the wrong horse.' They now feel that if Britain could not resist waging a war, then she should have done so on the German rather than on the Soviet side. Even Churchill expressed this realization in terms he deemed fitting: 'We slaughtered the wrong pig.'

"In 1939, however, this was not yet common knowledge among the powers-that-be; at that time, they let themselves drift unscrupulously before the wind of vociferous Jewish hatred and 'pacifist' war-mongering. The few that had retained a grasp on their common sense, such as Neville Chamberlain, Lord Londonderry, and Lord Runciman, gave in when the propaganda following the occupation of Prague reached fever pitch; influenced by the German Resistance, they agreed to the fateful and, for Poland, utterly ineffective promissory guarantee that made war inevitable.

"...Under the leadership of Sir Oswald Mosley, those sectors of the British population that had retained their common sense and realized that a war would lead not only to the destruction of Germany, but also to the surrender of all of Europe to the Soviet Union, resolutely opposed the efforts at war-mongering. Enormous public assemblies and proclamations enthusiastically received the passionate appeals of the leaders of the British Union. It is a fact that two months before the outbreak of war Mosley conducted the largest political mass rally in British history. The extent of this massive peace rally is shown by the fact that it took several special trains to transport the workers from the strongholds of the Union movement in East London to the rally. More than 30,000 people supported his call for peace with Germany with tumultuous enthusiasm and waves of thunderous applause, and not one voice

was raised in dissent. The name Churchill, the chief war-monger, was greeted with outraged booing and hissing, so that his son Randolph left the hall trembling with rage.

"When the war-mongers attained their goal a few weeks later, despite these desperate efforts to preserve peace and Europe's safety, Mosley showed his mettle; even now he fought courageously against the madness whose fires were being stoked with all the means that propaganda offered. He opposed the power of Churchill and his fellow war-mongers openly and with the full and unwavering force of his personality — not like those men of the 20th of July in Germany, who burrowed and rooted about in secret and did not dare come out into the light until Hitler's downfall seemed assured."

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Notes

²²At least the guarantee given to Poland triggered a "declaration of war", but as early as November 1939, when Rumania saw Russia preparing to grab for Bessarabia, Rumania found that England implored her for Heaven's sake not to insist on British action to back up that Guarantee. In June 1940, when Russia availed herself of England's weakness and swallowed Bessarabia and northern Bukovina in defiance of the guarantee, Rumania was left helpless. ...back...

²³This attitude has survived the decades and is still present today. Surely no-one can be unaware of the countless movies and television shows, for example, where even today "the evil Nazis" are ultimately beaten by "the good Americans" (or British, etc.)! [-trans.] ...back...



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WORM IN THE APPLE

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Worm in the Apple — part 9: The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany; Friedrich Lenz.

Worm in the Apple

German Traitors and Other Influences

That Pushed the World Into War:

**The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf
Hitler's Germany**

Friedrich Lenz

9. Ten leading personalities

comment on the question of war guilt (Part 2)

But let us also give some leading "neutrals" the opportunity to set out their observations. We will begin with none less than the famous Swedish scholar,

7. **Sven Hedin** in his book *Amerika im Kampf der Kontinente*:

"But once the great turning point had come in Germany's fate, the democrats fell upon her again; they did not understand that it was they themselves who, through their short-sightedness, had brought about this turning point. They had broken promises, and then accused the new German state leadership of breach of contract because it is always easier to shift the blame onto someone else than to take responsibility oneself. All of the suggestions that Germany made for the safeguarding of peace were either rejected or ignored, until Germany grew tired of seeking trustful co-operation with the other powers. Germany began to throw off her fetters herself, and to create a national arsenal for herself that would equal that of her neighbors, who had never complied with their disarmament obligations in the first place.



Hitler & Hindenburg

"All the Führer's solemn avowals that he wanted peace despite Germany's recovering strength were simply deemed to be lies. On

May 21, 1935, Adolf Hitler said in the Reichstag: 'Any war first of all devours the nation's very best... By raising the birth rate, a healthy social policy can bless its nation with more children of its own in the course of a very few years than a war could conquer and gain in foreigners. No! National-Socialist Germany wants peace, out of profound ideological conviction.' Nobody can deny that this is a true and convincing program for peace.

"If the victors of the First World War had at that time, 1935, **taken Adolf Hitler's suggestions and his publicly proclaimed offers seriously, or at least deigned to negotiate with him**, the new World War could have been avoided. An entire generation of men in the best years of their lives and countless innocent civilians could have been saved, and hundreds of millions of people around the world could have been put to a better use than the attempt to destroy Western culture. But the voices of freedom had to be ignored; the preference was for the death knell whose ominous peal announced 'too late', time and again, to the same peoples and nations who, now as before in World War One, as though they were bewitched by evil powers, gladly sacrificed everything for the one goal of Germany's destruction — *Germaniam esse delendam*.

"The roots of this unhappy development lie in the fact that the heirs of the Treaty of Versailles never realized that the seizure of power by Adolf Hitler and the NSDAP was something fundamentally different than one of the usual changes of government. It was not a matter of a stronger party relieving a weaker one of power; it was the arrival of a revolutionary Movement with a total claim to power. Born of the experience that Germany could never expect outside help for national recovery, but could only ever depend on her own strength of will, and resolved to achieve the return to power under any circumstances, the government of Adolf Hitler took the place of a weak, internally divided Parliament torn between 32 different parties and an equally weak government dependent on this inconsistent Parliament and without stable roots even among the people.

"If this revolutionary novelty had been recognized as such, and if efforts had been made to enter into negotiations with the National-Socialist government, the latter would doubtless have been willing; Adolf Hitler's various peace offers prove that. In those years he focused so emphatically on the accomplishment of his ideas in the domestic realm and on the unification of the German people that he would certainly have been ready to make a reconciliation with the German people, desired by the others, the foundation of his foreign policy.

"However, all of Adolf Hitler's offers were arrogantly rejected, and deemed dishonest, sight-unseen. They were only ever regarded as a threat, never as the attempt of a long-humbled nation to rejoin the community of the other great nations as their peer and equal. Offense was taken at various details of the German government, and the *intent* — that which was great and good in the new Germany — was disregarded. Instead of dispensing only negative criticism that benefitted no-one, one ought rather to have considered that reconciliation that Germany herself wanted; much would then have resolved itself in Germany's domestic affairs as well.

"The Second World War by no means began on September 1, 1939, when German troops crossed the Polish border. It was born of the First World War, at that hour at the latest when the representatives of thirty-two nations gathered in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles to endorse a document that was touted as peace treaty without being one.

"The events *prior to* September 1, 1939 included: the German-Polish Treaty of January 26, 1934; the Munich Agreement of September 1938; the Anglo-French promissory Guarantee to Poland which induced this bedazzled nation to risk ignoring Hitler's generous offer of August 29, 1939 for a peaceful resolution of the German-Polish dispute. This offer was so important and its refusal so incomprehensible that I will quote its 16 points in the following [abridged for length, retaining context; -author]:

1. Due to its purely German character as well as the unanimous desire of its population, the Free City of Danzig will return to the German Reich immediately.
2. The region of the so-called Corridor... will decide the question of its affiliation with Germany or Poland.
3. Towards this end, a plebiscite will be held in this region. Entitled to participate in this plebiscite are: all Germans who were resident in this region on January 1, 1918 or who had been born there by this date; similarly, all Poles, Kashubes etc. who were resident in this region on, or born there by, said date.... To ensure an objective plebiscite, this region, like the Saarland, will be placed under the supervision of an international Committee, to be set up immediately and to consist of representatives of the Four Great Powers of Italy, the Soviet Union, France and England....
4. The Polish port of Gdingen, being Polish sovereign territory, is excluded from the region in question....
5. In order to ensure sufficient time for the very extensive preparations required to carry out a fair plebiscite, said plebiscite will not be held before twelve months from the present date.
6. In order to ensure that during this time Germany and Poland will have unrestricted access to East Prussia and the sea respectively, roads and rail lines will be established which will facilitate free transit traffic....
7. The simple majority of the votes cast will determine the region's affiliation.
8. In order to ensure Germany's free and unhindered trade with her province of Danzig-East Prussia as well as Poland's access to the sea, the following measures shall be initiated subsequent to the plebiscite, regardless of its outcome: should the territory under vote go to Poland, Germany will receive an extraterritorial traffic zone... for purposes of the construction of a Reich Autobahn [superhighway] as well as of a four-track railway line. The roads and rail line will be constructed in such a way that extant Polish traffic arteries... are either over- or underpassed... If the vote turns out in favor of Germany, Poland will be granted the same rights to extraterritorial road and rail connections with its port of Gdingen as would be granted to Germany in the reverse case.
9. In case of the Corridor's return to the German Reich, the Reich shall be willing to participate in a population exchange with Poland, to such an extent as the Corridor is able to facilitate.
10. Any special rights which Poland may wish to have with respect

to the port of Danzig will be negotiated on a basis of reciprocity, with Germany receiving similar and equal rights with respect to the port of Gdingen.

11. In order to eliminate any sense of threat from or to either side in this territory, Danzig and Gdingen would take on the character of strictly commercial cities, that is, without any military installations or fortifications.

12. The peninsula of Hela, which would go either to Poland or to Germany, depending on the results of the vote, would also be demilitarized in any case.

13. Since the government of the German Reich has severe grievances with respect to the Polish treatment of minorities, and since the Polish government in turn also believes it has grounds for complaints against Germany, both parties shall agree to have these grievances submitted to an internationally constituted team of investigators....

14. To reassure the Germans remaining in Poland as well as the Poles remaining in Germany that they will not be left with an international lack of rights, and in particular to ensure that they cannot be called upon to perform actions or to render services conflicting with their national sentiments, Germany and Poland will agree to safeguard the rights of the minorities on both sides by comprehensive and binding agreements....

15. In the event of an agreement based on these propositions, Germany and Poland agree to order and carry out the immediate demobilization of their armed forces.

16. Any further measures necessary within the context of the preceding agreement will be mutually negotiated between Germany and Poland.

"The annals of recent diplomatic history will hardly yield any document matching this proposal in restraint, accommodation, and sympathy for the needs of another country.²⁴ That Poland nevertheless did not even consider it worth acknowledging can only be explained by the fact, since come to light, that this country relied not only on its European friends, Great Britain and France, but primarily on the support of the United States. Roosevelt had granted such support via his Ambassadors in Warsaw and Paris.

"In London it was alleged that the German offers were dispatched so late that the government at Warsaw did not have time to reply. The German invasion of Poland, it was claimed, followed so quickly on the heels of this offer that said offer appears not to have been meant seriously at all.

"This allegation is a lie. In its evening edition of August 31, 1939, the London *Daily Telegraph*, a newspaper sympathizing with the Foreign Office, reported on debates held in the British Cabinet. This report mentioned that the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, had been informed by the Reich Foreign Minister of the German offers for a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish conflict. He had immediately passed them on to London, since in an August 28, 1939 memo to the German government the British government had declared itself willing to assume the role of mediator. The London Cabinet had passed the German memo on to Warsaw, and after receiving it, the Polish government ordered general mobilization.

"The report of the *Daily Telegraph* caused great consternation in London, where the powers-that-be had decided — with Roosevelt's

blessing — that the blame for the outbreak of war was to be laid at the German door, thus following the example of 1914. In the British Blue Book about the outbreak of the war, as well as in Sir Neville Henderson's memoirs *Failure of a Mission*, this intent was carried out. The *Daily Telegraph's* unintentional truthfulness was to be covered up by confiscating the evening edition in question; the editorial offices were persuaded to put out a second, late edition, from whose report about the Cabinet session was excised that remark which was so embarrassing to the British government — the remark about Poland's general mobilization *after* receipt of the German offers. However, the Foreign Office was unable to prevent some copies of the first evening edition of the *Daily Telegraph* from reaching some people who took an interest in the truth of the matter.

"Everyone remembers the extraordinarily rapid course of the German campaign against Poland. The troops and military assistance promised by those powers that had encouraged Polish resistance against Germany never materialized. Poland was betrayed by England, France and Roosevelt's America."

8. Per Engdahl, leader of the Swedish Revivalist Movement, in the periodical *Nation Europa*, issue 3/I:

"There were repeated attempts to place sole blame for the war on the German people, but an objective examination of the evidence fails to support such a claim.

"It is alleged, for example, that the German memo to Poland of the last week of August prior to the outbreak of war was not to be taken seriously. And this claim is supported by pointing out that on the occasion of the British Ambassador's visit at eight-thirty on Wednesday evening, Ribbentrop refused to reveal the text of said memo. What is not mentioned is the fact that two hours later, Göring's headquarters communicated the selfsame text, by telephone, to the British Diplomatic Secretary, and that the text was at the disposal of the British Foreign Office in London at two o'clock Thursday morning.²⁵ What is also not mentioned is the fact that the Polish government, which received the text from London at six o'clock a.m., at noon that same day forbade its Ambassador in Berlin to enter into any discussions whatsoever about this memorandum, or even to admit that he had taken note of its contents."

9. The League of Nations Commissioner for Danzig, J. Burckhardt, a Swiss,

"...did not perceive the danger to world peace to lie in the clash of ideologies. In his view, this was only the screen behind which the conflict between thoroughly materialistic power interests took place. Accordingly, he saw the world's objection to Germany's resurgence as less a matter of dislike of National-Socialism than as the fear of predominance of the Reich, which would upset the European balance of power. If the German Social Democrats had anticipated Hitler's policies and had re-armed Germany, then all the Western nations would have risen up in a wave of anti-Marxism." (From L. v. Krosigk, *Es geschah in Deutschland*.)

10. Last but not least, here are the words of a Frenchman, **Professor Dr. Maurice Bardache**, the author of *Nuremberg or Europe*:

"Diplomacy of earlier times would probably have tolerated the partition of Poland (after all, it would not have been the first time), and the world war would have been avoided. Were not the events

of an annexation of Abyssinia or the liquidation of Czechoslovakia far less costly to mankind than a world war? Was it unjust? But what about the amputation of a quarter of Germany to the benefit of Slavic imperialism, and the horrible expulsion of millions of people who for years had been treated as even less than subhuman — was that fair? The statesmen of earlier days knew that concessions must be made to the unwritten laws of life. Would the partition of Poland have exposed us to any great danger? Is the danger which the democratic statesmen themselves have conjured up today not immensely greater? Is our situation not infinitely more hazardous? Who does not say today that the Europe of August 1939 was beautiful?"

Notes

²⁴I want to stress that Hitler's first offer of March 21, 1939 was even more favorable, and exactly in accord with the suggestions which Marshal Pilsudski himself had made in Versailles in 1918. These, however, were torpedoed at that time by the Polish chauvinists and the French. ...back...

²⁵In actual fact, the talk between Ribbentrop and Henderson did not take place until four hours later, but this does not change the fact that the British Government already had the proposals by Thursday morning. And as though that had not been enough, Herr Theo Kordt, the ambassadorial aide, felt obliged to take it along to one of his secret consultations with Vansittart on Thursday evening (August 31). So there was plenty of time indeed to urge Poland to agree to negotiations on the basis of these proposals. — The German government was able to decode the telegram in which Poland, as early as Thursday at noon, ordered her Ambassador not to become involved in any discussions, and also not to accept any suggestions or proposals. ...back...



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10. The ace up England's sleeve — Hitler's miscalculation

But to return to Hitler!

On August 22, 1939 the Head of State had gathered his Generals around him in Berchtesgaden and explained that he was now firmly decided to settle the question of the Corridor one way or another, even in the face of the British promise of assistance to Poland. He set out in detail that it was no longer reconcilable with Germany's honour and her future, for Poland and the Western powers to refuse the generous offers he had made towards an amicable settlement of the Corridor Question.

1. He believed that Germany was strong enough to overcome Poland, and even to hold her own in a battle against the Western powers;

2. he was convinced that in light of Germany's strength the Western powers would not dare to wage war, but would only threaten, as heretofore;

3. he pointed out the advantage to be gained from the imminent conclusion of the German-Russian Agreement.

It must be clear to any reasonable person that Hitler had carefully weighed the pros and cons and, most of all, had precisely assessed the balance of power before coming to this weighty decision. What was the reason for his grave mistake with respect to the intervention of the Western powers, and thus in regard to the outcome of the war itself?

1. He had overlooked the greatest army at the enemy's service — namely, the eager and obliging conspirators, Britain's friends, Hitler's foes. Britain awaited the promised coup, and lifted nary a finger for Poland.

2. His greatest "reinforcements", which he had known how to apply successfully in the diplomatic power struggle up until then,

no longer existed, without his knowing it. — This was the exaggerated arms potential, feigned by means of clever propaganda, whose true nature the "German friends" had promptly divulged to the British and which they therefore no longer needed to fear.

No sensible German can doubt that Britain would not have dared go to war if she had not been sure of the assistance of such very powerful allies in her greatest enemy's inner sanctum, as it were. Had this situation been otherwise, the German-Polish conflict would have been settled as Hitler wished, without a war, and there would no longer have been any questions remaining unresolved for Germany. Greater Germany would have been unassailable, and even Bolshevism would have had to curb its expansionist activities, or engage in a war that would have been hopeless from the start.

The assistance granted the enemy by the traitors was the only reason why Hitler lost the race for power in Europe. The following shows the immense importance that Britain attached to the knowledge of the existence of a plot against Hitler, and the related plans for a coup. In 1939 the British government had "tried" for months to work out a treaty of mutual assistance with Russia. The British House of Commons was very upset that negotiations dragged on for so long without yielding any results, and attempted repeatedly to urge haste and to find out what was going on. The British Government only ever replied evasively. The Russians as well lost patience with the sluggish negotiations, so that on June 29, in a lengthy article, the Russian politician Shdanov expressed his correct conclusion, namely that the British were not really serious at all. The article concluded: "All this indicates that the British and French do not want a treaty with the USSR that would be based on the principles of equality and reciprocity — even if they do solemnly vow day in, day out that they too are for 'equality'; rather, what they want is a treaty in which the USSR has the role of a slave who must bear the entire burden of obligation on his shoulders. But no nation with any self-respect would be party to such a treaty, else it would be a toy in the hands of those who prefer to let others pull their chestnuts out of the fire for them. The USSR, whose power, might and worth are known the world over, can thus not possibly participate in such a treaty."

Hitler and his Foreign Minister, v. Ribbentrop, are criticized most scathingly because, as the speech to the Generals on August 22, 1939 clearly shows, they did not expect Britain's intervention — in other words, because they had completely misjudged the world political situation. Well, reality is in fact quite different. As early as January 2, 1938, Herr v. Ribbentrop had reported to Hitler from London: "If England and her allies are stronger than Germany and her friends, then in my opinion she will definitely strike sooner or later."



Ribbentrop

If, on the other hand, Germany can manage to shape her policy vis-à-vis her allies in such a way that a German power configuration is stronger than or perhaps equal to the British, it might be possible that Britain would prefer a peaceful settlement.... Regardless of any tactics or diplomatic interludes which might be attempted with us, each and every day in the future that is not guided first and foremost by a view of England as our most dangerous opponent would be a gain for our enemies. I have striven for friendship with Britain for years now, and nothing would make me happier than to see it come about. When I requested the Führer to send me to London I was doubtful whether it might work, but in light of Edward VIII, a last attempt seemed warranted. Today I no longer believe in the possibility of conciliation. Britain does not want a powerful Germany that would represent a constant threat to the British island. Britain will fight for her hegemonic position!"

I leave it up to the reader to decide whether even Bismarck could have appraised the situation more accurately than von Ribbentrop had at a time when he was not even yet Foreign Minister and could not know all that would happen by August 22, 1939 to aggravate matters. And still, the truth could not save his life.

In their August 22 assessment of the European power configuration, Hitler and his Foreign Minister had appraised everything correctly — except that they failed to take into account England's new ally, because he was cloaked by the mantle of treason.



Lloyd George

That they had judged the situation correctly, and indeed were justified in believing that Britain would not intervene, is shown by the actions of one of Britain's foremost politicians, namely Lloyd George, who is known to have predicted that the next world war would break out over the matter of the Corridor. He had said to his daughter: "Yes, Heil Hitler, and I say it too, for he is truly a great man." It is easy to see why he was no longer made privy to domestic British secrets. As early as May 19, 1939 he said in the House of Commons: "Without Russia, our guarantees to Poland, Rumania and Greece are meaningless."

In late September, when Poland had been beaten, he went to see

the politician Robert Boothby (England's current representative in Strassbourg), who had "never before seen him so agitated and worried," and said with a deep sigh: "I wish I knew how things really stood. But I'm not told." The day before, he had said to a larger gathering: "We ought never to have given Poland a guarantee without Russia. But since we did, we should have made sure of Russia immediately afterwards, regardless of the cost to us... in this case we should not have declared war." Full of fear for Britain's fate, he even suggested negotiations with Hitler: "But under certain circumstances it would be wise to initiate negotiations, not only for political but also for strategic reasons, if only to gain time."

The fact that he then consoled his conversation partner with the reference that in the end the Treaty of Amiens (1802) had not prevented Napoleon's fall is graphic proof that — an Englishman through and through — he concerned himself only with the interests of his own country, in this case the time to be gained, and was perfectly devoid of any moral scruples whatsoever, true to the well-known British maxim of "right or wrong, my country!" Our foreign affairs politicians of the Opposition, who act against the interest of their Fatherland while claiming to do what they do for the sake of world peace and humanity, would profit from this British example.

So Hitler was quite right when he assumed on August 22 that Britain would not intervene, especially since voices had been raised even in England, declaring that if negotiations failed the Government would have to step down. This is also the reason why Hitler waited for reports of the dissolution of the British and French Cabinets the day after he concluded his treaty with Russia. But he waited in vain, for the British government lost none of its external composure. On August 25, 1939, despite the loss of Russian support, it nevertheless coolly concluded its Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Poland²⁶ and declared war on Germany.

Russian assistance would have been too costly for them at that point; the help provided by the German "friends" was cheaper. As early as June, the brothers Kordt had told Mr. Vansittart in London that Hitler was planning to conclude a treaty with Stalin, and had stated that he would not let matters turn to war with Poland if the British were to conclude their treaty with the Russians first.

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Notes

²⁶The British were not deterred from entering into this Mutual Assistance Pact even by the fact that they were very annoyed with the Polish, who had seized the Olsa region when Czechoslovakia broke up and, in the course of the Anglo-Russian negotiations, had denied the British the right of free passage for the Russians. Further, their noisy chauvinism had interfered with the British political game to a considerable degree. ...back...



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11. The importance of the Resistance from the English perspective

Being a "thorough" German, I will list some further evidence which shows that the British attached the utmost value to the activities of the Resistance Movement:

1. The London quarterly *Contacts* wrote:

"The existence of a German conspiracy was well known in London at the time of the declaration of war; and it must have played a considerable role in the British Government's deliberations at that time."

2. Churchill wrote:

"Jan Colvin, the son of the well-known leader-writer of the *News Chronicle* — stationed in Berlin — got deeply involved in German politics and established top-secret relations with some Generals but also with some independent and capable Germans of character. Several times I was visited by high-ranking people from Germany who poured out their anguished hearts to me.... Any and all facts that I learned from any source... I would report to the Government from time to time."

3. Oswald Pirow, the former South African Minister of Defence, had come to England shortly before the outbreak of war, with the intention of working together with Chamberlain and Hitler, with whom he was closely acquainted, in order to bring about an Anglo-German settlement. In England, however, he encountered various groups who considered 'Munich' to be a British defeat, and who were opposed to any agreement. He wrote the following about his experiences in his search for the reasons for this negative attitude:

"Whereas my task with respect to Berlin took on a more definite form in this way, I made use of my spare time to get clear in my own mind about the obstacles that stood in the way of an Anglo-German agreement.

"I have already mentioned the Jews in this context.

"Their closest confederate was Winston Churchill, who still lived in

the atmosphere of the First World War and who obviously hoped that his anti-German attitude would help him to rise up the political ladder again. On the occasion of an earlier visit to London I had discussed the European situation with him. He was on such poor terms with Chamberlain that this time I avoided any meeting with him.

"Major Attlee, the leader of the working classes, must be mentioned in third place. He and his party were very close to Communism and were judiciously brought into play by instruments of Jewish propaganda wherever these saw fit.

"The fourth group that opposed an Anglo-German agreement was of a more serious nature than the aforementioned politicians. It consisted of the national chauvinists of all parties and classes who regarded the events of Munich as the greatest humiliation for Britain since the Dutch had sailed their warships up the River Thames. A great percentage of these people were in the army and in the Foreign Office.

"I established contact with these people, and got to hear things which I regarded at the time as the pipe-dreams of those who told them to me. I was informed, for example, that if war broke out between Germany and Britain there would be a domestic German revolt against Hitler. Leading politicians and even high-ranking military men would participate in this. When I smiled at these prognostications they assured me that these people had already established contact with London! I, who believed I knew something of German honor and the soldier's oath of allegiance, refused to place any stock in these claims. Today, however, it seems to me that these Englishmen were right in their accounts of German treason even before the outbreak of war!"

"So these were the factors that fought against Chamberlain's politics of peace: the boundlessly embittered propaganda of world Jewry, Churchill's political egotism and that of a handful of his followers who at that time hardly included anyone outside his own family circle, the semi-Communist machinations of the Labor Party, and the chauvinists' war-mongering, encouraged as it was by German *traitors*. In November 1938, when I negotiated with Chamberlain, this peculiar coalition had not yet managed to shake his political position, as it was to do later...."

4. In his book *Before the Catastrophe*, the French Secretary of State **Bonnet** wrote:

"Admittedly, many bits of information from abroad could lead us to believe that our opponent was already in very bad shape. I received such news directly or through our ambassadors.

"Aside from the well-known tales of German workers on strike and soldiers refusing military service, we were approached time and again with hopes for an imminent assassination, which was already planned and was to bring National-Socialism to its knees. As in 1938, in the last week prior to the war we were deluged with reports of this. One might summarize it thus: 'Hold out, the German Generals will overthrow Hitler! Halder has already handed in his resignation.' On August 31, our Deuxième-Bureau summarized the news that had just arrived as follows: 'Hitler has

had a nervous breakdown in Berchtesgaden, and Dr. Bunck was called from Munich to his bedside. Hitler has recovered, but the physician remains at his service. The German General Staff hopes to avail itself of Hitler's nervous condition to carry out a military coup...' In the meantime, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939. So nothing stood in the way of the 'military coup' of which we had been so kindly apprised. This rumor continued to be circulated in the first days of the war. On September 5, for example, I was visited by one of my old colleagues from the Council of State who, with my agreement, had for the past three months been setting up a semi-official news service focusing on Hitler's Germany. He told me: 'We are aware that a plot is being hatched against Hitler. He and his régime will be overthrown within a month.' He had gathered this from a German politician who had lived abroad for years as refugee so as to escape the National-Socialists, and who appeared to be a reliable source."

5. How great a role the plans for the coup also played in the Polish decision-making process is shown by the following excerpt from the book by the Swede **Birger Dahlerus**, *Der letzte Versuch*:

Dahlerus and the British Ambassadorial Secretary Forbes had gone to see the Polish Ambassador Lipski in order to submit the German proposals to him. "On our way back, Forbes told me something that alarmed me: while I had been dictating to the secretary, Lipski had informed Forbes that he had no need whatsoever to take any interest in memos or offers from the German side. After spending five-and-a-half years in Germany as Ambassador he was thoroughly familiar with the situation there, and was in close touch with Göring and others from the leading circles; he declared that he was convinced that in the case of a war, unrest would break out in that country and the Polish troops would be able to march successfully on Berlin."

That the conspirators were clear on these consequences of their connections with abroad is shown by various sources, especially by the book *Germany's Underground* by the American A. W. Dulles. He writes that Halder believed that internal unrest would all but invite an attack from outside. Men such as Beck, Halder, Canaris, Weizsäcker, Kordt etc. must have been perfectly clear on the consequences of their actions. One cannot excuse them on the grounds of credulity and the noble intent of Krimhilde who believed she could protect her Siegfried by betraying his one vulnerable spot to Hagen.

But these gentlemen were the same ones who continued their subversive activities of 1938 day by day right until July 20, 1944, until their ambitious hatred seemed gratified by the attempted murder of Hitler — true to Talleyrand's observation that crime is one of the tools of choice of the politically brain-dead.

And now I come to the conclusion that, in retrospect, July 20, 1944 has at least the one redeeming feature of having shown the German people which clique it was that is to blame for Germany no longer being what she was on September 1, 1939, namely the great and powerful Fatherland of all Germans and sole protector of the Western world. It is one of the ironies of world history that the powerful victorious nations now court the military contribution of a pathetic remnant of this once great Germany.

Of the clever and noble gentlemen responsible for this development, those who are still alive today acknowledge in dumbfounded amazement that, as the well-known poet laureate of

the Resistance, Ernst Wiechert, put it: "We who considered ourselves the 'better Germans' desired nothing more dearly than the final demise of tyranny, we even prayed for the Allies' victory while their bombs leveled our cities, because we hoped that it would be the last war and that the Democratic Idea of a just and lasting peace would triumph."



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12. The assassination attempt of July 20, 1944: a shot in their own — and in Germany's foot

Even though just before his death the Red General Kurt Hammerstein had "passionately implored" Herrn von Hassel: "Just don't bungle it, like Kapp did! Tell Herrn Goerdeler!", the actual attempt of July 20, 1944 was so pathetically organized that one can only shake one's head in amazement.

Just imagine: Germany is engaged in a war against opponents with several times as many soldiers, and some lunatics come along and say: "We'll blow the Head of State away, order some divisions to march to Berlin, and then everything will be okay. We don't need to worry about what will happen if the Head of State *isn't* dead and the divisions *don't* march, since he's simply *got* to be dead, because that's the way we want it."

But since he wasn't dead, they at least "lied him dead" for a couple of hours, once again ignoring the simple facts, in this case that it would not take long for this lie to be uncovered as such. And this was the clique that wanted to replace an Adolf Hitler who, to use their own words, was a genius "at least in his diabolical cleverness"! The fact that he made the wrong decisions on September 1, 1939 and the day before Dunkirk was not due to political myopia, but rather to the insurmountable compulsion of crystal-clear far-sightedness arising from the essence of the German nature; in the absence of sufficient democratic freedoms I cannot go into detail at this point, but time will prove my assertion to be correct. I will quote two statements of the conspirators themselves as evidence for the amateurish organization of the putsch:

In his remarks on July 20, 1944, **Emil Henk** writes: "The plot hinged on a most decisive prerequisite: Hitler's death. It failed to consider adequately that the assassination attempt might fail. It ought to have had precisely choreographed plans for a revolt even

in the event that Hitler lived.

"It considered only the assassination. It considered military actions after Hitler's death, but it did not take into account the civil war it could not help but unleash if the despot was only badly injured. The fateful day ought to have been approached with both alternatives open: assassination or civil war. The decision was simple: only civil war could save Germany, and then if need be.

"In other words: the putsch was based on an exclusively military foundation. The mass uprising that was to follow the military action never happened. The torch that was to call the political elite to battle, to a general strike, to armed force — that torch failed to ignite.

"One thing is clear: revolutions are initiated by elites. Regardless, which. Their task is to bring about the initial situation that will change everything, and to guide the advance of the masses towards the successful coup.

"Neither had been sufficiently prepared for, and the decisive mental clarity indispensable for both was also lacking. And something else was lacking: tactical ability. The officers did not dare to bring about the civil war. It was almost pure chance that Stauffenberg could even risk the assassination attempt. It took awesome courage and utter cold-bloodedness. But everything hinged on one man! If he failed, a coup of utmost significance to the course of world history also failed. What a historical paradox!"

H. B. Gisevius put it more succinctly: "The morning after July 20 — was the beginning of the tragedy of July 20. For it is not the abortive assassination, not the failed coup that can be considered as tragic; there was too much incompetence, too much carelessness, too much indecision, too much unquestioning faith in blind obedience at work, to dignify this failure as a tragedy. Nothing was taken to its conclusion that day. Everything went only half-way. These officers see it all coming — the military defeat, even their own catastrophe, everything. They realize that things cannot go on like 'this'. After much hesitation they finally decide to act. They make the attempt. But then some of them don't go the distance, and others take a breather right in the final stretch. Still others turn back from the very edge of the diving board, and the rest proceed to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that to attempt the dive would have been foolhardy anyhow."

Henry Bernhard, Stresemann's Secretary, an uninvolved but sympathetic expert, in *Finis Germaniae*: "It is certain that the entire operation of July 20, 1944 was begun with downright unique awkwardness. And if it is true that almost two whole years lie between the plan's inception and its execution, then that only shows all the more the lack of maturity and circumspection.... The many conversations which I have had with friends, acquaintances and journalists... confirm the impression that at least some of these men were political dilettantes, and of the type that is anything but born or suited to the role of 'conspirator'."

As for the moral aspect, I shall quote an unknown source: "It already began when Stauffenberg was the only one of all the conspirators to be willing to carry out the actual assassination.

One must consider first of all that, to the conspirators' minds, the fate of a nation of 80 million souls depended on this assassination. Now consider that thousands of German soldiers, fully aware of their danger, nevertheless did not hesitate to risk their lives as fighter divers to sink an enemy ship, as single combatants to take out a tank, or as fighter pilots to eliminate a strategically significant target, and that millions gave their lives on all battle fronts in the defense of a house, a trench, a battery position, etc. Then contrast this with the spirit of these collaborators of July 20, whose alleged stake was the fate of a nation; and for this grand goal, only one — Stauffenberg — was willing to attempt the assassination."

A friend of Colonel Stauffenberg's who was gravely injured in the attempt wrote: "Stauffenberg had often reported to Hitler privately. Why did he not take one of those occasions to simply shoot him down, why did he plant a bomb instead, then leave, and blow me and his other unsuspecting friends sky-high right along with Hitler?"

The devastating effects of the conspirators' activities on the military situation itself — effects which are so hotly disputed — are a story all to themselves. Historiography has yet to reveal its findings in this respect, but one may already safely say that, aside from the enemy's numerical supremacy and the National-Socialist leadership's own mistakes — which, however, occurred not so much in military as in economic and other respects — the conspirators' treasonous activities had a decisive part in Germany's defeat; in particular:

1. For years the conspirators had devoted a major part of their activities to preparations for the putsch; and not only their own activities — they also brought many officers and soldiers into play, partly with and partly without their knowledge. They obtained unwarranted leave and had themselves certified ill or unfit for active service. They presented false reports, and withheld real ones in order to mislead their leadership. The American **Dulles**, who was thoroughly acquainted with the activities of the conspirators, commented: "But certain persons holding key positions in the upper echelons of defence deliberately falsified secret documents in order to mislead Hitler, and nipped some of his most important plans in the bud."

2. By influencing the mood prevailing among very large portions of the population, they devitalized the readiness for actions of many soldiers, of workers in arms production, and especially of the civilian population. J. Eckert declared: "We will never know the vast number of greater or lesser acts of sabotage performed in factories, workshops, traffic and transit services, military installations etc. by German opponents of Nazism and the war. We will never know for sure what other major or minor subversions were effected even by military officers in order to bring the war to an end. We may assume that our military opponents of those days know more about this than we ourselves do."

3. That the successful invasion was of decisive significance to Germany's defeat is well known. The British military historian **Liddell Hart**: "Three days later, on July 20, the attempt



Blumentritt

was made to kill Hitler in his headquarters in East Prussia. The bomb planted by the conspirators missed its main target. But it had terrible repercussions for the battle in the West at its most critical stage." As witness for this, Liddell Hart quotes General Blumentritt, Chief of General Staff of Field Marshal von Kluge, Commander-in-Chief in the West: "All this had a very bad effect on the hopes we still cherished of preventing the Allied break-through. In those critical days Kluge only paid incomplete attention to the events at the Front, for at the same time he was casting worried backward glances over his shoulder at Hitler's headquarters.... He was not the only General who was in such a state of anxiety due to the plot to assassinate Hitler. All the higher command was pervaded and paralysed with fear for the weeks and months to follow. The influence of July 20 on the Generals is a topic that could fill an entire volume in and of itself." The man who said this was one of the conspirators!

In his book *Invasion 44*, General **Speidel**, Chief of General Staff of Army Group B (Rommel), describes the concerns of the military leaders prior to the invasion: "...In a country seat in Mareil-Marly near St. Germain, on May 15, 1944, following initial discussion of the Chief of General Staff of Army Group B, detailed talks were held in the presence of both Chiefs of General Staff between Rommel and Stülpnagel about the measures necessary to end the war in the west. Following an overview of the political and military events, and in favor of the overthrow of the National-Socialist régime, the theoretical and practical preparations were set out in detail. Both military commanders also repeatedly urged their political and military concerns on the Commander-in-Chief West, von Rundstedt, who was not indisposed to listen. In May, the General Quartermaster of the Army, Artillery General Eduard Wagner [one of those responsible for the lack of winter equipment and outfitting at the Eastern Front in 1941-42], came to the Army Group's command post in order to co-ordinate the necessary measures in the West with the preparations of the Army Supreme Command. He informed Rommel of the active forces of Resistance in the Army Supreme Command, of the timetable-like preparations for a revolt, and (for the first time) of the earlier assassination attempts against Hitler. The Field Marshal opposed the plans for an assassination, for the reason that he did not want to see Hitler made a martyr....

"Further, discussions focused on the possibilities of negotiations with the Western Allies: via the Vatican, via the British Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare, and via Swiss connections. The opponents had already been cautiously approached via Rome, Madrid and Lisbon, but this had not yielded any results as yet....

"In the second round of talks, connections were strengthened

between the camps of the Resistance, and a line of communications to Rommel's command post was established, which stood the test and remained undiscovered....



Finckh

"On the orders of the General Quartermaster, Artillery General Wagner, the new General Quartermaster in the West, General Staff Colonel Finckh, reported to the Army Group's command post and described the preparations for the elimination of Hitler and the planned coup to save the nation. He reported on the failure of earlier assassination attempts and on the preparations for a new attempt to be carried out in Berchtesgaden. Rommel again expressed his view that for the reasons given previously he considered Hitler's physical elimination by means of an assassination to be inexpedient, and advocated his arrest and sentencing by a German court instead. He commissioned Colonel Finckh to work with the General Quartermaster in preparing the necessary initial co-ordination of all steps taken at Headquarters and in Germany, and to report to him as soon as possible. In his opinion, this crucial matter was being considered in far too many different places at once....

"...In these portentous evening hours the battle fronts at Caen and St. Lo were in a crisis of defence. The Commander-in-Chief and Chief telephoned, requested reserves and demanded details of the events at Hitler's headquarters and in Berlin, which they had heard about on the radio. The Army Group's Chief of General Staff was the one to answer this question, and to singlehandedly make the decision necessary for maintaining the battle front!

"...For political reasons as well, the Field Marshal deemed it advisable to have reliable tank units on hand for any situation that might potentially arise."

According to his book *Germany's Underground*, Dulles was able, on the basis of information given him by the plotters, to radio to Washington as early as April 1944 that German Generals in command at the Western Front were prepared to cease resistance and even to facilitate the landing of Allied troops. Preparations were even under way, he said, to receive Allied paratroops at key locations in Germany. In early May 1944 he received a plan which Gisevius had brought from Berlin, according to which the Generals were willing to clear the way for American and British troops.

In this same respect, the periodical *Nation Europa* reported: "500,000 soldiers were at Rommel's disposal for defence purposes. At the same time, however, the Commander-in-Chief of the Reserves held back 600,000 men fit for active service in the barracks at home, so as to ensure the success of the coup.

"In the battle at the central Russian front the troops had no armor-piercing weapons to use in defense against advancing Soviet tanks. The saboteurs had diverted the whole of such

armor-piercing weapons to — Greece, where there were partisans, but no tanks!

"At the start of the invasion, despite the urgent red alert and a strict ban on leave, the Commander-in-Chief in charge was not present at the battle front, where the force of his personality might have turned the tide of fate, but rather in Herrlingen near Ulm."

4. The psychological effects of the assassination attempt were downright devastating. For one, it showed the people of the enemy nations, who had no knowledge of the plans for a coup, a very significant weak point on their enemy's part. This could not but have strengthened the confidence of these people while weakening our own, especially since those were the very weeks when the Eastern front was experiencing a major crisis. I will discuss this in the context of the activities of Major General v. Tresckow.

5. The pro-Soviet espionage organization **Rote Kapelle** was made up in the main by Communist foes of Hitler's, but their members still numbered among the 'heroes of the Resistance'²⁷ until it had become fashionable to fight against the former ally, Russia. The *Rote Kapelle* betrayed to the Soviets:

- The strength of the German air force at the beginning of the German-Russian war;
- The monthly production rate of the German aircraft industry;
- Statistical data on the fuel situation in Germany;
- Preparations for the attack on the Maikop oil fields;
- The spatial concentration of chemical weapons in Germany;
- The transfer of German paratroops from Crete to the East;
- Production delays in locomotive construction and the manufacture of special valves;
- The monthly airplane construction rate in Charleroi;
- The location of the ship repair bays in Amsterdam;
- The arms production in Amsterdam and Rotterdam;
- Troop movements along the Belgian and French coasts;
- The iron and steel production in Belgium;
- The plans of an aircraft factory along the Dresden-Berlin route;
- The development of the German rifle grenade;
- The stationing of the German navy;
- Statistical tables on monthly arms production;
- Bomb damage and losses in the East.

And finally, a clever radio broadcast was used to betray to the Americans that Germany had cracked the Cairo Code. The consequences of this were a crucial disadvantage to Rommel's front in Africa.

6. For the sake of completeness I will also mention the treasonous activities of the master spy **Dr. Richard Sorge** in Japan.



Ott

First and foremost he was a dedicated Communist working in the service of the Soviet Union, but as it has turned out, his activities were made much easier for him by the friendship and incredible thoughtlessness of **Ambassador Ott** in Tokyo. Now if one considers that Ott used to be Schleicher's right-hand man, this may explain a great deal. In its issue of June 13, 1951 the German news magazine *Der Spiegel* wrote the following about Sorge:

"If Stalin does not retrospectively award him the most precious medal he has to give, then he is truly a skinflint, for: when the German armies advanced in western Russia, and when major Russian units were wiped out, the matter of Siberian reinforcements became vital. But the Red Army could not dare expose its Siberian flank as long as the Japanese were poised to strike. Sorge was able to assure them that the Japanese would not attack. Thus, the Siberian troops could be safely withdrawn to the West, and arrived in time to successfully defend Moscow.



Sorge

After the battles of encirclement at Minsk and Orel the Russians were extremely worried that the Japanese might annul the non-aggression pact they had only just entered into, and strike at the Siberian flank of the hard-pressed Red Army. In August 1941 Sorge reported that the Japanese fleet had enough oil to last them two years, but the armies had only enough to last them for six months. Among the countless political, economic and military details that Sorge passed on to Russian Counter-Intelligence there was also the report of May 20, 1941 which divulged that between 170 and 190 divisions stood at the ready to attack Moscow in a major offensive thrust on June 20."



v. Tresckow

7. Major General H. v. Tresckow was one of the leading figures in the conspiracy against Hitler. He was the Chief of General Staff to Army Group Central. At first he tried to win not only all the officers around him but also especially the various Commanders-in-Chief of the Army Group as participants in the conspiracy. Several times he attempted to lure Hitler to the group's headquarters for discussions. When he had succeeded in this, he gave an unsuspecting escort of Hitler's a parcel to take along, which contained a high-explosive bomb that was supposed to detonate on the airplane. The plane, however, arrived safely at headquarters, as the bomb failed to go off. Several other attempts also followed.

v. Tresckow feigned utter exhaustion to gain several months' leave in Berlin, during which time he availed himself of his sister's apartment to draw up the complete set of fake plans for an alleged 'Valkyrie' manoeuvre intended to camouflage the coup of July 20. It is said that he shot himself on July 21, 1944, but this claim is open to question.

In his book *Chief of Intelligence*, the Englishman Jan Colvin reports that important details of the plans for 'Operation Sea Lion' (the landing in England) were betrayed to Churchill right off the drawing board. He gives us to understand that Canaris might be the culprit in this case. Since v. Tresckow had very close relations with Canaris and Oster and was employed in a key position of the special staff for the development of these plans, one can assume that he was involved in this betrayal.

Malte Plettenberg, the author of the very objective but nevertheless deeply impressive book *Guderian: Hintergründe des deutschen Schicksals 1918 bis 1945*, writes: "Historical research must as yet deal in greater detail with the reasons for the collapse of Army Group Central, whose Chief of Staff, Tresckow, was the heart and soul of the military conspiracy. The degree of this catastrophe is far greater than the tragedy of Stalingrad: the troops of an entire Army Group and the supplies for two Army Groups simply disappeared. It will not be possible to compensate for this loss."

On June 22, 1944, the battle front still extended from Rogatschew via Orscha to Witebsk and was already in East Prussia on July 3. No wonder that Hitler exclaimed, "How is it possible to lose a front such as that! This entire development is a mystery to me."

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Notes

²⁷The women of the *Rote Kapelle* who participated in these treasonous activities were even commended in the July 20, 1952 special edition of the government publication *Das Parlament*.

WORM IN THE APPLE

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Worm in the Apple — part 13: The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany; Friedrich Lenz.

Worm in the Apple

German Traitors and Other Influences

That Pushed the World Into War:

**The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf
Hitler's Germany**

Friedrich Lenz

13. The morale of the people and the soldiers

What conclusions must we draw from these facts? Can these men, who presumed to intervene so thoughtlessly in the battle for Germany's fate, expect to be judged the way they and their descendants would like? No — not even if one were to concede that they only wanted the best. Would it perhaps be excused if a layman were to try to defuse a bomb that had landed in the heart of the city, instead of calling in the experts? The fact that they did not shy back from the consequences of their actions, but rather continued to make plans for Hitler's assassination despite great difficulties and many failed attempts — this fact alone already proves the mind-boggling profundity of their hatred that stifled all common sense and any pangs of conscience and prompted them to invent the most extravagant excuses to endow their actions with an ethical motive.

The majority of these people simply did not have their mental and emotional center of gravity in Germany. The American author Dulles, exceedingly well informed about the German Resistance Movement, also points this out in his book *Germany's Underground*: "It is interesting to note that the leading parts in this conspiracy were played by people who had familial or cultural ties to the Anglo-Saxon world."



Bonhoeffer

For others it was their relationship with the international Church

that prompted them to put the interests of the Fatherland second. In 1941, pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer (who was later executed) said at a secret Church conference in Geneva: "I pray for my country's defeat. Only through defeat can we atone for the dreadful crimes we have committed against Europe and the world."

But I would ask the conspirators and advocates of July 20: who will atone for the war, for the destruction wrought by the bombings, for the expulsion of the Germans from their ancestral German homelands in Eastern Europe, who will atone for the million-fold atrocities of the Bolsheviks, for the surrender of Eastern Europe to the Bolsheviks, for the economic suffering and the corruption in West Germany, for the way in which Germany was torn apart, and for the threat posed to all of western Europe as well as America by Bolshevism? And who will have to give their lives to vanquish this syndrome of European woes which, while it persists, will render peace in Europe impossible? What have the conspirators of July 20 who are still living, and the descendants of those executed, done to combat these crimes, and what do they continue to do about them? Nothing! Instead, they wage a never-ending war against the truth and most of all against the real Germany which they would like to suppress with pseudo-democratic means. They justify the breach of their oath with the ridiculous claim that Adolf Hitler had broken *his* oath to the nation. Aside from the fact that "an oath takes only one, namely that person who swears it freely, and freely in the face of God, yet stands staunchly by that which he swore," it is quite incomprehensible to me in which way Adolf Hitler might have broken his oath. Those who allege this breach have not a single proof for their claim; all they have is their accusation, couched in generalities. And in any case, the conspirators had already broken their oath at a time when Adolf Hitler could not even have done those actions yet which they falsely term 'breach of *his* oath'.

Another reason that is given to justify the assassination attempt is the alleged hopelessness of the military situation (1944). Aside from the fact that this excuse was seized on belatedly — because after all it has been clearly established that the conspiracy had already been ongoing since 1933 — the rebels were not in any position to assess the real chances of the war effort, since they did not have the perspective of the leadership, much less an understanding of their intentions. The conspirators' claim that they were under an obligation to rid the German people of a dictator is even more ludicrous. Even as late as 1944, by far the majority of the people did not regard Adolf Hitler as a man whose leadership they felt oppressed by and whom they wanted to be freed of.

At this point I will quote an important passage from a book which assesses this problem with perfect clarity:²⁸

"July 20 showed that the idea of high treason had neither its roots nor even support in the broad masses of the people and the millions of the army. What we discovered with alarm was the fact that there had been a faction — standard to almost any political movement — devoid of any constructive political force, yet in a social stratum where nobody would have suspected or even deemed it possible. We were particularly glad that the putsch had

failed because, had it succeeded, then within 24 hours it would invariably have plunged us into a most bloody civil war, both at the battle front and at home, and thus driven us to immediate collapse. There can be no question that in spite of all their heavy cares and sorrows, the masses of the laborers and the soldiers would have regarded a putsch government of such a nature with embittered desperation and would have refused to obey its injunctions, because they would have viewed the coup as fatal treason against their own hopes — treason motivated solely by status-based prejudices and interests. What cheated the rebels of even the smallest shred of public sympathy was the unmistakable personal agenda of the participants, which was not to stake their lives in the interests of their country and for the sake of their self-proclaimed foremost necessity, but rather to survive for the sake of ambition and the power they craved.

“As it turned out later, the rebels had detained considerable troops at their home stations for their own purposes, thus depriving the battle front of badly needed reserves at the most critical times. The extent of these misappropriations of manpower was not known for individual cases. It seems to have been great enough on the whole, though, considering that Himmler was able to patch the holes in the Eastern front with these reserves. In any case, this gave rise to the suspicion that the insurgents had been more than passively interested in the military break-down of the Eastern front as a prerequisite to the collapse of the régime, and had intentionally magnified the disasters arising from this strategic misdirection, rather than minimizing them. Hence we had reason to also hold them directly responsible, to a degree, for the fateful course of events at the front. This course of events had threatened the success of our overall conception and jeopardized the gain in time that we needed so badly. The miscarriage of the putsch gave us a last chance to perhaps bring this danger under control after all.

“It was by no means the case that the Gestapo itself had been the backbone of domestic stability. In light of the situation as it really was, this perception was the illusion of those few who really stood in serious opposition. Both the people and the armed forces fought as grimly and staunchly as they did because they were informed by the realization that what was at stake in this war was literally the ultimate issues of national as well as personal existence and freedom. Especially in the East, there was as good as no desertion from the main front. In the armaments effort at home as well, there was next to no ‘blue-collar’ sabotage. And all this despite the fact that Communism had been strong in Germany in the none-too-distant past! These people were under fire for the sake of their own interests as never before, and needed no prodding to devote all their moral energies to saving themselves. Neither the Gestapo nor troop discipline would have retained any significance, or warded off the immense pressure, had the moral situation been different.

“That it was the way it was, was due primarily to the war aims that the Allies had proclaimed and which had been expressed unmistakably in the Morgenthau Plan. To the majority of the people this declaration seemed so incomprehensibly absurd that it was hardly to be believed, especially since it originated in the Western world whom nobody would even have thought capable of such monstrosity. Goebbels had his work cut out for him when he tried to convince the public of the credibility of this plan. The Germans considered it an attempt to panic them. This conflict

between disbelief and anger was the atmosphere in which their moral resolution grew into a desperate and embittered intransigence. If the rebels had succeeded in their putsch, they would nevertheless have run aground on this mental state brought about in the German masses by Allied policies.

“When Hitler declared time and again that the only choice was between victory and annihilation, then in light of the identical options offered repeatedly by the Allies, the German people had no alternative but to choose the battle for the ultimate extreme.

“As army officers — and that included practically the intelligent majority of an entire generation — we had good grounds for the belief that the morale of the soldiers would ensure that the war would be won, if only they could be supplied with the requisite material assistance in the form of arms technology. We had witnessed first-hand the unparalleled mettle of the working man who did not shy back from even the greatest sacrifices in order to enable this assistance. We had witnessed how the miners of the Aachen coal fields still went down into the pits even right in the immediate battle area, and dug the coal out literally from under the battlefield — these extraordinary deeds took place on a level far beyond the Gestapo’s authority. We had witnessed how the miners of the Ruhr region had halted a corrupt unit’s flight from France with nothing more than clubs, and routed the marauders back to the battle front. We witnessed how they mistook the remnants of the crushed division ‘Hitlerjugend’ — that division that had held its ground so tenaciously at Avranches — for marauders as well, when these units returned for reinforcements. They had cornered them, and had already begun to vent their disgust at their supposed desertion. In Silesia we witnessed how our arms workers continued without respite to work on the completion of our ‘Tiger’ tanks even within firing range of Soviet artillery and infantry and did not give up their place even when we had to withdraw from our position. They remained, because of course we would return and bail them out. We knew all that. We knew that we could all rely on each other, if only the secret plans of our leadership were realized. That was the goal.”

The same source, on the topic of possibilities destroyed by July 20:

“...The conversation also turned to the issue of whether a settlement with the Western powers would not have been possible at some earlier date. The man in question from the innermost circle said — and stressed that this was Goebbels’ opinion as well — that the disastrous events of July 20 had deprived Hitler and any possible legal successor government of just that option.

“The fact that July 20 happened in the first place could not but have strengthened enemy speculations about internal German weakness, and thus also the enemy’s resolve to widen, by means of extreme military pressure, the rift that had become apparent in the armor of German war leadership. On the other hand, the German government could not afterwards have expected the people to accept a solution which it had already had to brand as treason in the interests of the German position that had been so severely compromised by the attempted putsch. Until July 20, Hitler had left such a possibility wide open in internal discussions with Himmler or Goebbels, but afterwards he categorically rejected it and declared that the only course of action now left open was to hold our own until the new weapons were ready or until the enemy coalition collapsed, and hence to win or be crushed.

"Since this man enjoyed Himmler's particular trust in political matters, he was no doubt reporting a more confidential and privy view of the state of affairs — one based on individual experiences.

"Besides, he said, there was an obstacle to such a settlement for the Western Allies as well, namely the very real need to act with absolute consideration for the Soviets. It was our misfortune, he said, that we had had to ally ourselves with the Japanese. On the one hand, this circumstance had rendered a potential, one-sided conciliation with the Western powers an impossibility for Hitler, because he would have had to desert our Japanese allies in the process, which he would never have been willing to do. On the other hand, the Soviets would doubtless have replied to a one-sided settlement between the Western powers and Germany by supporting Japan against Great Britain and the United States, so that the Western powers would probably have had to pay for a settlement on the European front with defeat in the Far East. Therefore, the key to our success could only be to keep up the fight until, at least through decisive new weapons, we might force one or another of our opponents to end the war against us, or until we could obtain respect for our national and territorial being through political methods based on the ever-increasing duality of the Allies. This last and final possibility was to be served by the continuation of the war from the so-called Alpine and North Sea strongholds and finally from the Norwegian stronghold as well. More than forty divisions fit for battle were still stationed there; we had not been able to lead them back in time to deploy them in the decisive battle against the Soviets. Bases for operations with the new submarines, airplanes and rocket weapons were located there, as were bases for the completion of the most important weapon, about which we only knew that it was a retaliatory weapon with undreamt-of range and was to be armed with a brand-new, devastating explosive..

"This final politically operative idea of Hitler's and Goebbels' last deliberations was based on the clash, inevitable as it was on principle, between the Capitalist West and the Bolshevik Eastern power, or at least on the collapse of their coalition of that time and on our further abilities of negotiation with the Japanese. It was of decisive importance then that German sovereignty would still be championed somewhere, and would gain a hearing.

"Meanwhile, the world has come to be quite clear on the question of to what extent the German secret weapons were actualities of consequence.... The technological niveau of these innovations in those days prior to the atomic bomb is of crucial importance to the assessment of the hopes and expectations we still cherished at that time. Churchill and Eisenhower later confirmed the very real significance they had to the opinion of the Western powers and their leadership as well."

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Notes

²⁸In the original edition of this booklet, *Der ekle Wurm der deutschen Zwietracht*, the source of this quotation was withheld - probably with the intent of protecting the author - and replaced with the note: "Information regarding the author and title of this publication are available on request from the author."

Unfortunately, since Friedrich Lenz can no longer be contacted, we have not been able to obtain this information for publication here. [Scriptorium] ...back...



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German Traitors and Other Influences That Pushed the World Into War:

The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany

WORM IN THE APPLE

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German Traitors and Other Influences

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14. Views on the assassination attempt and the would-be assassins

In light of the briefly popular tendency to defend the assassination attempt, albeit on the whole in very general and vague terms, the following will quote the assessments of responsible and competent individuals.

1. In the monthly periodical *Nation Europa*, issue I/9, Admiral Hermann **Boehm**, war-time Commander-in-Chief in Norway, wrote about the deed of July 20:

"Incidentally, I condemn the act of July 20 because, objectively speaking, it was based on a completely incorrect assessment of the situation in terms of both foreign and domestic policy.



Churchill

a) In terms of foreign policy, no different attitude on the part of the victorious powers could have been expected even if the assassination had been successful. As early as November 1939, Churchill said in a radio address to the British people: 'This war is a British war and its goal is the destruction of Germany.' (Source: Sven Hedin, *America in the War of the Continents*.) Note: not 'the destruction of National-Socialism', but 'the destruction of Germany'! A single unbroken chain of the wish for destruction

leads from there to Potsdam via Casablanca, Yalta and the Morgenthau Plan. Just read Churchill's account, in his memoirs, of his discussion with Stalin (August 1942) about the deliberate bombing of the German civilian population; just read Churchill's cynical speeches about the intended forcible expulsion of millions of Germans from their ancestral homes! If Hitler had died in 1944, his death would have changed nothing in the designs of the victors, in their manner of warfare, or in our national fate.

b) In terms of domestic policy, the plotters of July 20 had come to completely false conclusions regarding the mentality of the German people at that time, especially that of the young front-line soldiers. Even if the attempt on Hitler's life had succeeded, it would have been inevitable that on top of all its other sorrows the German nation would also have been plunged into a bloody civil war. It is claimed today that a collapse in 1944 would have spared us much bloodshed and sacrifice. It strikes me as pointless to speculate on developments that can only be properly judged through observation of the actual events; but since this claim is advanced with such frequency, I would like to predict that the most likely consequence would in fact have been that the civil war, which would no doubt have broken out, would have claimed a heavy toll of life and would thus have brought about the immediate collapse of the various fronts, and hence the imprisonment and abduction of even more millions of German soldiers and civilians to the East than was the case anyhow.

"To conclude, I am of the opinion that from the point of view of possible and actual consequences for the German people, the treasonous attempt of July 20 is *not* historically justified."

2. In his book *Soldat unter Soldaten*, Dietrich **von Choltitz**, the last Commandant of Paris, writes:



v. Choltitz

"Were all the misgivings as to whether Hitler's removal could even serve to avert the misfortune of a lost war really unfounded? Did not the experiences which the men of July 20 themselves had had with the opposing nations indicate the contrary?

"Was the war against Germany really waged only against Hitler and his satellites? Were our cities laid waste solely and only in order to force Hitler to capitulate? Did the 'crusade in Europe', as Eisenhower was later to title his war memoirs in such good taste, really need to destroy so many churches and other works of art in both France and Germany, if the object was only to combat National-Socialism?"

3. Otto Meißner in his book *Staatssekretär unter Ebert — Hindenburg — Hitler*:

“The question of whether a successful outcome of the assassination attempt and the forcible removal of Hitler would have brought about a favorable turn in Germany’s fate and would have spared our people some of the misery and sacrifice they still had to endure after July 1944, cannot be answered in the affirmative. The Party and its subdivisions were still strong at that time, and even had Hitler been eliminated, it would have continued under the leadership of ruthless and fanatical brutes such as Himmler, Bormann, Goebbels etc. These would have defended themselves vigorously and probably successfully against a Beck-Goerdeler government and a ‘reactionary military dictatorship’. The state apparatus — the police, propaganda and the press — were in their hands. The mood prevailing in the Wehrmacht was not uniform; most of the front-line officers, namely the young ones, regarded the attempt on Hitler’s life as high treason, a breach of the oath of allegiance and of the loyalty that one owed one’s Fatherland in war-time. The Waffen-SS, that highly trained and superbly outfitted elite troop of close to 600,000 men, would have become the heart of bitter front-line resistance against the domestic marauders. Party agitators, on the other hand, would have seized on the claim that treason was stabbing the valiant troops in the back, as a slogan with which to arouse the fanaticism of the masses. A successful assassination would have eliminated the dictator, Hitler, but not the dictatorship of National-Socialism. It might have shortened the war by a few months, but would have led to more destruction and severe losses of life through domestic conflict, and these costs would hardly have been less than those suffered even after July 1944 in the battles at the front and in the bombing attacks on German cities.

“Through the fragmentation of the German people, the overall state of the war would have continued to deteriorate; at best, the enemies would have stood at order arms until the Germans had torn themselves apart, without then easing up at all in their demands for an unconditional surrender. A successful assassination, and a revolution triggered thereby, would not have changed a thing in this demand, in which the enemies of Germany were adamant. The suggestion that a successful coup would at least have preserved Germany’s unity and a real German government will not hold water, for at that time (in the summer of 1944) the Allies had already agreed on the division of the Reich into zones to be governed autonomously by the victors.”

4. In 1943, Field Marshal von Manstein offered the following perspective (after a source by D. von Choltitz):



v. Manstein

“The superior strength of the enemy which I have had to fight for years has now increased from 1:3 to 1:20. In light of this, it is

ridiculous to think that one could simply drive to the Führer’s headquarters to kill Hitler, while just up ahead I see millions of Russians poised to invade Germany. Standing as I do at the leadership of an Army Group, I am answerable to the German people, and as Army Commander I cannot for even one minute consider forcibly effecting a change in our leadership. Besides, I am too familiar with history not to know the disastrous results a revolt at the front-lines can have. I do not have the right to unsettle my soldiers through my own disobedience. First and foremost, a front-line General must set an example for his subordinates. If there are plans for such a change — which is necessary in many respects, and which I myself would welcome — then it will have to be initiated by men at home who have the opportunity to get close to Hitler and who are much better able to understand and predict the political repercussions. I for my part must stand by my soldiers, whom I must lead and whose fate I share.”

5. General Heinz Guderian, in his memoirs:

“In terms of foreign politics, the prerequisites for a successful coup were not given. The relations of the conspirators to political authorities of the enemy nations were meager. None of the leading enemy politicians had in any way committed himself in favor of the conspirators. It is no exaggeration to say that if the attempt on Hitler’s life had succeeded, the prospects of the Reich would not have been any better than they unfortunately are today. Our enemies were interested in more than the elimination of Hitler and Nazism....



Guderian

“Of course the question is often asked, what would have happened if the coup had succeeded? No-one can say. But one thing seems certain: a very great part of the German people still believed in Adolf Hitler at that time and would have been convinced that the assassins had removed the one man who might still have been able to bring the war to a relatively innocuous end. This odium would have been attached primarily to the officer corps, the Generals and the General Staff, already during the war but afterwards as well. The people’s hatred and scorn would have turned on the soldiers, who through breach of their oath of allegiance had contributed to robbing the already beleaguered ship of state of its captain — and in the middle of a battle for life and death, no less. It is unlikely that this would have made our enemies treat us better than they did after the collapse.

“Now you will ask: so what should have happened? I can only say: there is so much talk about resistance to the Hitler régime. Which one of the writers and speakers still living today who could have gotten close to Hitler ever really offered any resistance, even once? Who dared even one single time to tell Hitler his dissentient opinion, much less to insist on this opinion face to face with the

dictator? That's what should have happened! In the months during which I witnessed numerous strategic, military, technical and political discussions with Hitler, only very few people did that, and unfortunately most of these are no longer with the living. But I cannot agree to calling those people Resistance fighters who only whispered behind the scenes that they disagreed, and who only tried to incite others. This is the parting of the ways. Anyone who disagreed with Hitler had the duty to tell him so openly whenever the opportunity presented itself. This goes first and foremost and most particularly for the time during which there would still have been a point to any dissent, namely the time before the war. If someone felt certain that Hitler's policies must lead to war and that such a war must be prevented because it would be a misfortune for our people, then that person would have *had* to find an opportunity, before the war, to tell Hitler and the German people this in no uncertain terms — if not from within Germany, then from abroad. But did those in charge at that time ever do that?"

6. But let us also hear what persons of lower rank had to say. In *Herz im Stacheldraht*, Erich **Kern**, First Lieutenant of the Waffen-SS, who participated in the war as armored infantryman and up, writes:

"They deliberated hundreds of times about how Hitler could and must be done away with. At the same time, they stood beside him at the map table many dozens of times, most of them usually had their pistols with them, and not one, not one single one of them had the courage to stand up and be Brutus.

"In the end they left it up to a one-eyed, one-armed dreamer and zealot, who had turned from a fanatical National-Socialist into a fanatical National-Bolshevist and who dreamed of a sort of national soviet republic as the only hope for Germany — they left it up to this man to plant the briefcase with the British time bomb under the desk. But when Hitler survived even that, they folded their hands in resignation and waited until death came for them....

"In the middle of war they conspired towards the establishment of a monarchy and hoped to win support for this hare-brained scheme among the Communists who, incidentally, kept at a very cautious distance. They dined with the Wittelsbachers, chatted with Princess Pilar, went to tea with crown princes, and conferred for weeks and months with Frau Riegele, Göring's sister, in hopes of using this lady's influence to persuade the Reichsmarschall to participate in a putsch. Another time they toyed with the idea of collaborating with the hated Reichsführer-SS to bring about Hitler's fall, "since he has absolute power". Yes, in endless discussions they even already drafted laws which were hidden in the library of the Prussian Minister of Finance, Dr. Popitz, they formulated guidelines for handling law and order with respect to the state of siege which decreed, *inter alia*, that 'Party functionaries must turn in their marching boots without delay', that public gatherings and demonstrations were banned, as were strikes, and that foreign workers and prisoners-of-war were to remain at their assigned jobs for the time being.

"We shook our heads in disbelief at so much naivety. What Prussian Generals and Ministers imagined revolution to be like!

"But the others — and they were by far the majority — were nothing more than co-conspirators of this desire for resistance. They signed the death sentences for treason, for cowardice in the face of the enemy, and for desertion without even so much as

batting an eyelid, and then went out for a conspiratorial cup of tea. With the Commanders' standard proudly displayed, mind you. Woe to any front-line soldier who had not saluted them respectfully enough as they passed!"

7. A lieutenant of a front-line unit wrote as follows (from the news service *Die Plattform*):

"Let's look at it objectively. Every front-line soldier knows that in a charging battalion, for example, a Company Commander who believes that a Chief Commander misdirects the battalion and therefore shoots him in the back in plain sight of the soldiers and officers of the battalion, would never save the day in this way. Either he would immediately be shot in turn, or a bloody battle would break out between the followers of the murderer and the others. In either case the result would be outright panic, which any enemy Commander would take advantage of so as to wipe out the battalion.

"Let us assume that the attempt of July 20 had succeeded. In every city to which the rebels had connections, arrest lists had already been drawn up. In some cases, Party men and the NSFO were already locked up, as for example in Vienna. Does anyone really believe that the Waffen-SS, for instance, would cheerfully have turned themselves in for arrest and execution? Does anyone really believe that the young officer corps, whose members came mostly from the Hitler Youth and had distinguished themselves at all the battle fronts, would have joined forces with those rebels, who without exception came from the reactionary sectors of the population?

"The first consequence of July 20 would have been a nation-wide, bloody civil war. The Red Army would have invaded no less than the Western Allies, so as to 'restore order'."

8. A mountain soldier, **private first class** from Styria:

"I don't understand what there is to discuss and argue about. On the one hand you have all those decent fellows who, while they are not politicians with heaven knows how much influence, did their duty because their people and their nation were in grave danger, regardless of the question of blame. They did their duty on the farms, in the factories, and most of all on the front lines. On the other hand you have a bunch of faithless traitors who were either criminals or at least daydreaming visionaries, and who failed in their undertaking. There is only one plain and simple decision to be made here: one sides either with the great mass of lowly, honest men who bravely did their duty, or with the handful of criminals or dreamers. There is no other decision to be made. It goes without saying that we stand by those who did their duty. Because of course that included us, as well."



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WORM IN THE APPLE

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Worm in the Apple

German Traitors and Other Influences


That Pushed the World Into War:

**The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf
Hitler's Germany**

Friedrich Lenz

15. A few words to General Halder

Since every German is probably aware of how great an importance the enemy powers must have attached to the fact that the plot against Hitler was led by persons holding such important positions of power as Beck and Halder (Chiefs of Army General Staff), Canaris (Chief of Military Intelligence), the other Generals, Herr Schacht, Herr Weizsäcker and Kordt (important functionaries with the Foreign Office), I must deal with this problem in greater detail, especially since Herr Halder



Halder

is presently trying to trivialize or to justify his participation in the attempts at a coup. In issue 1/8 of *Nation Europa*, the Englishman Mr. M. T. Pacey, who had become suspicious of this entire matter, asked Herrn Halder:

- “1. Is it true, General Halder, that in September 1938 you sent a Brigadier General by the name of H. W. Boehm-Tettelbach to London in order to persuade the British government to take military steps against Hitler's successful anti-Versailles policies?”
2. Is it true that this German General was under orders to promise an attempt on the German Head of State's life ‘on the day following the outbreak of war’?”
3. Is it true, General Halder, that you were informed in 1939 that

your offer of such an attempt would persuade the British and Polish governments to hold the more rigidly to the Treaty of Versailles in their opposition to the German demands for territorial revision (Danzig, passage through the Corridor)?

4. Is it true that in 1941, prior to the start of the German campaign against Russia, my country's government had the Vatican deliver a secret document to you, requesting reconfirmation of your promise of September 1938, ie. the assassination of Hitler?
5. Is it true that in return for Hitler's removal this nation's government promised a guarantee for the following developments which had by then already taken place on the political scene abroad: full sovereignty in the Rhineland and the Saar, rearming of Germany, full equality of rights, annexation of Austria, annexation of the Sudetenland, economic assimilation (but not a political protectorate) of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia, sovereignty for Slovakia, the return of Danzig, the return of West Prussia and the easternmost part of Pomerania (after plebiscite under international supervision!), return of the Memelland?

6. Is it true, General Halder, that you submitted this document to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, but that he rejected negotiations about the elimination of the German Head of State as constituting treason?”

On September 7, 1951, *Halder* replied (published in issue II/6 of *Nation Europa*):

“Dear Mr. M. T. Pacey!

“The publisher of the periodical *Nation Europa* has conveyed to me your inquiry which appeared under the title ‘Verhängnisvolle Versprechen?’ [‘Fateful Promises?’ -trans.]. I have the honor of answering your questions as follows:

Re. 1. It is true that Herr Hans Boehm-Tettelbach, who, incidentally, was not a Brigadier General but a retired Lieutenant Colonel and the head of an industrial enterprise in the Rhineland, traveled to London in early September 1938 on behalf of the military opposition. As regards his ‘orders’, he himself stated in the July 10, 1948 issue of the *Rheinische Post*: ‘My orders were to request key members of the British Foreign Office to ensure the British government's rigid opposition to Hitler's demands. My principals wanted nothing more than the British government's decided ‘no’ to Hitler's expansionist endeavors. These were the orders on which I went to London on September 1 or 2, 1938 — I don't remember the exact date.’

“There was no mention of ‘military steps’ to be taken by Britain. Hitler's term ‘anti-Versailles’ was never used. The efforts of the military opposition were directed at only one aim, namely the prevention of a German attack on the Czechs, which must trigger a world war. For that reason, and for that reason alone, a British stance in support of these efforts was desired. Such a stance was also requested by the military opposition after previous steps had already been taken by the diplomatic opposition and, if Raymond Lacoste's remarks in *La Libre Belgique* of June 19, 1951 are

correct, by Canaris as well.

“Re. 2. No, Herr Boehm-Tettelbach did not have any such orders, nor did he make such a promise. In this context I wish to add that the military opposition did not at that time plan to murder Hitler. Rather, the plans and preparations made by the military opposition aimed at having Hitler arrested and tried in a German court.

“Re. 3. No.

“Re. 4. — 6. This probably refers to the records of negotiations carried on by a British authority with leading individuals of the German civilian opposition, with the mediation of the Vatican. The records that were brought to my attention were an unsigned copy of the results of negotiations already concluded, of which I had had no knowledge up to that time. It was my duty to submit them to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, my immediate superior. He in turn flatly refused to concern himself with this matter which, in light of the state of war between Britain and Germany, he deemed to be outright treason.

“I am not able to give any details of that document, which was forwarded confidentially to Army Supreme Command. Herr Dr. Josef Müller, presently the Bavarian Minister of Justice, Gedeonstr. 4, Munich, who was a leading figure in the negotiations in Rome, will be able to provide such details. He will confirm that I had not the slightest part in these negotiations.”

This begs the following comments:²⁹

The term ‘military opposition’ in and of itself is a concept that makes any decent soldier’s hair stand on end when he considers the rebellion, corruption and insubordination it entails. How much worse, then, is the ‘military opposition’ of a Chief of General Staff when it means that he calls on a foreign nation to assist him against his superior, to whom he has sworn loyalty and who is the leader chosen by his own nation? At Halder’s trial at the Denazification Court, his own defense counsel correctly termed this “consummate high treason.”

For the sake of completeness I will quote Admiral Hermann Böhm’s thoughts on this attempted coup, as published in issue II/4 of *Nation Europa*:

“If men of high rank were convinced of Hitler’s harmfulness as early as autumn 1938, and if an especially prominent one among them had already raised his hand to strike Hitler down, only to draw back on learning of the Munich Agreement and then to remain at his post under the dictator’s rule for four more years of both peace and war, as other conspirators did as well, then such a course of action is quite incomprehensible....

“But if the issue is historical guilt, then a study that lays claim to historical significance must also consider whether the step of secretly urging Britain to resistance against Hitler in autumn 1938 did not perhaps contribute substantially to inducing Britain to declare war on Germany one year later, since it knew how great a rift destabilized the foundation of the German armed forces. The reference to the British guarantee to Poland will not hold water, since on September 17, 1939 Russia also entered the war that resulted in the partition of Poland — without a British declaration of war.”

But since, of course, Hitler’s only purpose in building up the German armed forces was to invade peaceful nations, he was a criminal, or, to use the term coined by a present-day court, the

leader of a “state based on injustice”, towards which it was impossible to act in a treasonous way; in other words, towards which such actions were permissible and even a duty. — That is what you mean to say, isn’t it, Herr Halder?! Just a minute! We haven’t come quite that far yet. Let’s stay with the military aspect a little longer. I might remind you of what our superiors once said to us soldiers when we had dared to come to conclusions of our own — which, presumably, might also be one of the prerequisites for military opposition: “Leave thinking up to the horses, they have bigger heads than you do.” Being merely a former private first class, I cannot do this, but I can remind you of what Hindenburg once said to Herr von Hammerstein when the latter advanced his plans for a coup against Hitler’s Reich Chancellery: “You’d better worry instead about making sure that next year’s maneuvers work better; that’s your job.” Under the rules of Prussian-German army tradition, tried and proven for several centuries, this was his right, and after Hitler had become Supreme Commander he doubtless had the same right as well.

He made use of this right when he said to your predecessor: “The Wehrmacht is a political tool. I will assign the army its task when the time has come to do so. The army has the duty to carry out its task, not to debate whether the task was correctly stated or not.”

This was too much for Herr Beck to take from a “Bohemian private” and hence, to quote Beck’s biographer, “the soldier deliberately intervened in a field outside his own authority: the foreign affairs of the Reich! In Prussian-German tradition such intervention seemed inadmissible. Moltke and Schlieffen, even when their views differed from those of the statesman in charge, strictly refrained from stating their opinion unasked, much less presumed to influence the course of foreign affairs.”

With respect to Hitler, of course, such intervention was permissible, since first of all he did not have the slightest understanding of politics and, secondly, had nothing better in mind than to attack other nations and to foolishly involve his own in a war. This process already began in the occupation of the Rhineland where, according to some ‘historian’ or other, Hitler allegedly already said that now he had no more territorial claims to make in Europe. Then came the ‘unprovoked’ attack on Austria, against which Herr Beck believed he was obliged to write no end of warning memos. He must have looked pretty stupid when he learned in the afternoon of March 10 that the planned war would really begin in two days’ time, and without his contribution! He just simply had rotten luck, for Hitler had not ordered any strategic plans from the Chief of General Staff for this “war of flowers”. He *had*, however, ordered strategic plans from the General Staff for eventualities, since after all it is the case not only in Germany but in the entire rest of the peaceful world that General Staffs do not pass the time up until the outbreak of the defensive wars they find thrust upon them with playing bridge or with other innocent pursuits. But since that bellicose Hitler — in my opinion also for reasons of having these gentlemen do something to earn their pay, and to keep in practice — had ordered strategic plans to be worked out, including one for the Czech region, he no doubt intended to engage in another war, which in turn had to be prevented, this time with your help, Herr Halder, and that of the British. That was Coup Number One. But this war once again turned out to be a “war of flowers” and netted the Reich the Sudetenland, won on the ‘battlefield’ of Munich. — Herr Beck himself had to admit in his memo of May 28, 1938: “It is

true that Czechoslovakia, the way in which the Dictate of Versailles had forcibly set it up, is a thing not to be borne by Germany, and a way — war, if necessary — must be found to eliminate it as a danger area for Germany; only, if armed conflict were to be the way, the results must be worth it,” and you, Herr Halder, saw yourself compelled to admit in the course of your interrogation at Nuremberg that Hitler had told you that he would get Czechoslovakia without any war (and did, after all, really get it, despite all memos and the attempted coup); yet the traitorous rebels nevertheless persisted in betraying your Head of State’s new plans to London and begged there for unwavering opposition — alternately painting the picture blacker than black when it suited them to do so until it might have frightened the British out of their wits, and alternately downplaying the German strength as though it would be child’s play to intervene.

But these important strategic messages were not enough — oh no, something had to be promised to the enemy as well, and this something was no less than the elimination of the German Head of State.

However, what you meant by ‘elimination’ then and what you claim today to have meant by it are two very different things, aren’t they? According to the literature on this subject, you proposed the creation of “conditions where the oath of loyalty would not apply.” A train wreck resulting in the Führer’s death — that was what you would have liked best. “Then there will be no more Hitler,” the British government was informed. But all of this is not really important, since even the *intent* to “eliminate” suffices for what I am trying to prove here.

The motives for your actions, just as for those of all your co-conspirators, were of course strictly of a pure and deeply religious kind, of the nature of a Christian sense of responsibility, and rooted exclusively in your love for your Fatherland. So in other words... what Herr Gisevius wrote about his first visit to you, in 1938, is not true? He wrote: “Suddenly this rather restrained man grew animated, not so much in terms of gestures as in verbal malice. Suddenly he was rancor in person. I have heard... many hard and angry words about our Führer in these past years; and I would not claim to have been innocent of any unpleasantness myself. But never before or since have I seen as much pent-up hatred and heard as much declamation on the subject as I was witness to in those few hours... According to him, this ‘madman’, this ‘criminal’, had deliberately set his course on war, probably out of some ‘sexually pathological tendency’ that made him want to see blood. ‘Blood-guzzler’ — that word was applied to Hitler that summer of 1938.”

Or is it not true what a well-known English politician recounts, namely that you were pursuing your own personal interests and had sold your soul to the devil? Is it true that you “were embarrassed, ashamed of the plot in front of the American officer who interrogated you, because your involvement had cast a shadow over your soul as an officer”?

Come now, you mustn’t be so modest; for a shadow always passes away again, but in your case things are a little different, after all. Maybe you will realize that if I show you the attitude and bearing of three other ‘conspirators’:



Fromm

On July 20, the plotters tried to persuade General **Fromm**, Commander of the Reserves — in whom they imagined to have found a sympathizer — to participate in the coup. They told him that, unbeknownst to him, the fake “Valkyrie” orders which were to have effected the practical implementation of the coup had been endorsed with his forged signature and passed on. Since he had learned in the meantime that Hitler had survived, he pronounced the traitors in his presence to be under arrest. These, however, turned the tables on him and, after a brief scuffle, locked him up in his room, to release him later in the army quarters. A guard battalion freed him that evening. He then had General Olbricht, Count von Stauffenberg and other participating officers court-martialed and shot. Even so, the People’s Court sentenced him to death for cowardice, and he was executed. He died with the cry of “Heil Hitler!” on his lips.



v. Kluge

For years, the conspirators had pressed General **von Kluge**, Commander-in-Chief in the West, to join the plot. While he was an accessory in the sense that he knew of the plans against Hitler, he rejected the conspirators’ suggestion that his army should capitulate. Due to differences in strategic matters, he was relieved of duty on August 18, 1944 by Field Marshal Model, and ordered to report to the Führer’s headquarters. He took poison after writing Hitler a letter concluding with the following words:

“There must be a way to prevent the Reich from falling victim to Bolshevism. The attitude embraced by a number of officers who were taken prisoner in the East has remained a mystery to me. My Führer, I have always admired your greatness and bearing in this titanic struggle, as well as your iron will to ensure the survival of both yourself and National-Socialism. Should fate prove stronger than your will and genius, then such is Providence, and history will bear witness to it. Act now with that greatness that is needed to put an end to a struggle which henceforward will be hopeless. In the conviction that I have done my duty to the end, I shall conclude, my Führer, to whom I was inwardly much closer than you may have guessed.

Heil Hitler, my Führer!
von Kluge, General”



Rommel

General **Rommel**, Commander-in-Chief of the invasion front, was introduced to the plans of the Resistance rather late, by Karl Strölin, the former Mayor of Stuttgart. While knowing of the plans for an assassination, he did not approve. On June 17, 1944 in France, in a discussion of the military situation, he described to Hitler the poor prospects along the invasion front and the other theaters of war. Hitler dismissed his interference, and referred to the intended introduction of new weapons. Since the discussions did not achieve anything and the military situation at the invasion front did not improve, Rommel sent another situation report to Hitler on July 15, requesting him to draw the appropriate conclusions (he had deleted the word “political”), and was resolved to take up an active part in the conspiracy if his report were to be rejected again. On July 12, Rommel had been severely injured in his car by enemy fire. Hitler learned of this fact after July 20. And as much as some people refuse to understand, he chose the only solution that, though hard, was the sole correct one from the point of view of absolute state authority. Rommel, a soldier through and through, understood this and acted accordingly. He neither resisted (as it would have been thoroughly possible for him to do), nor did he prefer the option of a People’s Court trial.³⁰ Hans Hagen says it much better in issue I/4 of *Nation Europa*:

“It is humanly understandable that Rommel and his family and closest colleagues sympathize warmly with Hitler’s enemies. But are they doing justice to Rommel’s rank? Are they able to see into the soul of a soldier as great as he? The Commander took the poison that Hitler had no choice but to send him when he recognized him to be an accessory to the conspiracy and the attempted assassination. What statesman would have let an attempt on his life go unexpiated, what Commander can let a plot, carried on in the moment of greatest danger to his people, in the face of danger of fatal defeat, go unatoned-for?

“The figure of the Field Marshal rises in untainted grandeur out of the post-catastrophic clash of opinion over these events. At the tragic moment of Hitler’s and Rommel’s separation, it is the silent gesture with which Rommel accepts the poison that is most overwhelming. At that moment he joined the great humble ones of fate. He rises to the heights of a Socrates who, like he, took the cup of poison and, like he, scorned the advice to flee for his life. The higher level of obedience elevates Rommel beyond the conflicts of the parties, their struggles for justice and injustice as it may still apply to lower ranks and as the trend of the day may wish to portray it with randomly cast lights and shadows. We forget our quarrels of the moment in our awe of the tragic, timeless and eternal fulfilment of fate.”

Now *those* were men, Herr Halder!

Notes

²⁹In his answer to points 4–6, Herr Halder makes things rather too

easy for himself. The fact of the matter was rather that the civilian opposition had gone to great trouble to obtain “Document X”, that is, the British declaration, because the military opposition was far too distrustful of the British attitude towards a coup; in other words, the civilian opposition requested such a document outright. That it was given was due to the fact that in the meantime the situation had become catastrophic for England, and proportionately favorable for Germany. That Herr Halder passed the document on to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, ie. his superior, was due less to his sense of duty than to the fact that the military opposition had long attempted to win Herr v. Brauchitsch over to the ranks of the conspirators. Both of them, however, violated the loyalty and integrity of service that was required of them, by not turning the document in where it really belonged. ...back...

³⁰Aside from its other shortcomings, the American movie about Rommel which is currently playing in theaters in Germany contains so many historical untruths that it is more than deplorable that this movie is being shown in Germany to delude the people, and is even being lauded as a document of truth etc. by business-minded movie people. This, and especially the fact that we are utterly helpless against it — due less to the bearing of other nations than to our own officials and authorities — shows how low we have sunk and how dishonorable we have become. ...back...



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16. The role of Admiral Canaris

I must now consider a member of the conspiracy who also presumed to carry on 'German politics' on his own initiative, namely Admiral Canaris, the Chief of Intelligence, in other words of that organization whose purpose was first and foremost to gather news throughout the world which would be of military and political significance for the German government. Anyone can understand the importance of this task. Since Canaris was peace-loving and Hitler a war-monger, he worked against him. His biographer Abshagen expresses it thus: "That Canaris took the opportunities, such as when reporting to Hitler or to Keitel, to influence the supreme leadership in a manner that seemed to him to be sensible and morally irreproachable, by giving particular emphasis to certain news which supported his own views and deliberately skipping over others which would tend to encourage Hitler's — that is an entirely different matter."



Canaris

I will confine myself to the brief discussion of four especially important instances:

The Norwegian Campaign

Herr Canaris opposed it because he considered failure inevitable. Even though the German government as well as he were aware of what had even been officially admitted by the English side, namely that Britain had begun to prepare for an invasion of Norway even before Hitler, he nevertheless tried to foil Hitler's plans. According to his biographer Abshagen, his rationale was: "In any case, we

(Intelligence) must do everything in our power to reinforce the effect that the British demonstrations which may be expected will have on Hitler.



Oster

We must submit as many alarming reports as possible about British counter-measures. — And indeed, in the days to follow all news that could be interpreted in this sense were phrased most urgently and directed to the special staff for the Norwegian Campaign."

That Germany's operation succeeded despite his predictions, despite the false news he directed at the planning staff, and despite the fact that his right-hand man, Oster, had even betrayed the German plans to the Norwegians, is a point in Hitler's favor and against Canaris.

The Attitude of Spain

There is no question that Spain intended to join Germany in order to gain possession of Gibraltar. I hardly need to explain the advantages that would have accrued to Germany from control over the Mediterranean.

Herr Canaris thwarted this in early September 1940 by having Dr. Josef Müller, a member of Intelligence, tell the Spanish Foreign Minister Serrano Suner, who had visited Berlin only shortly before:

"The Admiral begs you to tell the Caudillo to keep Spain out of the war at all costs. It may seem to you that our position is the stronger now — in fact it is desperate [and this was after the victory over France! —author] and we have little hope of winning this war. The Caudillo may be sure that Hitler will not invade Spain."

While Franco had written Hitler a confirmatory letter as late as September 22, 1940, he was cold and unapproachable at the conference in Hendaye four weeks later — because he was in possession of information whose source was Canaris.

The Russian Campaign

There are reasons to believe that as early as summer 1940 Canaris deliberately passed false news to Hitler about Russian preparations for an attack in order to cause him to worry about a Russian offensive, thus preventing the march through Spain and the subsequent attack on Gibraltar, which was planned for early January 1941. More research is needed to clear up this matter, but

it would not surprise me to learn that Hitler's growing concerns over a Russian offensive were due largely to these reports.

The Italian Front

When Mussolini was overthrown, Badoglio assured Germany that Italy would continue to fight at Germany's side under the new régime. Since Hitler did not believe this, and found his disbelief reinforced by reports from various sides, he prepared to forestall Italy's breaking-away through military measures. Canaris now began a major campaign to delude Hitler. He had himself sent to Italy "to investigate this matter" and learned from his friend General Amé, Chief of the Italian Secret Service, that Italy was indeed engaged in negotiations for an armistice with the Allies but feared reprisals on Germany's part. He, Canaris, was to prevent such retaliation. Canaris did so by following up on this private conversation with an official conference in the presence of personnel from both sides, to ask Amé the questions Hitler had charged him with. Amé responded by denying Italy's intentions to break with Germany and by giving a "declaration of loyalty" to the Axis Powers. This vulgar farce was taken down and the minutes presented to Hitler, who then reluctantly decided to dispense with preparations for counter-measures.



Liddell Hart

To quote the British military writer *Liddell Hart*: "On January 12 the Allies launched an attack in the Casino sector, and on the 18th it escalated into a full-scale offensive over Garigliano. The Army Commander feared that there might be a break-through into the Liri Valley, and requested the loan of two reserve divisions, commenting that he would only need them for a few days. General Kesselring hesitate to comply with this request. But just at that moment he was visited by Admiral Canaris, the Chief of German Intelligence, who replied to his questions by assuring him that 'there were not the slightest indications of a new landing, and traffic in the port of Naples was absolutely normal.' So Kesselring, however reluctantly, agreed to hand over his reserves... with the result that the British and American forces met with no resistance when they landed at Anzio, and not even when they advanced inland and set up a cover for their bridgehead...."

In conclusion, a character sketch by his biographer: "...he greeted the news of Heydrich's death in May 1942 with a sigh of relief, although at Heydrich's funeral he deemed it politic to tell Heydrich's colleagues, in muffled tones as though choked by tears, that he had admired and respected Heydrich as a great man and that his death had robbed him of a true friend.... When he saw Hitler in his headquarters 'Wolfsschanze', his companion said: 'At this distance it would be a shot through the shoulder to the heart.' Canaris promptly replied: 'So do it!'.... But he also did not object to preparations taken within the ranks of Intelligence which had to do with the planned attempt on Hitler's life. He was more or less aware of these plans but did not want to know too much."

My question to Herrn Strölin: So was Canaris a patriot or a traitor?



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17. The brothers Erich and Theodor Kordt

We must also recall two men who performed the work of most serious consequence of all the treasonous machinations: the brothers *Erich* and *Theo Kordt*, Secretary of State Weizsäcker's 'right-hand men'.



Erich Kordt

Prior to the events of Munich, the conclusion of the German-Russian Pact, and the outbreak of the war with Poland, they had taken it upon themselves to apprise Halifax and Vansittart of all those important secrets of state which they had learned through their activities in the Foreign Office and through carefully sounding out those men closest to Hitler. They proceeded in this so cleverly that one might even admire the technical side of their operations. They made old Hagen seem like a choir-boy in the way he coaxed Krimhilde into giving up her secret. The description of these actions in Erich Kordt's book *Nicht aus den Akten* would make any decent German despair at the perfidy and downright stupidity with which Germans — members of our own nation! — betrayed vital state secrets to Britain's most powerful man, a man who for three decades was known to everyone as the worst of all German-haters, the man for whom the word 'Vansittartism' was coined and who held the important position of 'advisor to HM

government'. And not only that: the Kordts also urged this man to take measures against their own Head of State, after first having slandered him most vilely. And at the same time they promised, as instructed, to arrange the overthrow of their own Head of State!



Theodor Kordt

Of their own? Well, no, since they no longer had one; after all, they had written Hitler off long before. No — it was the Head of State of the German people, that man who on August 19, 1934 had called for a referendum to approve the laws which, after the death of Reich President von Hindenburg, had elevated him on August 2, 1934 to the position of Head of State with the support of all 14 Ministers, including seven from the 'bourgeoisie'. The reason Hitler had given for this referendum is too typical of him to leave out here: "What I want is that the entrustment of the Reich Presidency to myself and hence to the office of Reich Chancellor *per se*, as decided on and implemented in constitutionally lawful manner by the Cabinet, shall have the express sanction of the German people. In the conviction that all state authority is based on the will of the people and must be confirmed by them in a free and secret election, I request that you will submit the Cabinet's Resolution to the German people, to vote on in a free referendum." 90% of all Germans eligible to vote cast their ballot in favor of the Cabinet's bill. Who dares deny that those who betrayed this Head of State also betrayed the nation led by him?

On September 5, 1938, when the first instance of treason was perpetrated, the traitors did not even have any proof that Hitler really wanted war at any price. Or do they suggest that the demand for the return of the three-and-one-half million Sudeten-Germans — a demand which was made with decisive emphasis only after so many prior, disappointing denials — was unfounded, or an attack on the freedom of the British, for whose benefit the German state secrets were betrayed? Or could the brothers Kordt perhaps name those Englishmen who betrayed Britain because Britain took her numerous colonies away from other peoples, or because Britain fought for centuries against the freedom of the Irish, or because she attacked Copenhagen in peacetime, or because she waged war on the Boers and incarcerated them in concentration camps, or because she waged the Opium War or fought against the Sepoys? They will not be able to name anyone.

But when the brothers Kordt bragged of their honorable activities in Nuremberg, Mr. Vansittart claimed: I do not know these people! What luck that Mr. Halifax was there to act as unequivocal witness; otherwise the brothers could never have rested easy

again, having been deprived of the honour of seeing their treason clearly confirmed. It is confirmed, however, and will remain as a perpetual reminder of disgrace for Germany. Nevertheless, Dr. Theo Kordt holds the position of Ambassadorial Aide in the Federal German Foreign Service — and it is *because* of this background that the Investigative Committee saw fit to re-use him. Erich Kordt's present whereabouts are unknown to me. However, I have no doubt that things are going well for him, and that he is *persona gratissima*.

Before I conclude this chapter, I just want to quote what Mr. Vansittart said to Herr Kordt on August 31, 1939:



Vansittart

“England will wage this war right to the end, and like Samson in the Bible we will tear down the pillars of the palace and bury everything beneath the rubble!”




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18. Hitler's striving for peace



Beck

The Resistance fighters and traitors who came in all shapes and flavors, from the Communists to the Junkers, did have a Führer of their own in Herrn Beck, albeit one not as modest as Hitler who liked to have Providence³¹ direct and protect him; rather, Beck's followers generally referred to their leader as "God".

Nevertheless, he was quite unable to turn the goals (much less the actions) of the various dissident groups into a uniform channel, even though — according to Dr. O.A.W. John, the President of the Office for Defence of the Constitution and, as goes without saying, another prominent one of the traitors — the Social-Democratic Party and its Herr Leuschner actually agreed to the plan of establishing a monarchy under Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia! All I can say to that is, "some Republicans you are!".



John

But the main thing was that, according to Dr. John, "all party-political conflicts were easily reconciled in light of the common foe, Hitler." At the same time, however, all of them maintained their own connections and channels to abroad.

In the absence of any 'planning', the activities of these 'civilian' conspirators consisted in the main of:

a) since 1933, inciting foreign nations against the leadership of the Reich by serving them exaggerated reports about alleged oppression and other abuses, and pointing out the dangers of National-Socialism. Those circles interested in a conflict with Germany made use of these reports in their press organs, as propaganda with which to prepare their people for conflict;

b) disseminating Hitler's alleged intentions for war abroad, namely by consistently exaggerating and magnifying the minor instances in which the person in question, being quite blind to the true context, believed to discern a desire for war.

I could easily fill an entire volume with evidence of **Hitler's honest wish for peace**, but that is not my purpose here. Still, I will not take the easy way out, like Karl Strölin in his work *Verräter oder Patrioten*, in which he tried to prove Hitler's fundamental desire for war by quoting Hermann Rauschning, that psychopath whose *Gespräche mit Hitler* one can see to be fake after only a few pages and whose historical value even renowned British historians dispute. Hence, I will not list all of Hitler's proclamations of peace, but just point out the following:

1. Ambassador **Abetz** who was very critical of Hitler, wrote in his book *Das offene Problem*:

"This was also the time of that particular one of Hitler's public speeches that first shook my distrust of him and convinced me of the sincerity of his professed love of peace. 'A medium-sized modern shell,' he set out before a large assembly, 'costs 3,500 Mark. A small single-family home for a working-class family also costs 3,500 Mark. To arm my country, I would need at least 10 million shells. These will then lie in storage in the arsenals, and no-one will thank me for them. But if I build 10 million homes for working-class families, I will have the gratitude of the greatest part of my nation. So how could I not want the others to disarm, that I may save myself arming in turn? But at the heart of a Europe armed to the teeth, Germany cannot be the only one to remain unarmed.' — I must admit that the simplicity and logic of this

argument impressed me deeply. I began to believe Hitler's claim that he desired to put all the means at his disposal at the service of the social cause, and to achieve Germany's reconstruction through works of peace."

2. From the very first day onward, Hitler had taken great pains to settle all differences with the Great Powers and especially with Germany's neighbours in a peaceful manner, but when he found that he was never met half-way he eventually resorted to those politics that were inevitable in light of the inconsistent attitude of the former enemy nations. However, he always maintained his wish to avoid a war.

In the Polish Question in particular, indisputable documents prove beyond any doubt that he proceeded so cautiously that a settlement *must* have been reached if only the other side had been willing; and indeed there were circles on the other side — I would rank the British Ambassador Henderson among these first and foremost — which desired a settlement, but were not sufficiently decisive forces in the matter. I am pointing this out on purpose because their wishes are often cited in favor of the enemy side, which can easily lead to misapprehensions. It is amazing to see with what patience Hitler took up each and every offer of mediation, right up to September 3, 1939. Since this fact is particularly annoying to those who would falsify history to Germany's detriment — and this also includes German historians — they invent the lie that at the Conference in Berchtesgaden on August 22, 1939 Hitler had allegedly expressed concern that "some son of a bitch might interfere at the last minute with an offer to mediate." Thank God there is at least one officer, General Hermann Boehm, Admiral (ret'd.), who has taken it upon himself to refute, under oath, this and other lies contained in the so-called minutes of this Conference. Did not Hitler offer peace terms to the enemy powers on October 6, 1939 after the victory over Poland, and on July 19, 1940 after the victory over France, and did he not later respond favorably to several attempts made by neutral parties to restore peace — all of which attempts were rejected out of hand by Germany's enemies?³² The spirit in which our present historians judge these efforts towards peace is shown by the fact that they are either not mentioned at all — just like all those other insignificant details — or else are downplayed with a sneer.

With respect to the speech of July 19, 1940, one of these gentlemen has actually written: "The flood of promotions and honors conferred hardly reflects the intended tenor of a peace speech."

It is all the more pleasant, therefore, to hear a Frenchman's view:

3. Jean **Montigny** in his book *La Defaite*:

"The goals for which the Allies entered the war — the rescue or recovery of Poland — can no longer be realized. At the same time, the danger to France is becoming clearer. The German divisions are rushing from Poland to France: from this point on, the German army has an indisputable advantage over France which is at least equally as great as that of May 1940. The moment has come when [Hitler] can throw his entire strength behind one single battle front; the dreaded situation whose specter the war-mongers always exploited for the sake of their own policies has now become reality...: 'We must join in the war as soon as ever a conflict in the East affords us the opportunity to do so, otherwise Hitler will one day make use of our isolation in the West in order to destroy us.' Now — late September 1939 — there is no longer an Eastern front,

and France practically stands alone. If Hitler really has the ulterior motive that the war-mongers impute to him, then he will show his true colors and attack. If on the other hand he desists and does not attack, then it is a sign that he was in fact sincere all these years when he strove for the consolidation of peace with France and Great Britain; when he declared the Franco-German border to be a permanent one after the settlement of the Saar troubles; and when he solemnly relinquished the old German claims on Alsace-Lorraine, for the sake of preserving peace in the West.

"The facts will have the final say here.

"The situation is now one where Hitler not only has not attacked, but has even declared publicly in a speech in the Reichstag (October 6, 1939) that he is willing to engage in peace talks with France.

"Another task is to clarify the goals of European foreign politics. The Reich is willing to participate in such clarification as far as her own intentions are concerned. She has no more demands save that for **colonies. The German demands in this respect are legitimate and justified.** They are not of the nature of an ultimatum.

"[Hitler] further points out that Europe will one day be faced with the necessity for arms control and co-operation between nations: 'It would be more sensible to begin working on this problem before millions of lives are lost. Those peoples and Heads of State who believe that everyone is the loser in a war should take the hand I offer them.'

"Chronologically, this speech lies between Hitler's devastating victory in Poland and his equally devastating victory in the West. Who would not be deeply affected by it today? But back then, London and Paris responded with jeers and mockery: 'Hitler is afraid, he knows his inferiority and impotence.'"

4. In closing, two quotations from letters Hitler wrote. Their contents, not being intended for the public, no doubt are the most accurate reflections of his motives:

a) September 3, 1939, to **Benito Mussolini**:

"Duce! First of all, I thank you for your last attempt at mediation. I would have been prepared to accept, albeit only on the condition that the means would have been found to give me somewhat of a guarantee respecting the successful outcome of the conference. For two days now the German troops have been advancing in Poland, at times very rapidly. It would have been impossible to let the casualties incurred in the process be devalued by more political intrigue. Nevertheless I believe that a way could have been found, had not Britain been resolved from the start to have matters come to war at all costs. I did not back off in the face of the British threat because, Duce, I no longer believe that peace could have been preserved anyhow for any longer than six months, or say one year at the most. Under these circumstances I nevertheless considered the present time more suited to resistance. At the present the superiority, in all technical respects, of the German Wehrmacht in Poland is so immense that the Polish army will collapse in a very short time. I cannot but doubt that a similar rapid success could still have been achieved one or two years hence. England and France would certainly have armed their ally sufficiently by then that the decisive superiority of the German Wehrmacht could not have been as dramatically evident."

b) October 30, 1942, to **Sven Hedin**:

"...If Poland had been willing to come to an agreement such as I offered, war would not have broken out. In such a case, however, Russia could have completed her arms program on a scale such as we can only recognize and gauge properly today. Five more years of peace, and Europe would have been simply squashed flat by the force of the Bolshevist machinery of war. It is, after all, clear that after the German-Polish dispute was settled, the Reich and especially the National-Socialist Movement would have turned its attention primarily to cultural matters and, first and foremost, to social issues. While we would not have neglected our arms status outright, it would have remained very limited, and this could not but have resulted in a helpless inferiority to this Asiatic colossus a few years later.

"Under these circumstances, the fate of Europe and hence of a culture several millennia old would probably have been sealed."

=====

Notes

³¹Incidentally, the Pope told Mussolini that he was a "man of Providence". ...back...

³²Interesting details of this may also be found in the book *England — Nürnberg — Spandau* (1952) by Ilse Hess, in which she writes about her husband who, after all, did not risk his life in his flight to England in the capacity of Reich Minister merely for the sake of a pleasant weekend excursion, but rather in order to bring about peace with Britain before the outbreak of the war against Russia. ...back...



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19. Verdicts of the victors and the German justice system

But just imagine now how our opponents must have grinned — Churchill already told us about it — when they heard the binding promises regarding Hitler's elimination! Individual parties to any war have at all times invested enormous sums in such assistance, and here it was being promised free of charge and with delivery postpaid, as it were.

Our own statesmen, on the other hand, were shocked when they learned of these things in Nuremberg — and this was by no means the last thing they learned before their deaths. Foreign Minister v. Ribbentrop, for example, said:

"It's no wonder then that Britain did not shy away from the war and the Polish Ambassador spoke of revolution and a Polish march on Berlin. These groups of conspirators thus had a decisive part in bringing about the outbreak of the war. They undermined and thwarted all of the Führer's and my own efforts at peaceful resolution in the last days of August, and were a pivotal factor in the British decision to go to war."

Now the war against Germany was no longer any risk at all. Britain only needed to declare war — and sit back and wait. That is approximately how Mr. Lindley Fraser explained the purpose of the help that had been promised Poland. That the fulfilment of the promise was delayed is a different matter; the main thing was that the promise had been made and the conclusions drawn therefrom. The plotters love to cite moral reasons for their numerous attempts on Hitler's life — without considering that other innocent people also lost their lives in the process. But once the invasion had succeeded and some individual conspirators felt that the assassination would no longer serve a purpose, the chief assassins argued that it should take place anyhow, the purpose now no longer being the practical aim but rather that of demonstrating to the world and to history that the German Resistance Movement had dared to take the decisive step. And all the while the decisive step *had* already *been* taken in 1938, without their ever having looked beyond their simple-mindedness to notice this fact!

Incidentally, when one reads through the very voluminous

literature on this subject, one cannot help but be amazed at what the traitors *did* consider. They even sought guarantees from the enemy to the effect that these latter would not intervene militarily while the Resisters were in the midst of coup activities. Later, when the war was already on, they asked for better conditions once that nasty Hitler had been removed.



Eden

But since they failed to deliver the coup by the date promised, the opponents had their own views on the matter. Chamberlain's attitude was "chilly", Roosevelt considered personal contact to be "imprudent" and in 1942 informed a liaison that his request for contact was "most embarrassing to official policy". The conspirators' most servile offers of peace — without Hitler — were acknowledged by Eden with the comment that the case was closed, and by Churchill with the declaration that the Atlantic Charter did not include the Axis Powers. And when the offers made by the plotters piled up, and took on a wording that "differed from unconditional surrender only in name", they reaped their first rewards in Casablanca in January 1943, where the Allies did indeed demand unconditional capitulation. And when the "decisive step" of attempted assassination was finally taken in 1944, the beneficiaries thereof showed their gratitude by proclaiming the Morgenthau Plan.

As for the assassination attempt itself, the August 9, 1944 edition of the *New York Times* commented that the details of the attempt were more reminiscent of "the atmosphere of the dark criminal underground" than of what "one would normally expect from the officers corps of a civilized nation." The newspaper was appalled that high-ranking officers had spent years on plans "to abduct or kill the Head of their State, the Commander-in-Chief of their army — and with a bomb, no less, that weapon typical of the criminal underworld." The same day, the *Herald Tribune* remarked in an anything but sentimental manner that the Americans on the whole had no regrets that Hitler had survived the bomb attack, so that he could now get rid of his Generals. Churchill, on the other hand, was really a bit too unappreciative — which, however, might be expected from such a historical giant — when he commented that the entire affair was merely some in-fighting among a pack of curs. Like Napoleon, he loved treason while hating traitors. Freisler, the infamous judge at the equally infamous People's Court, could not resist directing the attention of one of the conspirators to the cynical fliers in which the British gratitude to the traitors was expressed as follows: "The participants and those who had arranged the event were not worth even a plug nickel. At best it

was all done out of a perverse love for Germany.”

But we have forgotten the District Court of Braunschweig! It expressed a different view in its verdict, and concluded:

“1. The conspirators did not act in the intent to harm their people and the strength of the Reich, but strictly in the honest desire, born out of patriotism, to benefit both. The charge of treason is thus inappropriate to such men....

“2. Insofar as the Resistance fighters of July 20, 1944 had established connections abroad in order to sound out the enemy’s attitude towards the intended internal coup, they cannot morally and hence not juridically be charged with any misdemeanor....

“3. This Criminal Court is of the opinion that the National-Socialist state was not a state under the rule of law, but one under the sway of a lawless régime not serving the interests and benefit of the German people. It is beside the point here to consider the question of the constitutional legitimacy of the NS state. All that the German people have had to endure, from the burning of the Reichstag to June 30, 1934 to November 9, 1938, was a glaring injustice whose rectification was imperative.”

That was dated 1952; now where on earth have I read it before, couched in somewhat less official phrases? Right — it was in an interesting article published by Resistance fighter Hanns Erich Haack in issue 9/47 of Rudolf Pechel’s *Deutsche Rundschau*. I will quote some excerpts:

“Those men who acted out of a spirit of patriotism to establish those connections abroad by no means took these steps lightly. They did not take this measure until it had become clear that no other way was possible in light of the immeasurable extent of the impending murder, hardship and suffering. A rebellion against the tyrant is obedience to God, that is the motto that was constantly before their mind’s eye....

“Further, the claim advanced by the German opponents to the Resistance Movement, namely that co-operation with abroad must invariably yield the greatest benefits for the foreign participants, is invalid. In this respect Europe is truly indivisible, none of its nations can live in ‘splendid isolation’ any longer and all are mutually so interdependent on each other that even the need for a redefinition of the term ‘national’ is becoming more and more pressing. Anyone who acts for Europe as a whole is acting in a national spirit — and anyone who acts against Europe is committing treason in the true sense.

“Dictatorship may be defined as an unlawful infringement on a substantial portion of human rights, specifically on freedom. Thus, any act directed against a dictatorship is automatically a lawful one.”

And Herr Pechel himself, who bragged of his “burning hatred” of Hitler, concluded “...that the battle against National-Socialism was waged by an elite of the German people, as a binding obligation to God and for the greatest values and good of mankind, without the slightest motive of personal ambition or striving for personal gain.”

Thus, it is clear that the views expressed by the Court are in agreement with those of the traitors. If the verdict were to be upheld by the Appeal Court it would mean that the German people would have to accept an official opinion on historical events as legally binding, which in turn would of course be at odds with the

demands for freedom of thought and other basic rights.

Nevertheless, I believe that regardless of how the Appeal Court may decide, the final verdict in this matter will be passed by history guided by common sense.

I will summarize my opinion on the verdict quoted as follows:

Re. 1. The conspirators had already fought for years against the Führer of the Reich who, however, had come to power legally and had been favored with the confidence and trust of the overwhelming popular majority time and again in numerous referenda. They repeatedly planned attempts on his life and established contacts abroad in order to bring about foreign intervention against him and to procure help in their attempts to thwart his further plans to rectify the injustices of Versailles and to establish a Greater German Reich.

They could not have assumed that the acts committed against the Führer would affect only him and not also the people whose leadership he had. There is far too much counter-evidence in the conspirators’ literature to allow for such an assumption. The bomb that was intended for Hitler and took the lives of innocent bystanders, as was to be expected in any case, was also used in a premeditated manner.

Re. 2. For the most part, the conspirators maintained their connections to the enemy behind the back of the responsible government even after the war had broken out — and in the eyes of the law this constitutes treason no matter how one looks at it. Beyond that, their intentions were by no means merely to sound out the foreign leadership’s attitude towards their plans for a coup; rather, they repeatedly requested foreign intervention against Hitler and promised a coup involving Hitler’s arrest or murder. These connections were maintained unceasingly until the war’s end, even though the foreign leaderships confined themselves to passing on messages and to squeezing the conspirators for information, and never once made even the slightest promises regarding a more favorable peace treaty for Germany in the event of Hitler’s removal. Since these contacts also involved the giving out of information on Germany’s alleged or real military strength, this again constitutes treason beyond any shadow of doubt.

Re. 3. I might take the easy way out here and say, *de gustibus non est disputandum* — there is no accounting for taste! But it is not hard to understand that people such as these have no concept of what constitutes a state under the rule of law — people such as these, who set up or support a state which, aside from perpetrating other monstrosities against the most basic principles of morals and law, also launched the greatest Inquisition of our age, the denazification process, whose boundless stupidity and brutal arbitrariness of ‘law’ is revealed by the well-known periodical *Der Stern* under the rather harmless title “The Great Hoax”. Further, I would remind the German people and especially the gentlemen of the Braunschweig Criminal Court that the number of suicides committed since Germany’s collapse, out of fear of reprisals and due to other deplorable conditions, by far exceeds the numbers of suicides *and* so-called politically motivated murders committed under that “lawless régime”. If we consider, further, what a small percentage of accused have in fact been convicted since 1945 (in contrast to what one might expect in light of the mendacious propaganda about alleged crimes and atrocities), and we then subtract from this number those accused

who could never have been convicted if the law had been applied correctly and as intended, then the difference is mind-boggling. And if one took a closer look at the remainder, one would observe, interestingly enough, that those were for the most part cases where the acts in question were committed in the name of the National-Socialist state solely for the purpose of camouflaging personal criminal intentions.

If, on the other hand, one wanted to legally and correctly prosecute all those crimes perpetrated against the Germans and against humanity which are so graphically described in Freda Utley's book *The High Cost of Vengeance*, then the German courts alone would be booked solid and working overtime for the next twenty years.

The partiality with which the Criminal Court lays this touchy subject to Germany's charge already becomes apparent from the fact that it blames the NS State for the burning of the Reichstag, which in fact was *proven* to have been the personal and individual crime of a certain van der Lubbe.

Even if we do not as yet have a complete and historically accurate account of the Röhm putsch, the unbiased description given by Meissner, the former Secretary of State, suffices to convince any person capable of objective thought that Hitler must have had weighty political reasons for quelling a revolt detrimental to the state by taking rapid and severe measures and dispensing with time-consuming procedures towards that end, and if he also rid himself of potential opponents in the process — as he allegedly put it — then one will have to judge the matter somewhat differently when one considers that Herr Schleicher was in fact planning a military revolt in order to prevent Hitler's lawful assumption of power and had negotiated with France behind Hitler's back right until June 30, 1934 in order to ensure the recognition of the government he planned to establish together with Röhm. In any case, by taking steps against Röhm and his revolutionary hangers-on, Hitler acted as protective shield to the conservative social stratum — which never so much as thanked him for it.

I must of course refrain from an adequately detailed discussion of acts which were done in the Third Reich in the spirit of National-Socialist statecraft for the purpose of very specific higher aims and which were considered by the opponents of this approach to be 'injustices', whereas the popular majority considered them just, and I must confine myself to pointing out that considerable sectors of the population today already hold conflicting and quite vivid opinions on the various concepts of 'state under the sway of a lawless régime', 'dictatorship', 'democracy', 'freedom', 'humanity', etc. What will this spectrum of opinion be like in a few more years, after we have lived through either the Bolshevization or the 'de-Bolshevization' of Europe!

On Elba, Napoleon wrote about the Germans: ***"I never needed to sow the seeds of discord among them. I only needed to set up my nets and they ran into them of their own accord. They strangled each other, believing thus to be doing their duty. No other people on earth is dumber than they. No lie can be dreamed up that is too crude for them to believe. They always fight more bitterly against each other than against the enemy."*** This was the realization that informed not only Churchill when he set up *his* nets, but also Adolf Hitler when he tried to direct his people into a common line of approach towards the achievement of great aims. Hitler's goal was the fulfilment of a

prophetic statement by Friedrich Schiller:

Each people has its day in history!
But the day of the Germans is the harvest of all time.

At harvest time everyone must work together and take on more labor and restrictions. Hitler's attempt was gladly supported with cheerful co-operation by those who understood, and decried as compulsion and injustice by those who did not. Millions, for example, willingly complied with the ban on listening to foreign radio stations — a measure intended to minimize the effects of their propaganda lies — and they were no less healthy and happy for it than those hundreds of thousands who believed that they absolutely had to hear them. It is ridiculous for Herr Pechel to suggest that the fight against Hitler originated with an elite. No, it was a clique in the most typical sense of the word. And that is why it is paradoxical for the 'Resistance fighters' to cite in their own support that well-known passage of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*: "If the means of governmental authority serve to lead a nation to its downfall, then rebellion is not only the right, but the duty, of each and every member of such a nation. Human rights take precedence over national law."

It is interesting that Herr Strölin quotes an open letter from Hitler to Brüning from 1932 in which Hitler himself cites this view. I can only refer to what Gert P. Spindler, writing under the significant heading "Falschmünzer der Geschichte" ["Falsifier of History"; -trans.] in the May 25, 1951 issue of *Fortschritt*, says about that time and its seven million unemployed: "Do those parties from the Weimar Republic, who have since resurfaced, really perceive the sole cause of their failure up to 1933 to lie in their not having combated National-Socialism with bans and prison terms? Does the arrogance and smug self-satisfaction of these politicians of then and now really go so far that they consider their post-war resurgence to be due to true popular demand? They must be reminded that National-Socialism did not come to power through the abuse of democratic freedoms but rather through the incompetence of the Weimar government, which failed to deal appropriately with the consequences of the peace treaty of Versailles and with the economic and social problems of the time. All those constructs of rationale by means of which the leading personalities of the Weimar Republic sought to disguise their own total failure by claiming that Hitler had seized the reins of government illegally, are in fact nothing other than the exaggeration of individual facts which fail to explain the phenomenon of his rise to power. They are to be regarded as falsifications of the overall historical scene, originating with the understandable desire to divert attention away from their own inadequacies.

"The unsolved problems of pre-1933 were the fertile soil on which Hitler understood how to cultivate the support of the masses. The unreasonableness of the victors of 1918 were the drums on which he beat his tune."

So one only needs to consider the following questions:

Did Hitler lead his people to their downfall when, in
1933 Herr v. Hammerstein and his clique attempted their coup;
1934 Herr v. Schleicher and his clique did likewise;
1938 Kordt, Weizsäcker, Halder and their clique betrayed vital state secrets to the British;
1939 the same gentlemen repeated this, and smoothed the way for the enemy to decide on war against our homeland by promising

a coup;

1939-1943 Hitler was victorious in all theaters of war, while they constantly plotted attempts on his life and collaborated secretly with the enemy?

No! cannot but be the answer of the vast majority of our people, even if the 'elite' claims the opposite. After all, malcontents today might just as easily presume to stage a coup of their own.

If I am going to make any concessions, then it is this, that I do not hold it against anyone who doubted the German chances for victory after the invasion and drew their own conclusions in consequence — provided that they had loyally done their duty up until then. Unfortunately, however, I have often noticed that we had more men in uniform than soldiers. It is admittedly difficult to bring oneself to adopt the truly soldierly maxim that says, "sweet and honorable it is to die for one's country."³³ Only those who could really internalize this ideal will understand that a true German soldier could not have done otherwise than to fight for as long as he was ordered to do so, regardless of whether the situation looked rosy or bleak. Where would Old Fritz have been if his soldiers had run off whenever one of his "hopeless situations" cropped up? But anyone who made plans for a coup even *prior* to the invasion cannot claim any sympathy; and if Hanns Erich Haack then even tries to tell us that those treasonous activities were in the interests of Europe, then this is downright ridiculous and does not warrant the effort of a detailed rebuttal in light of the danger and the hopeless situation in which Europe presently finds herself. The claim that the war was lost before it even began is equally nonsensical. There can be no serious mention of a 'critical' state of affairs for us until after Stalingrad — and even then the war would not inevitably have been lost, but this is not a point of debate here.

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Notes

³³Even though this sentiment is already more than 2,000 years old, Hoffmeister, the leader of the SPD, came to the 'nobler' insight that the bottom line of a heroic death was merely a lump of mashed-up flesh wrapped in a strip of canvas. ...back...



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German Traitors and Other Influences That Pushed the
World Into War:**

The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany

WORM IN THE APPLE

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Worm in the Apple — part 20: The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany; Friedrich Lenz.

Worm in the Apple

German Traitors and Other Influences

That Pushed the World Into War:

**The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf
Hitler's Germany**

Friedrich Lenz

20. Summary and Conclusion

In conclusion, one may say: those enemies of Hitler's who did not restrict their fight against the system he represented to domestic Resistance activities such as may potentially become necessary under any form of government, but who instead, in their hatred, went so far as to call in foreign nations, acted wrongly and reprehensibly in any case, regardless whether one agrees or rejects the theory of the "lawless régime". First of all they disregarded a fundamental fact of life, namely, that every act has four kinds of consequences: immediate and delayed, good ones and bad. They believed that their messages of September 1938 and August 1939 would each promptly induce the British government to take a hard line against Hitler.

Domestically speaking, the British government profited from these messages by drawing the conclusion favorable to itself, namely that the enemy had a weak spot. Internationally speaking, and in consideration of the incomplete British arms status, it took a soft instead of the desired hard line. A year later, when the hazard of inadequate armament had been rectified on the one hand, and the government was under pressure of time due to Hitler's plans on the other, the requested hard line turned into a declaration of war. The information channeled abroad as well as the promises of a coup were allegedly intended to preserve world peace, but in fact brought about a world war.

It is interesting to note that in his work *Dolchstoß oder Legende?*, Hans-Ulrich **Rudel** comes to the same conclusion: "If we summarize what the publications of Resistance fighters themselves irrefutably show, then we find the facts of the case to be as follows:

"The practical ramifications of the conspiracy of those men speaking up today were directed not only against Hitler and National-Socialism but against the existence of the Third Reich.

Towards this end they not only employed all the means at their disposal to cause Germany to lose the war with dreadful losses in every respect; they also — and this has not been sufficiently considered to date — greatly facilitated Britain's entry into World War Two through their promise to Lord Halifax, to eliminate Hitler if war should break out. Without England, however, France would not have taken any steps of her own, and similarly the USA would not have had an excuse to get involved. In other words, without the activities of these Resistance fighters all German resources might have been available for the defeat of Bolshevism. Therefore, must they not be deemed ultimately responsible for the fact that the Second World War came about in the first place, as well as for its course of events and all its horrible consequences? Should they be given another opportunity, legally this time, to intervene in the fate of their nation?"

Up to this point there has been no mention of that term which tends to come up automatically in the context of the phenomenon of the conspiracy: that infamous term 'stab in the back'. The Resistance fighters and plotters protest against this term with a great show of outrage, and even the Federal Government not only endeavored in a special issue of the Federal publication *Das Parlament* to proclaim "the truth about July 20" and to reject the thesis of the "stab in the back" most decidedly, but even placed great emphasis on this in their charges against the SRP. This is not at all difficult to understand if one knows that not only a few Ministers and Members of Parliament but also many higher officials of the Federal Government as well as numerous politicians and officials of the provincial governments come from the ranks of the Resistance and the conspirators. H. B. Gisevius, one of the kingpins and historian of the conspiracy, kindly facilitates our understanding of the various concepts by stating with refreshing clarity: "There are still those anxious souls who do not want to admit the reality of such warnings [to the enemy] because this might give rise to another legend of a 'stab in the back'. The reply to these people must be that the comparable legend of 1918 was based on a historical lie, while the matter here is one of facts. The truth, however, cannot be suppressed permanently, and *shall not* be hushed up in this case.... Incidentally, one may be even less concerned about these warnings since they were in vain anyhow. As for a stab in the back — even if it had been directed against the German people rather than solely against those who were their downfall — matters never even got that far. And if it did, then it was Hitler who reaped its benefits to the fullest in 1940."

First, this shows once again that these gentlemen still do not seem to understand that the 'stab in the back' was done in 1938-39 in the form of betrayal of information and the promises of a coup given to the enemy powers. If the warnings issued to the enemy prior to the invasions of Holland, Belgium and Norway were in vain, then after all this was only because the opponents could not believe the Germans capable of such treason and hence disbelieved the warnings, or thought they were being lied to for Germany's benefit. But for all that, the warnings remain fact, they remain treason and thus a stab in the back — not a mere legend at all.

Another question is how one regards the claim that what was stabbed in the back was the “lawless régime”, not the German people. It is of course up to each individual German to decide which point of view to take in this regard, and whether he wants to let the courts dictate what he is to believe. It also depends on how one feels about remaining loyal to the leader one has elected oneself — whether one wants to remain loyal to him only in good times, or only when he makes no mistakes, or not at all.

If the issue in 1939 had really been world peace, then this could have been preserved and ensured in a matter of ten minutes by the following declaration given jointly by all those powers opposed to Hitler:

“Some hundred statements of leading Allied, neutral and German politicians have established that the present arrangement of ownership conditions in Danzig and the Corridor is irreconcilable with the precepts of fairness and the minority principle, therefore in the interests of preserving world peace we have asked the Polish Government to accept the German proposals of August 29, 1939, which appear to be correct and legitimate, and have further decided to arrange for a conference at which the still unsettled colonial questions shall be decided in a way that is just to all concerned. We invite Germany to this conference. At the same time, however, in the interests of world peace we ask that after the settlement of these two points of contention the German government will give its solemn promise that it will not make any further demands of other nations which would tend to compromise their sovereignty. If the German government should in future attempt this after all, in whatever way or form, the signatory nations would consider themselves obliged to initiate joint counter-measures, of a military nature if necessary.”

Hitler would have accepted this without hesitation, and world peace would have been preserved. — But was world peace really the sole issue? Well, only day-dreamers could believe that, and the majority of the conspirators belonged to that category. The real issue was something quite different! I will show what it really was, with an example that should make it clear even to the worst dim-wit: Imagine for a moment that peace had continued and the Volkswagen production plan in Fallersleben had been finished, as well as the buna rubber and hydrogenation plants that went with it. And that the Volkswagen automobile had been for sale for 1,100 RM instead of for 5,000 DM, as is the case today. How much greater would our exports have been than they are now? And what would have happened if, as was absolutely within the realm of the possible, given the German economic power that was consolidated for the first time ever — what, I say, would have happened if Hitler had multiplied this successful experiment tenfold, and had also applied it to other essential export products? The Western world had already gained a far different impression of German productivity, enterprise and inventive genius than those pathetic carpers in Germany who, like Goerdeler from the moment when he was no longer in charge of pricing policy, had nothing better to do than to predict one economic collapse after another — which, however, never came about even in the worst times of the war. Surely one can see now what was really at stake. Our opponents could only risk war after they had caught up on their arms status, had wooed and won a few more allies, and most of all had gained the certainty that, as many times before in history, the Germans were once again at the point where they would tear themselves apart out of their own internal discord, without outside help. They

knew very well that the Germans would do a thorough job of this — and they did indeed. But to make sure that we would keep in practice after our collapse, and not by some chance wake up, they put a few bugs into our heads — namely, denazification, four-way division, federalism, party conflicts, and drafts of a Constitution. Now we will be busy ‘debugging’ ourselves for at least the next fifty years. But our opponents, in their collaboration with the Bear, also picked up a few bugs of their own... and now we are supposed to help them rid themselves as well! However, I think that will be a little too much to ask for the time being.

To summarize what we have found:

1. Was the world war necessary? — There can be only one answer to that: No!

2. Could it have been prevented in August 1939 if Hitler had dispensed with a satisfactory settlement of the Corridor Question, at the expense of his own and Germany’s prestige? Yes — but only temporarily!

3. Could the war have been avoided permanently? On the one hand, no, because in light of the ever-increasing population the space allowed to Germany was too small, and because the competition posed by German export trade was too great; on the other hand, yes, if the rest of the world had only been willing to let Germany have the Corridor, an appropriate share in colonial possessions, and fair agreements regarding raw materials and markets.

4. How could the war have been avoided in any case? — If Germany’s lead in military strength had been maintained at a level great enough that no-one would have dared to attack Germany. But this entailed two prerequisites: first, that the conduct of foreign affairs rested exclusively in the hands of the Head of State and his Foreign Minister, and second, that “everyone gave his all; that there was no chink in the armor; and that domestic discord did not continue to sap the Germanic strength.”

5. Without knowledge of this “worm in the apple”, Britain would not have declared war in 1939. The various peoples would have settled even for a solution to the Corridor Question that had been forcibly initiated.

6. The whole of the European defense forces would have remained intact as protective barrier against Bolshevism. By virtue of the anti-Bolshevist tendencies vitally embodied in National-Socialism, Bolshevism would have remained restricted to its territory then extant, and would eventually have perished from this restriction since it is a system which can only survive through expansion, that is, in new pastures — of which it has been granted plenty ever since Teheran and Yalta.

7. Under Germany’s leadership Europe would have burgeoned, and could have devoted all its energies to the development of Africa, for the benefit of all its people.

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For seven years now they have been dead — Hitler, Mussolini and the Anti-Comintern Pact, the war criminals, enemies of peace, trouble-makers etc. And no power in the world was able to stop those men who shook hands in Potsdam, smiling and pleased with their achievements, from concluding peace, healing the wounds of war and building a better Europe. And nobody in Germany stood in the way of those men who, together with their hangers-on, longed

for defeat and 'liberation'; nobody stopped them from joining ranks despite all party-political conflicts, as of old, to build a better Germany. I will spare myself a discussion of all the hot air that has been spouted to the detriment of the various peoples in the past seven years at hundreds of costly conferences; suffice it to quote the realization of Mr. McCloy, who is reported to have said: if we do not manage to solve the Saar Question in the foreseeable future we all ought to have our heads examined.

Instead, we are presented with treaties whose jungle of paragraphs, sections and subsections no sane person can make sense of and which contain so many booby-traps that in light of the law of four-fold consequences of all actions (which certainly includes the ratification of treaties) neither the advocates nor the opponents of the treaties can properly assess whether they will ultimately be in our interests or not. It is beyond anyone to judge this in light of the complex world political situation and of the uncertainty of our own fate. It is only amazing to see the self-assurance with which both the advocates and the opponents claim to have a full and exact understanding of the consequences of all these treaties. I myself assess the question of whether we can already conclude such far-reaching treaties, and with whom, from a completely different perspective: from the point of view of honor; not of that exaggerated concept of honor that disregards the realities of actual fact and possibility, but from the standpoint of that modicum of honor without which successful foreign affairs are impossible and without which no nation can exist for long.³⁴ On our side of the matter there is as yet nobody at all who could conclude such treaties for us, and I might refer not only to the Social-Democrats in order to show that our present government cannot claim the support of true popular opinion: that's common knowledge. Even if an election were held tomorrow, the results would not reflect the true popular opinion, since there is no party suitable for right-wing voters; after all, these are prohibited from all practical election activities, and the people, lacking as they do sufficient objective awareness and understanding, cannot even make a proper choice, not least of all because they are so firmly in the clutches of materialism that they do not have the time it would take to get clear in their own minds about what they want. The circles from which Germany's Parliaments and governments are drawn are the same ones that **have placed the blame for the war and for war crimes on Germany** and that **have committed Germany to reparations above and beyond the normal claims of any victors**, they are the same as those who have trampled the honor of our soldiers into the dirt and totally stripped great parts of the population of their rights and precipitated them into the greatest misery.³⁵ Some of them were participants in the Resistance and the conspiracy and now expect that the people uncritically deem their laws good and just and accept their fateful treaties, regardless of whom they are to be concluded with. To forestall any doubts, I want to emphasize that I have known for thirty years that Bolshevism will one day need to be banished from the world one way or another. But the prerequisite for this is a healthy and united Europe, and this will never be for as long as Germany is not admitted as European state with equal rights, and for as long as the European peoples are not ruled by governments who first of all have the proper will and intention for this and who also are prepared to put their own interests second to Europe's great necessities. What opinion can one have of the government of France, that acts so egotistically in the Saar Question? There can be no better gauge of the right and proper time for Germany to enter into treaties with France than a fulfilment of the prerequisite

that France must return the Saar region unconditionally to Germany, because after all the international referendum of 1935 proclaimed the region to be German.

Have we ever considered who governs the peoples with whom we enter into agreements? In Britain they are still the same men who declared war on us, and in the United States the President is still that same Mr. Truman who said on June 24, 1941: "If we should see that Germany is winning this war, we must help Russia — and if Russia wins we must help Germany, so that as many of them kill each other as possible."

The election was won by that same Mr. Eisenhower who pointed to survey squares on a map and explained how places of cultural interest would be systematically bombed until the terms of surrender were accepted.


According to the report of their own War Department, the Americans supplied the Soviet Union during the war with the complete equipment for some 200 divisions, 1,500 airplanes and 400,000 trucks, which contributed decisively to the Russian victory. The Allies supplied the bomber planes with which German cities were destroyed, they worked among all nations to stir up partisan activity, the justified combat against which gave rise to so-called war crimes. They suffered a bestial Russian soldiery to descend upon the defenceless population of Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany, to pillage, rape and rob them. Through their propaganda they incited the subhuman **hordes of Czechoslovakia and Poland** against the Germans. They further left hundreds of thousands of German and European soldiers, who had fought for years against Bolshevism, at the mercy of this merciless system. Through a more than foolish settlement concluded in Potsdam, they robbed further millions beyond the Oder and Neisse Rivers of their homeland, their property, their honor. What has become of our patents and the dismantled factories, of our enormous foreign assets, of our prisoners of war and those men who are still incarcerated as "war criminals" even though they were convicted in trials that made a mockery of justice? Does anyone honestly believe that the German people could simply forget 'Nuremberg' or the way the Dönitz Government was treated? An enormous construct of mendacious propaganda has served to burden the German people with an illusory guilt that is to serve as legal title for the carrying-out of aims not at all far removed from those of the original Morgenthau Plan.

Before we can negotiate any pact of alliance, fundamental changes must come about in the attitudes held towards us by the peoples formerly at war with us, and for this it is necessary that those peoples set up governments which no longer bear feelings of hatred towards us and only deign to negotiate with us on the basis of victor vs. vanquished — governments which have realized that Germany is the heart of Europe and that Europe can only exist if this heart is restored to health with love and common sense; governments, in other words, that do not begrudge Germany what is necessary for her future, namely economic, political and military freedom. This also includes material and political assistance in the reunification of all her regions, and true equality within the framework of a Europe whose nations without exception retain their cultural and economic independence but nevertheless cooperate absolutely in the great labors which alone will preserve the Western world. Germany still has friends in the world, and once truth has penetrated the fog of propaganda she will gain

many more, especially in the former enemy nations. Once they begin to see more clearly, these people will also realize that there is a Germany different from that which has been propagandistically exhibited to the world by the gentlemen Oulman, Kempner, Habe and Auerbach, by emigrants, Resistance 'fighters' and traitors. But it will take a few more years. In particular, one cannot expect other people to go through this process any more rapidly than we ourselves do.³⁶

Even though a certain degree of impending improvement has become apparent in the last few months, this must not blind us to the fact that this improvement is only due to the ever-increasing differences between the former allies, between Bolshevism and the Western powers, and that these differences in the end work out in Germany's favor.³⁷ No example can show this more dramatically than that of Katyn. Whereas at Nuremberg the Western powers still cautioned the Russian prosecutor Rudenko not to go into the case of Katyn, they are now eagerly at work to prove through meticulous investigation by a special committee that the blame for this crime correctly rests with the Russians. No doubt Mr. Churchill already regrets that, as he admitted on the Americans' Independence Day (July 4, 1950), America and Britain were solely responsible for preventing Hitler from driving Stalin back beyond the Ural Mountains.

All we need to do is wait; time is on our side. For this reason as well, it is incomprehensible how eager Chancellor Adenauer is to enter into binding obligations regarding a German contribution to NATO military forces. If in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union it were to prove impossible to beat the Eastern giant back with the united strength of the Western powers but without West Germany's help, then it will be equally impossible *without* our at best pathetically minuscule contribution. It does not take a detailed study of the works of military authorities to realize that. Rather, I would suggest that Herr Adenauer should ponder the insight expressed on November 5, 1950 by the well-known Swedish scholar Sven Hedin:



Hedin

"Like a force of nature, the inevitable course of events will force Germany's enemies to restore Germany to her old independent status at the heart of Europe. If this is not done, Europe will perish. It is dangerous to fight the forces of nature. The present powers-that-be who do so are both blind and mad....

"If I were a German, I too would not want to be thrust into an international army under the command of foreign leaders who were my mortal enemies only a few years ago. I would first demand a decent and honorable peace treaty that granted my country full independence and equality with other great powers. I would demand, further, that the German contingents of the new European Army be placed under German command, that all

German prisoners-of-war be returned by the foreign nations still detaining them, and that all Germans incarcerated in Allied prisons be tried under German law and either punished or set free, as the case may be.

"Without Germany, Europe is lost. Restored to her former position, Germany will be Europe's salvation. It takes self-control and magnanimity on the part of the victors to realize and acknowledge these fundamental truths. Hatred, envy and propaganda have brought the world to its present state of disorder. It is necessary to combat the forces of evil and to grant equal human rights to all, even one's former enemies, so that those in whose hands the power of decision rests may save the world and lead suffering humanity to that peace we all long for."

Germany will have to be patient until these prerequisites have been met. Only when true equality, in other words Germany's full freedom, has been guaranteed, will the honor of the German nation have been restored.

It would be dishonorable to accept a merely *seeming* equality and a hypocritically *pretended* restoration of our soldiers' honor without the prior release of all political prisoners and prisoners of war, which should be no less than a matter of course; dishonorable, because the true soldier fights for the existence and honor of his nation, not for his own.

Until such time as we can again participate actively in international politics, it is of prime importance that we put our own house in order, in political, economic, social and cultural respects and most of all in respect of our national representatives.

This task will only be successful if the German people recognize the deceptions and propaganda lies for what they are, draw the correct conclusions, and express these at the next federal election.

Only a new Bundestag with a strong right-wing party, voted into power in a truly free and democratic election, can form a government that must begin to put the German house in order and to pursue a cautious and far-sighted political line — informed by the guiding principle:

***"Base and worthless is the nation
That does not gladly devote her all to her honor!"***

Notes

³⁴In this context I refer the reader to the publication *Wir Frontsoldaten zur Wiederaufrüstung* by the well-known pilot Hans-Ulrich Rudel. ...back...

³⁵In the article "Gedanken zur Kriegsschuld", issue 10/II of *Nation Europa*, Hermann Sievers expresses this political absurdity very tactfully indeed: the endeavors of our representatives in Bonn, he says, to join the choir of these accusations for calculated reasons of domestic politics and to pile all conceivable blame on Hitler and National-Socialism is not only ethically and historically wrong, but politically reprehensible as well. Neither history nor politics make any distinction between the people and their statesmen: it is always the nation that must live with any guilt imputed to their representatives. It is therefore no use at all to join in the abuse hurled by our opponents; instead, we should support to the utmost those intrepid men abroad who strive for objective clarification for the sake of historical truth or political necessity. I do not wish to disparage our attempts at reformation, but at the same time we must not endanger the souls of others by even encouraging

hypocrisy and perfidy by silence or cowardly acquiescence.

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³⁶Unfortunately the author considered the situation with a little too much optimism here. In 1952, when the original edition of this publication appeared, this view may yet have been justified, but today, almost half a century later, the Allied campaign of re-education has had greater success than Lenz probably ever dreamed. Germany still has not been given a peace treaty and is still being treated as “enemy nation” in the Charter of the United Nations, and the peoples incited to hatred against Germany are still as blinded as ever; Germany is still regarded as the global menace whom everyone loves to hate. Indeed, one cannot expect that other people should put our history into a truthful perspective any faster than we ourselves do – and how should the other people even get the idea that there might be something about the history they’re taught that is not truthful in the first place? For as long as we Germans continue to be fed both historical and present-day anti-German propaganda with our mothers’ milk and our youth consequently wave posters begging “Bomber Harris, do it again!” or go hiking with backpacks sporting the slogan “I shit on being German”, and for as long as we cheerfully soil our own nest with mendacious anti-Wehrmacht Exhibitions and commission “scholars” to perpetuate the anti-German falsehoods of the past, we are not exactly giving other people a reason to believe that we might be better than we have been portrayed to be.

What Friedrich Lenz overlooked is the agenda of those behind-the-scenes forces whose hands our traitors and even the Allies themselves played into, and which had no interest in a correction of history after the war or even today. Shortly after the war the prominent American journalist Walter Lippmann wrote: *“Only when the war propaganda of the victors has found its way into the history textbooks of the vanquished and is also accepted and believed by the next generation — only then will the re-education process have been fully successful.”*

In this statement, Walter Lippmann reinforced what a high-ranking official of the French ‘Contre-Espionnage-Bureau’, an expert in enemy atrocity propaganda, had announced to Professor Dr. Friedrich Grimm, a German legal scholar of world renown. The scene was the VIP prison ‘Hotel Bayerischer Hof’, in May of 1945. When Professor Grimm remarked that, now that the war had ended, the atrocity propaganda directed against Germany would have to stop, his conversation partner suddenly blurted:

‘No, no! It’s only going to really begin now! We will continue, year after year. We will escalate this atrocity propaganda until the very last spark of sympathy for Germany anywhere in the world has been extinguished, until the German people themselves are so muddle up that they no longer know what they’re doing!’

*We can now see the results of these many years of enemy Muzak. Germans of all ages and professions now attempt to prove guilt and criminal acts against **our** war generation alone, while celebrating as ‘liberators’ the most bestial and sadistic gangs of murderers of the enemy sides — as though all of this were perfectly natural and normal.”* (Translated from: Prof. Dr. Friedrich Grimm, *Politische Justiz: Die Krankheit unserer Zeit*, p. 148, and: Wolfgang Juchem, *Wahrheit und Recht gegen Lüge und Hetze*, Hess. Lichtenau: self-published by Aktion Freies Deutschland, 1992, p. 11.) [Scriptorium] ...back...

³⁷The following statement by the British newspaper *Economist* of April 17, 1948 speaks for itself: “If there were nothing behind the Iron Curtain, then it might be possible to let Germany rot.”

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